Pursuant to your request, there is sent you herewith a draft of a message
from you to the Emperor of Japan.
I understand that, prior to sending the message to the Emperor, you have
in mind sending a message to Chiang Kai-shek in which you would, without
quoting the text of the message to the Emperor, outline to him the
substance of the “stand-still” arrangement which you contemplate
proposing to Japan.
From point of view of ensuring the confidential nature of your message to
Chiang Kai-shek, it is suggested that you might care to call in the
Chinese Ambassador and Dr. Soong, to impress upon both of them the
urgency and secrecy of the matter, and to ask the Ambassador to
communicate to Chiang Kai-shek, by his most secret code, your
message.
[Annex]
Draft Message From President Roosevelt to the Emperor of
Japan
70
[Washington,] December 6,
1941.
I feel I should address Your Majesty because of the deep and
far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation in relations
between our two countries. Conversations have been in progress
between representatives of our two Governments for many months for
the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the
Pacific area. It has been my sincere hope that this would be
achieved and I am sure that it has equally been the sincere hope of
Your Majesty.
Developments are now occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to
deprive each of our nations and humanity of the beneficial influence
of the long and unbroken peace which has been maintained between our
two countries for almost a century. Those developments are
suggestive of tragic possibilities.
In these circumstances, where continuance of present trends imperil
the now tenuous threads which still hold our two countries in
amicable relationship, I feel that no possibility should be
overlooked which might serve to relieve the immediate situation and
thus enable our two Governments to work out in a calmer atmosphere a
more permanent solution. I am sure Your Majesty will share my
feelings in this regard.
The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which
your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by
wise decisions and enlightened acts, arrested harmful trends and
directed national policies along new and farsighted courses—thereby
bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the
peoples of other nations.
With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose now the
conclusion of a temporary arrangement which would envisage cessation
of hostilities for a period of ninety days between Japan and China
and an undertaking by each of the Governments most concerned in the
Pacific area to refrain from any movement or use of armed force
against any of the other parties during the period of the temporary
arrangement. If the Japanese Government is favorably disposed toward
conclusion of such an arrangement I would be glad promptly to
approach the other Governments concerned with a view to obtaining
their assent and commitment.
In order to give those Governments an incentive to enter into this
arrangement, I further propose that, toward relieving existing
apprehensions,
[Page 723]
Japan
reduce her armed forces in French Indochina to the number which
Japan had there on July 26, 1941, and that Japan agree not to send
new contingents of armed forces or materiel to that area during the
ninety-day period of the temporary arrangement.
If the commitments above envisaged can be obtained, I would undertake
as a further part of the general arrangement to suggest to the
Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those
Governments enter into direct negotiations looking to a peaceful
settlement of the difficulties which exist between them. Such
negotiations might take place in the Philippine Islands should the
Japanese and the Chinese Governments so desire.
In as much as the Chinese Government has been cut off from its
principal industrial areas, I believe it equitable that during the
temporary period of the proposed arrangement the United States
should continue sending material aid to China. I may add that the
amount of material which China is able under present conditions to
obtain is small in comparison with the amount of material that Japan
would save through discontinuance of operations for a period of
three months.
It is my thought that while this temporary arrangement would be in
effect our two Governments could continue their conversations
looking to a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The
kind of solution I have had and continue to have in mind is one in
which Japan, on the basis of application of the principle of
equality, would be provided through constructive and peaceful
methods opportunity for the freer access to raw materials and
markets and general exchange of goods, for the interchange of ideas,
and for the development of the talents of her people, and would thus
be enabled to achieve those national aspirations which Japan’s
leaders have often proclaimed.
In making this proposal, I express to Your Majesty the fervent hope
that our two Governments may find ways of dispelling the dark clouds
which loom over the relations between our two countries and of
restoring and maintaining the traditional condition of amity wherein
both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security
throughout the Pacific area.
