711.94/2547: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:50 p.m.]
1895. For the Secretary and Under Secretary only. You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal68 is being represented here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of “fanciful principles which ignore the realities of the situation”, and that no intimation whatever has been given out that the proposal, if implemented, would provide Japan by peaceful and orderly processes with that security—political as well as economic—which she affects to seek by exercise of force. The response of most Japanese to whom we have said the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well-balanced, constructive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating order out of the disorders of the past, has been to express strong disappointment that the private individual is not in a position to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a matter of such supreme importance, while some have said that if the American proposal is actually such as we have described it to be, an attitude of intransigence on the part of the Japanese would be viewed with regret by the masses.
It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect publication of our proposal would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the proposal, notably complete evacuation of China, would be strong and [Page 721] indeed might be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility of an agreement. However, there would seem to be even greater risks of the elimination of that possibility if the points at issue continue in Japan to be befoggged by ignorance and misrepresentation. I feel sure that you will have considered the wisdom of publishing the proposal as soon as possible after consultation with the Japanese Government but even without the latter’s assent if that should not be forthcoming, publication to be accompanied by a statement substantially along the lines of the thought expressed in paragraph 2 of my 1874, December 1, 8 p.m.
A prominent Japanese in close touch with Government circles wrote to me in handwriting yesterday inter alia:
“The situation is most deplorable. I may understand how you feel and you know how I feel. Allow me to write to you frankly what I have now in my mind. After speaking with friends and studying their frame of mind I come to conclude that they feel without having the knowledge of the true nature of your document of the 26th November as if we received an ultimatum from Washington. Under such unfortunate psychology of your people the only way left us, I think, that your government will broadmindedly take our proposal as a base of discussion for the modus vivendi with a view of arriving at final settlement on the line of your proposal. From sheer desire for happy ending I have to write you.”
I believe this letter to be a fair criterion of public opinion here.
- November 26, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 768.↩