Office of the Historian

711.94/20053/14

The Postmaster General (Walker) to the Secretary of State

[New York,] March 7, 1941.

Memorandum:

a. As proof of the authority of Mr. Wikawa has been given in an open cable sent Wednesday night26 at 8:15 P.M. from RCA Washington directly to Prince Konoye;

b. As it now appears certain that Prince Konoye, the Privy Council, the Army and Navy leaders and Baron Hiranuma have agreed with the Emperor to a conditional reversal of policy;

c. As, if this decision becomes known before any real progress has been made some of these men may be assassinated as “traitors” and their contemplated agreement with the United States nullified;

d. As the principal Japanese authorities have confidence in President Roosevelt and in Mr. Hull personally but have no confidence in their own foreign office, the foreign minister of which they plan to displace if agreement with the United States is reached;

e. As the Inner Cabinet group with the Army and Navy leaders decided last Sunday night on a formula for relinquishing active participation in the Axis alliance;

f. As neither this central fact nor any other major items of policy have been communicated to Admiral Nomura or his Minister,27

g. As the Japanese Embassy (but not the Army) is totally unaware of the agenda agreed to in our memorandum;

h. As Admiral Nomura is also unaware that the Japanese intention “to shake hands with the United States” has been within the last few clays communicated to Hitler—

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It would be imperilling, as well as useless, to project, at this time, progressive diplomatic conversations with members of the Japanese Embassy.

It would be more in accord with Mr. Hull’s desire to prevent any effort toward a peace offensive and it would expedite substantial action within ten days or two weeks—

if, when Admiral Nomura, acting in his official capacity states on Saturday28 that his government “would be pleased to consider actively the possibility of the reassumption of traditional cordial relations with the United States,[”] Mr. Hull were simply, and cautiously, to indicate that the United States would entertain such a prospect.

Mr. Hull could then suggest that the non-committal conversations begun in Tokyo by private individuals could be continued while he and Admiral Nomura meanwhile would think over the agenda for their next official meeting.

Points:

1. Mr. Hull cannot reveal that he already knows the proposed agenda; that he knows the decision on the Axis alliance or any other specific circumstance communicated by ourselves;

2. Mr. Hull need say nothing to Admiral Nomura concerning the designation of some individual to carry out the secret private conversations. Such a person could appear, so far as the Japanese are concerned, as an acquaintance of ours, who is assisting in the preparation of suggestions to be submitted for the consideration of the United States Government.

3. While Mr. Hull should be completely and progressively informed of every step in these private discussions, the Japanese Embassy during the next ten days should be informed of nothing.

(Mr. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister is “doubtful”. He should not appear on Saturday with Admiral Nomura.)

  1. March 5.↩
  2. Kaname Wakasugi.↩
  3. For memorandum of March 8 by the Secretary of State, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 389.↩