711.94/3–741
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: Mr. Hamilton and I incline to the view that, in the conversation which you are to have with Admiral Nomura tomorrow, the procedure probably most practicable in service of the objectives which we have discussed with you would be for you to adopt and maintain the role of listener and to draw the Ambassador out while avoiding as far as possible any indication of perplexity, uneasiness, apprehension or eagerness on the part of your Government and any disclosure of your position, favorable or unfavorable, regarding any concrete proposals or suggestions for action which the Ambassador may put forward.
When Admiral Nomura talked with you and the President, the President suggested that Admiral Nomura come to you and that you and Nomura explore the situation as regards relations between the United States and Japan. You might perhaps care to review before tomorrow the material which FE and PA/H23a prepared some four weeks ago by way of background for a conversation with the Ambassador, consisting of two memoranda, one on the program of the United States and the other on the program of Japan—which memoranda are attached hereunder24—some of the ideas in which might be useful if the Ambassador directs the conversation toward the existing situation, fundamental problems, et cetera.
In case the Ambassador suggests that plans be made for a negotiation and/or suggests that persons be designated to explore jointly the question of a possible negotiation and/or offers an outline of possible subjects of negotiation, it is believed that you would need to be guided by what may have been said before that point is reached and by the indications which you will have had of Nomura’s thought and intention; but it is surmised that you will find it warrantable and probably advisable simply to say that you will give the matter sympathetic consideration.
Mr. Hamilton and I continue of the opinion that the Japanese leaders are not at this time prepared to embark immediately upon a new and extensive move southward. They have not yet made certain readjustments of their position in China; the situation in Indochina has not yet reached an advanced stage of consolidation; relations between Japan and Russia are still full of question marks; it is not yet [Page 63] clear what Germany’s next moves are to be; the battle of England has not reached a climax; Matsuoka may or may not proceed to Europe; the German Ambassador to Japan25 is “perched” for a trip to Germany with a round-trip ticket; Germany and Japan are not fully sure of each other; the Japanese Embassy’s unofficial associates are just beginning new explorations in this country; approaches are being made to the American Government on Japanese initiative by unofficial agents or go-betweens; et cetera.
Our immediate problems are, it seems to us, that of (1) keeping the Japanese in a state of hoping and yet having to guess and (2) finding out all that we possibly can regarding their thoughts and their actual or possible intentions.