The British Ambassador called and handed me the attached copy of a
memorandum of conversation between the Ambassador of Japan and himself
yesterday.
The Ambassador said that he understood the difficulties of this country
and Japan in finding ways and means of keeping up the appearance of
not-too-strained relations between our two countries while the present
government of Japan endeavors to improve public sentiment and opinion in
support of the basic principles for which this Government stands and
which envisage a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The
Ambassador said he would communicate with his Government in order to see
if it had any suggestions along this line, which would aid the
Government of Japan to move in our direction on the fundamental issues
involved.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the British Ambassador (Halifax)
1. The Japanese Ambassador asked rather mysteriously this morning for
an interview with me, and came to see me this afternoon.
He began by recalling a conversation that we had had when he had
first arrived in Washington as to the desirability of maintaining
peace in the Pacific. Since then, as I knew, he had for some time
been talking with Mr. Hull, and from these talks three principal
points of difficulty had emerged.
2. The first point concerned the Tri-Partite Pact. The Ambassador did
not develop this in detail beyond saying that the United States
Government wished for some more precise definition of the Japanese
attitude than they had hitherto felt able to give, but he thought
that the United States Government understood the Japanese position
pretty well.
The second point concerned non-discrimination and equality of
treatment in economic matters. These he thought could be
adjusted.
The third point, which was the only one on which he anticipated
serious difficulty, concerned the admission of a right for Japan,
secured by agreement with China, to station troops for an agreed
period, in North China and Inner Mongolia to control the Communist
armies there.
[Page 517]
3. So far no solution had emerged in his conversations with Mr. Hull
on this third point.
The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was due to internal
differences between on the one hand the Prime Minister and those who
wished to reach agreement with the United States by not insisting on
the third point mentioned above, and on the other hand those who
thought that not to insist on this point would involve too great a
loss of face.
But the Ambassador did not anticipate any sudden change of policy.
The Emperor was in favour of peace, and even if a general were made
Prime Minister, it was unlikely that the Emperor’s wishes would be
disregarded.
The outburst of a Japanese Navy spokesman as reported in the United
States press today was of no importance, and might be
disregarded.
Everybody in the Japanese Cabinet wanted understanding with the
United States, and the only difference was as to the price that
should be paid for it.
4. Reverting to the Tri-Partite Pact, the Ambassador said that though
we might disagree, the Japanese Government of the time had regarded
adherence to it as the only policy that was possible for Japan to
pursue, having regard to the evidence of what he called Anglo-Saxon
co-operation against Japan.
Freezing and embargo measures were not likely to affect very
seriously the ordinary Japanese consuming public, who were
accustomed to low standards, but would create difficulty for
Japanese business, which was pressing that some way out must be
found.
5. I said that nobody wanted to strangle Japan, either here or in the
British Commonwealth, provided Japanese policy was no longer such as
to constitute a threat. Moreover, if he would allow me to say so,
Japanese economic difficulties were of her own making, and certainly
she would not get out of the difficulties largely created by one war
by plunging into another.
Both the United States and Great Britain wanted to see peace
preserved in the Pacific, and there was no reason why peace should
not be maintained if the Japanese Government abandoned its
expansionist policy, and were willing to recognise principles which
both the United States and Great Britain wished to see
maintained.
But do not let the Japanese Government make the mistake of backing
the wrong horse. I could well understand that many people in Japan
might be misled by the succession of apparent German victories, but
let them remember that none of these victories had yet brought
Germany within sight of the only victory that would win the war.
[Page 518]
It might indeed well be argued that they had largely aggravated
Germany’s difficulties, and that the strain that they would impose
would end by becoming intolerable.
The Ambassador said that many in Japan agreed with this view, and
that he himself was of opinion that one victory or two victories
were not the same thing as a war.
Returning to his main point, he asked me whether I thought that it
would be possible to find any modus vivendi
in the Pacific that might be of value in giving time for the
atmosphere to calm, and make easier the solution of the third point
to which he had referred at the outset of our conversation, which he
thought it would be extremely difficult for any new Government to
solve quickly.
He knew how close the relations of the British Government and the
United States Government were, and hoped that I would take an
opportunity of speaking with Mr. Hull about it. This I said I would
certainly do.
6. At one point in our talk the Ambassador remarked that some
Americans spoke of finishing off the Japanese Navy in a few days.
But the Japanese Navy was well trained, and, as I knew, never
surrendered, and he thought it could be relied upon to give a good
account of itself.
I disclaimed any desire to appraise the relative merits of Navies,
and told him that British policy had been repeatedly defined. I
could define it for him again by repeating that we were anxious to
find the way to friendly relations with Japan, but we could not hope
to resume those friendly relations so long as Japanese policy
retained the direction it had recently followed.
I asked him whether Mr. Shigemitsu might be expected shortly to
return to London. As to this, he was without information, but he
knew that Mr. Shigemitsu was in frequent conference at the Japanese
Foreign Office.
I also asked him whether he had any opinion as to what might be
General Chiang Kai Shek’s view of his third point as to temporary
occupation by Japanese troops of an area in North China by agreement
with the Chinese Government.
He said he had not, but he had an impression that though the Chinese
army were not now very keen on fighting, Chinese diplomacy was
extremely shrewd, and vastly better than that of Japan.
7. The whole conversation was very friendly, and left on my mind the
clear impression that the Japanese Government, or certainly that
part of it for which Admiral Nomura can be held to speak, felt their
position to be one of extreme difficulty.
[
Washington
,] 16 October,
1941.
