740.0011 P. W./10–1641
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations
(Hornbeck)
to the Secretary of State
[Washington,] October 16, 1941.
Mr. Secretary: Mr. Hamilton does not recommend
taking the proposed action.22 Mr. Ballantine feels that it is premature to come to any
decision on the matter. I feel strongly that this proposed message in
the form in which it stands should not at this time be sent.
A redraft is submitted here attached. The important paragraphs are, of
course, the last two. We all feel that great care should be
[Page 515]
exercised to avoid making any
too broad commitment or any too emphatic threat. I myself feel that we
should avoid anything that implies countenancing of the Japanese
operations in China.
[Annex]
Proposed Message From the President to the Emperor of
Japan
23
Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I
addressed Your Imperial Majesty. I feel I should again address Your
Imperial Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency
in the process of formation. As Your Imperial Majesty knows,
conversations have been in progress between representatives of our
two governments for many months for the purpose of keeping armed
conflict from any extension in the Pacific area. That has been our
great purpose as I think it has equally been the real purpose of
Your Imperial Majesty.
I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles
to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic
accords could have been realized so that the success of such a
conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would
be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the
second related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United
States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.
If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is
considering armed attacks against Russia or against France or Great
Britain or the Dutch or independent territory in the South, the
obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic
and European and Near East theatres of war to the whole of the
Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American
interests.
The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to
see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of
the seas and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join
with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy
to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of
certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and
that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from
abroad.
If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the
United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very
seriously concerned.
