711.94/2353
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 13.]
Sir: With reference to my telegram no. 390 of September 15, 3 p.m., I have the honor to enclose a copy of a full memorandum42 of my conversation on that date with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to [Page 460] whom I communicated orally the contents of the Department’s telegram no. 213, of September 12, 6 p.m., on the subject of the American-Japanese conversations on the situation in the Pacific.
The information which has reached the Chinese Government from the Chinese Ambassador at Washington and from other sources has apparently led to the impression that the American-Japanese conversations were being directed principally, if not solely, toward seeking a détente under which Japan would abandon her southward ambitions, Thailand and Indochina would be neutralized, and economic pressure on Japan would be relaxed, Japan thus being able to recoup her strength, which the Chinese expected would then be hurled in full force against China for the settlement of the “China Incident”.
I do not propose to speculate how the Chinese Government formed this impression, but I point to Dr. Quo Tai-chi’s statement of the report received from Dr. Hu Shih, the Ambassador at Washington, as set out on page 3 of the enclosed memorandum of conversation. I should also mention that Dr. Quo has several times referred to information from other “sources”; for example, he remarked that Konoye in his letter to the President is reported to have suggested that Japan should retain a small force in Indochina and not be required to withdraw fully from that area. Dr. Quo has avoided disclosing the sources of such information.
The anxiety manifest in Government circles regarding the Washington conversations soon spread to the press, which seems to have halted only short of suggesting that the United States was planning a “Munich” in the Far East. Anxiety and concern have also been evident in political, banking and business circles and amongst the military.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs repeatedly asked me for news on the Washington conversations. I was unable to tell him more than what in fact had appeared in press telegrams from Washington; that is, that the Secretary of State had told the press that only informal, exploratory conversations were taking place with a view to ascertaining whether any basis might be found for discussions or negotiations on the Far Eastern situation but that no such basis had yet been found.
The Foreign Minister had asked me whether I had any information on the conversations of Dr. Hu Shih with the Secretary of State and the President. I was obliged to reply in the negative.
I was not surprised when Dr. Quo finally sent for me on the afternoon of September 10 and made the observations reported in my telegram no. 383 of September 10, 6 p.m.
It is my hope that the clear and categorical statements made in the Department’s telegram no. 213 of September 12, 6 p.m., may serve to reassure the leaders of the Chinese Government and that this reassurance [Page 461] will be reflected in the attitude of the press and in political, business and financial circles.
My telegram no. 384 of September 11, 7 p.m.,43 supplementing my no. 383 of September 10, 6 p.m., was intended to outline my opinion on the Chinese situation, reached after more than three months of quiet observation since my arrival at Chungking. There can be no question as to the determination of the Generalissimo to continue resistance to Japan; but there is a strong undercurrent, even in Government circles, tending toward the view that continued resistance to Japan might not be in the best interests of China, that China might not now fare so badly in negotiations with a Japan anxious to be rid of the “China Incident” in order to engage in adventures elsewhere, and that ultimately, in any circumstances, China and Japan must arrive at some common understanding in the Far East.
If the Chinese were to come to believe that the democracies had set their own interests above all others by reaching a regional détente with Japan in relation to Indochina, Thailand, and the south, without regard to the possible effect on China, the resentment in this country would be so deep that no amount of aid to China, lend-lease or otherwise, would overcome it. I am convinced that that resentment would lead to a strengthening of the influence of those inclining to the view that the best interests of China dictate that a peace be now sought with Japan.44
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- Vol. v, p. 537.↩
- In his memorandum of conversation with Dr. Quo, Ambassador Gauss reported his own comment “that from my observations I was inclined to the view that some of the evident anxiety and disappointment at Chungking regarding the American-Japanese conversations arose out of the bare fact that conversations were being held, that there seemed to me to be evident in some quarters the intense desire that there should be no conversations with Japan but that America should forthwith involve herself in hostilities with Japan, the sooner to settle the China Incident and all problems in the Pacific. Apparently our failure to become involved in war with Japan has been the cause of disappointment. Dr. Quo replied merely that he did not believe that there is any such feeling.”↩