711.94/2034
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine)11
In reviewing the record of the conversations which officers of the Department have had with Mr. Hashimoto, it is interesting to compare Ambassador Grew’s reports of the purposes of Hashimoto’s visit to the United States as represented to the Ambassador by Mr. Hashimoto and Mr. Toda with our observations on the subject. In the Embassy’s telegram no. 1297, December 8, 1940,12 Ambassador Grew reported that his informant (Mr. Toda) had replied that it was regarded of the highest importance for Hashimoto to come to the United States to sound out American opinion (on Japanese-American relations) at first hand and report accurately on his return to Japan. Mr. Hashimoto in his letter to Ambassador Grew explaining his purpose in coming to the United States stated: “I am anxious to sound out the views and opinions of high American statesmen in order that I may be able to obtain such materials as will be useful to determine the direction which the Japanese Government should follow in the future”. Ambassador Grew adds that Hashimoto desires to see the President and the Secretary of State as well as prominent senators, editors, et cetera. Mr. Grew explained to Hashimoto’s associate that it would be difficult for Hashimoto to be received by high American officials without the support of the Japanese Embassy at Washington. Mr. Grew expressed to the Department the opinion that some advantage might accrue if Hashimoto were to proceed to the United States [Page 50] without American official encouragement and were to obtain even a limited grasp of American personal opinion through unofficial contacts in our country.
In a previous telegram, Embassy’s 1282, December 7, 9 a.m.,13 Mr. Grew stated: “He (Mr. Hashimoto) is said to have a plan or idea, not disclosed, which he believes would be immediately effective if adopted. I have a strong suspicion that this plan involves American intervention with the Chungking Government with a view to an early settlement of the hostilities in China which it is held would automatically bring about improved relations with the United States”.
There is no evidence that Mr. Hashimoto during the course of his visit to this country made any serious effort to get in touch with leaders of American public opinion other than officials of the Department, nor is there any evidence that he or his associates made any extensive study of the American press. In fact, toward the close of their visit, Mr. Toda remarked that Mr. Hashimoto was impatient to return to Japan but that he (Toda) wondered whether it might not be advantageous for them to extend their stay in order to interview senators and other leaders of American opinion. Mr. Ballantine in reply suggested that if Mr. Hashimoto intended to do this care should be exercised lest undesirable publicity result. Mr. Ballantine also suggested that Mr. Hashimoto might find it useful to make a study of American press opinion on the subject of American-Japanese relations, if he had not already satisfied himself that he was adequately informed on American attitude.
Mr. Hashimoto’s central purpose in visiting the United States was evidently, as suggested in the last sentence quoted above from Mr. Grew’s telegram—to explore the possibility of persuading this Government to use its influence with the Chungking Government to seek peace with Japan and thus to enable Japan to emerge from the conflict with China with its prestige substantially intact. He argued that it would be difficult for Japan to decide to abandon its present course unless the United States should be willing to act along the lines suggested by him, as otherwise a change of course by Japan would be interpreted by China as weakness on Japan’s part which would be taken advantage of by China to Japan’s disadvantage. He also argued that unless the United States was prepared to make concessions to Japan his group would find it difficult, in the face of opposition by the pro-German group, to convince the Japanese Government that Japan’s real interest lay in aligning itself with the United States and Great Britain rather than with the Axis powers.
Although Mr. Hashimoto was probably disappointed that officers of the Department could not discuss specific proposals with him in [Page 51] the way he had hoped we would, it is believed that he was on the whole satisfied with the results of his visit to the United States and that he had become convinced that Japan’s hope for the future lay in a policy of cooperating with the United States. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the statements that he made before taking leave of us that he intended upon his return to Japan to endeavor to persuade the Japanese Government to change its course and abandon a policy of aggression. He expressed his confidence that, as he had never been identified in Japan with the pro-Anglo-American group, he would have a better chance of success in that task than any person who had in the past been identified in Japan with that group. Whether he will succeed or not, of course, is doubtful, but it is to be hoped that the time and effort spent in discussing American principles and policies with him will be productive of good.
- Initialed by the Chief of the Division (Hamilton) and noted by the Secretary of State.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iv, p. 464.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iv, p. 458.↩