711.94/2044

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State 9

[1.]
The Japanese Ambassador on February 17th left with Mr. Butler in my temporary absence a personal message to him from Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs of which the gist is as follows.
2.
Minister for Foreign Affairs was surprised to learn of the undue concern of Secretary of State10 based no doubt on information from the British Embassy at Tokyo and other sources. There was no way of ascertaining what kind of information the British Government had [Page 48] been receiving, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs would like to state that so far as he could see there were no grounds for alarming views on the situation in East Asia. More than once he had explained to the British Ambassador and even to the public, that one of the primary purposes of the tripartite pact was to limit the sphere of the European war by preventing involvement of other powers, and also to help to terminate it as quickly as possible. This was still the avowed aim of the Japanese Government; and constituted a fundamental basis of their policy. Of this the British Government might rest assured.
3.
Mr. Matsuoka owed it to candour to say that he could not but be anxious about the movements of the British and the United States Governments in their attempt to expedite and impose warlike preparations in order to meet any supposed contingencies in the Pacific and South Seas. Press reports thereon from the United States and elsewhere were causing increasing misgivings in Japan with the consequence that it was contended in some circles that Japan should at once take measures to meet the worst eventuality in these regions. The concern felt by the Japanese was natural and if the United States Government could only be persuaded to restrict their activities in this respect to the Western Hemisphere, thereby easing Japanese anxiety, the situation would be very much mitigated.
4.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs wished to make further observations in view of his former acquaintance with the Secretary of State at Geneva and of his belief that frank views would be of use at the present time. The uppermost thought in his mind had always been world peace and he sincerely hoped that both the China affair and the European war would soon end. He earnestly wished that the differences between the powers and organisation of a just and lasting peace might again be discussed by the powers at a round table conference and in this connection he desired to assure the Secretary of State that far from aspiring to control the destinies of, and to dominate, other peoples it was Japan’s established policy to inaugurate an era of peace and plenty and mutual helpfulness in Greater East Asia by promoting the spirit of concord and conciliation. As repeatedly affirmed, Japan’s motto was “no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation”. He therefore strongly deprecated those biased reports designed to calumniate.
5.
Minister for Foreign Affairs confessed his utter inability to see any good served by prolonging the war whatever the motive. Whatever the outcome and whoever the victor there was great danger of chaos and even of the downfall of modern civilisation and it needed statesmanship of a high order to meet this danger. He had not yet lost hope that such statesmanship would not be wanting in the British Empire.
6.
Lastly the Minister for Foreign Affairs would like to make it clear that Japan, deeply concerned as she was for the restoration of an early peace, was fully prepared to act as a mediator or take any action calculated to restore normal conditions not only in Greater East Asia but anywhere the world over. He hoped the Secretary of State would agree that the grave responsibility of restoring peace and saving modern civilisation from impending collapse rested with the leading powers. Such responsibility could only be fulfilled by a wise and courageous statesman willing to display an accommodating and generous spirit in listening to other claims and contentions and it was hardly necessary to add that whatever Japan might do she would always be actuated by the consciousness of responsibility which she owed to humanity.
  1. Handed on February 24 by the British Minister (Butler) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck).
  2. Anthony Eden.