711.94/2287: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:06 p.m.]
388. Despite local censorship of all news of rumored terms of an American-Japanese agreement (such as Hong Kong newspapers report having appeared in the American press) the Japanese [Chinese] press has continued to devote considerable comment to the subject with a noticeable trend toward growing anxiety. The Churchill speech on August 24 broke the news of the conversations in Washington, the first reaction was to dismiss them as a final warning of the democracies to Japan and an indication that a showdown by force was imminent. During the next few days American statements of principle were reviewed and confidence expressed that America would consult fully with China and base any settlements on the Nine Power Treaty and the recently announced eight points, the last of which, disarmament of aggressors, was especially welcomed. The belief was expressed that Japan’s ambitions were incompatible with these principles and any agreement with the United States hence impossible. The announcement of the sending of the American military mission to China was hailed as a definite indication that appeasement was dead and that the United States was preparing for military and strategic collaboration with China extending even beyond material aid.
About the first of September and after the news of the Konoye letter to the President,23 the burden of editorial comment changed to the belief that Japan was the leader in the negotiations because it was feeling the effects of economic measures, feared the United States’ growing [Page 448] strength and desired a breathing spell to await international developments and a favorable time for further aggressive action. Japan was therefore insincerely offering the bait of withdrawal from the Axis and putting up the smoke screen that pressure on Japan would cause the pseudo-liberal Konoye Cabinet to fall and its place to be taken by an extremist Military Government. Most editorials then turned to “warning” the United States of Japanese duplicity. For instance, the Central Daily News, the official organ of the Kuomintang, on September 10 recalled Japan’s efforts in 1931 to persuade the United States that any strong action would play into the hands of the militarists. The omission by the President in his Labor Day speech24 of any reference to Japan or the Far East was generally noted.
The news of Secretary Hull’s conversation of the fourth with the Chinese Ambassador in Washington received favorable comment. But as there remained no concrete news of the negotiations other than that numerous conferences were being held in Washington and that there was great anxiety in Tokyo (the report that Ambassador Grew had personally seen the Japanese Foreign Minister 12 times in a week received wide notice) the general tone turned to one of gloom and discouragement. This was almost openly acknowledged in comment on the interview given by Generalissimo to the United Press on September 10 (news of which was not printed locally until September 12 under a New York dateline).
All papers applauded the statement that, come what may, China is determined to fight, and, among others expressing the same sentiment, the Shih Hsin Pao, an H. H. Kung paper, stated that “coming as it does on the eve of President Roosevelt’s speech,25 and while negotiations, the terms or subjects of which are unknown, are proceeding at Washington, the statement is a great stimulus to the spirit of the Chinese people”.
The growing concern culminated in a lengthy article on September 12 (before report of the news of the President’s speech) in the Ta Rung Pao, probably the most influential newspaper in China. The gist of this article is as follows: many Chinese are saying that Chamberlain’s broken umbrella is being resurrected and labelled American-Japanese agreement. We hope that President Roosevelt will give attention to three points:
- (1)
- The unswerving, even though unacknowledged allegiance of Japan to the Axis and the intimate relationship between Axis policy in the Atlantic and Pacific. During the first stage of the war Germany’s main objective was England and Japan’s assigned task was to keep the attention of the United States centered in the Pacific so that it could not send its fleet to the Atlantic to aid Great Britain. [Page 449] Since the attack of Russia the strategy has been reversed. Russia is now the main objective because its army is the only one that can directly threaten the Axis. It is therefore to be attacked from both east and west. To enable Japan to act it is necessary for it to delude the United States into an agreement so that pressure will be relaxed and the threat of the American fleet removed. To facilitate this, Germany by present ship sinkings is deliberately provoking the United States into moving its fleet into the Atlantic where it can now be of no offensive damage to Germany and Italy.
- (2)
- That if it had not been for China’s 4 years of resistance, Japan would have been much stronger and would have before now attacked the greatest of the democracies under more favorable conditions for success.
- (3)
- The past experience of American leaders who have made agreements with Japan has invariably been disappointment. An outstanding example is that of President [Wilson] of the United States who with the best intentions toward China received promises from Japan which were later broken when the secret treaties came to light at the peace conference and the Shantung settlement26 resulted.
- August 27, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 572.↩
- September 1, Department of State Bulletin, September 6, 1941, p. 177.↩
- September 11, Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1941, p. 193.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, pp. 934 ff.↩