894.00/1099: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 12—3:32 p.m.]
1447. Three important and unusual events took place in Tokyo yesterday to which political significance must be attached. These events were:
- (1)
- A conference between the Cabinet and military headquarters, the news of which was announced and almost immediately suppressed;
- (2)
- A dinner tendered by the Emperor to the entire Cabinet and a few other high officials publicly announced as an expression of gratitude by the Emperor for their loyal service to the nation;
- (3)
- The establishment of a unified military command directly responsible to the Emperor to embrace all military jurisdictions in Japan proper, Chosen, Taiwan and Karafuto.
While an appraisal of the significance of these steps must necessarily be speculative, it is obvious that the main purpose of the dinner was to convey to the Japanese people the Emperor’s expressed support of the policy and measures of Prince Konoye and the Cabinet, with a view to counteracting the present mobilization of dissident and opposing elements, especially pro-Axis elements, which may be given expression tomorrow in a scheduled meeting of the Tohokai and other extremist and pro-Axis groups with a proposed speech by Nakano, prominent exponent of right wing sentiment. Since Japan’s conclusion of the tripartite pact a year ago was given imperial sanction, it follows that the present efforts of the Government to effect a reorientation of policy toward a reconstruction of relations with the United States, even while the Government still subscribes to the letter if not the spirit of the tripartite alliance, needed some similar manifestation of imperial approval, and while an imperial rescript could be issued only in the event of some concrete agreement with the United States, it is probable that domestic considerations required some preliminary indication of imperial support. This was accomplished by the dinner, a gesture clearly indicating the Emperor’s support of the Prime Minister.
The establishment of a unified military command under the direct control of the Emperor and the placing of almost unprecedented powers in the hands of General Yamada as Commander-in-Chief of the National Defense General Headquarters, concurrently with his duties as inspector general of military education, may indicate the serious concern of the Government at the potential danger of outbreaks in opposition to its current policies, the step being reinforced by the declaration that the new defense organ be made directly responsible to the Emperor. Some significance may be attached to the fact that General Yamada was placed in command of the military academy immediately following the May 15, 1932 assassinations, the implication being that he was selected both at that time and at this to enforce discipline and to throw the weight of his personality against the direct actionist elements. Quite apart from the necessity of controlling political malcontents there can be no doubt that the progressive economic effects of the American freezing order are likely to give rise to domestic discontent, and it is possible that this factor was also influential in the establishment of the new command.
While the new unified command does not embrace the Kwantung Army nor the forces in China or in Indochina, the recent appointment of Yoshizawa22 as envoy to Indochina, and of Kuruoma as Secretary General of the mission may be regarded as significant in [Page 447] view of Government’s desire to curb further expansionist tendencies of the military forces in that quarter.
The Japanese press interprets the creation of the general defense headquarters as a step toward consolidation of the “home front” and of the nation’s defenses against foreign attack. Sufficient information is not yet available to permit an accurate estimate of the power to be invested in this new army organ nor of its relationship to the Imperial headquarters, the General Staff, and the War Ministry. Its establishment may mean that Japan has proceeded one step farther in a program leading to eventual war or simply that ordinary defense precautions are being taken. The more tenable view now seems to be, as expressed above, that the Government is seeking sure control of the internal situation.
- Kenkichi Yoshizawa, former Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, who headed the mission to the Netherlands East Indies.↩