740.0011 P. W./517
Dr. E. Stanley Jones, our most famous Methodist missionary, stopped in my
office this week and told me of conversations he had had with very high
Chinese and Japanese officials as to a possible basis for peace. The
conversations were, of course, informal and unofficial, but they showed
an astoundingly wide area of agreement, in contrast with the popular
conception of a hopelessly confused and deteriorating situation. Dr.
Jones said he had gone as far as he could at this time and wondered how
these possibilities could be called to the attention of the proper
government officials, without publicity, but in a manner that would
assure careful consideration. He was leaving the city immediately and
asked me to undertake this. I asked him to prepare a memorandum of his
conversations, which I submit to you herewith. I have talked over the
telephone about this with Mr. Acheson of the Department of State and am
submitting a copy of this memorandum to him for consideration by Mr.
Hamilton of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
I am not submitting this memorandum to anyone else at this time.
I taught school in China, served in the Secretariat of the Conference on
Pacific and Far Eastern Affairs in Washington in 1921–22 and have,
therefore, had an interest in the Far Eastern situation for many years.
In a sense, it can be said that World War II had its origin in the
Orient in 1931. Conversely, if a peaceful and satisfactory adjustment of
the Far Eastern situation could now be worked out, this would go far
toward stabilizing the situation around the world.
Dr. Jones is on his way to the World Sunday School Convention in Mexico
City and will be at Occidental College, Los Angeles, from July 18 to
July 30, in case it might be desirable to contact him directly in the
near future.
I am at your service in this matter, if there is any way in which I may
help. I am always ready to serve you in your labors for peace.90
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by Dr. E. Stanley Jones
Memorandum of Conversations Regarding Possible
Peace Between Japan and China
In informal conversations between Dr. Miao, Secretary of the National
Christian Council of China, and Dr. Kagawa, well-known author of
Japan, regarding a possible basis for peace between China and Japan,
I found the following:
- 1.
- They both agree that the time is ripe for a consideration
of a possible peace if a basis could be found. They were
both speaking individually, of course, and were not
representing in any way anyone officially. But each thought
that he was expressing the opinions of a large number in
each country and possibly on some points the official
attitude.
- 2.
- Dr. Kagawa said that he thought Japan was prepared to make
peace on the basis of four points:
-
a.
- The recognition of Manchukuo.
-
b.
- The suppression of Communism in China.
-
c.
- The elimination of anti-Japanese agitation in
China.
-
d.
- The recognition of the territorial and political
integrity of China by Japan.
He suggested that there might be other points raised by some, such as
(a) a creation of a joint defense system
in Mongolia against Russian Communism, (b)
the port of Shanghai under Japanese control, (c) a concession between Hongkong and Indo-China for
immigration. But these were subsidiary—the four points above were
the main bases of peace from the Japanese viewpoint.
Dr. Miao said that if the intention of the peace between China and
Japan is that Japan’s hands may be freed to carry out aggressive
intentions elsewhere, then the peace would not be a real peace.
China wants real peace. He said that if China could get two things
nailed down she would be prepared to negotiate the rest:
-
a.
- The territorial and political integrity and sovereignty of
China.
-
b.
- The recognition of Chiang Kai Shek as the head of
China.
If these two things were agreed upon China would feel that there is a
basis on which peace could be considered, not that she recognizes
that the other points raised are necessarily legitimate, but they
might be made subjects for negotiation. Dr. Miao suggested, for
instance, that some agreement might be worked out for joint control
of Manchuria.
It will be noted that there is one area of agreement between the two
suggestions, namely the territorial and political integrity of
China. This is important for this area of agreement is not a
marginal matter, it is central.
As to the recognition of Chiang Kai Shek, Dr. Kagawa thought it might
be brought about in time, but Japan’s face would have to be saved in
the matter, for Wang Ching Wei had been recognized. He thought it
might be possible to solve the matter if Wang Ching Wei should agree
to give away to Chiang Kai Shek for the sake of peace and the
unifying of China. Dr. Miao thought that Wang Ching Wei would have
to give way entirely and that there could be no place for him in the
government after what he had done. Dr. Kagawa said that the
recognition of Chiang Kai Shek is not impossible as many Japanese
considered him as a great man. Both agreed that peace could be
scarcely hoped for if Chiang Kai Shek were left out for he
represents China in a way that no one else does.
It was suggested by Dr. Kagawa that if I want to get the official
viewpoint it might be well for me to see the Japanese Ambassador.
Accordingly, I endeavored to see both the Japanese Ambassador and
the Chinese Ambassador during a short visit to Washington. The
Chinese Ambassador was absent speaking at the University of Michigan
and the Japanese Ambassador was tied up with engagements and
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could not give me the time
during the period at my disposal. But the Japanese Minister invited
me to see him instead. Apparently the Japanese Minister is the
diplomatic advisor to the Ambassador.
I made it plain to the Minister that I did not represent anything
official, that I was only there in the capacity of one who desired
to see these two nations come together on a just basis, and that it
was also clear that the opinions I was interpreting from Dr. Miao
and Dr. Kagawa were entirely unofficial and were elicited by my own
initiative. In other words, they did not raise the matter with me—I
raised it with them. I also suggested that I knew the Minister’s
situation as a diplomatic official and that he need not give
anything on the matters raised, but that I would put the matter
before him and he could comment on it or not, and I would
understand. After I had placed the conversations I had had before
him, he replied he would comment on the matter, but in an unofficial
capacity.
He said that Dr. Kagawa left out one important point, namely, the
economic cooperation of Japan and China. When I asked if the
economic cooperation meant the political dominance of the country by
economic control, as many Chinese and others thought it would, he
replied that it need not necessarily mean this. He further stated
that although the territorial and political integrity of China was
not specifically stated in the government statements regarding a
basis of peace, it was implied in the other three points, because
these points inferred a sovereign and independent China. He also
added that the government of Japan had stated that there would be no
indemnities and no territory demanded of China. This, too, he said
implied the political and territorial integrity of China.
He suggested that Japan would desire a joint defense in Mongolia and
North China against possible Russian aggression in these sections.
When I pointed out that in the minds of the Chinese this planting of
Japanese soldiers in North China and Mongolia would cancel the point
about the territorial and political integrity of China he replied
that on the face of it it would and that the demand might seem to be
harsh, but in international law a nation might still be sovereign if
she requested another nation to help her in the joint defense of
territory.
In regard to the recognition of Chiang Kai Shek as the head of China,
he stated that the Japanese government recognized Wang Ching Wei
because he was willing to accept Japan’s basis of cooperation and
that if Chiang Kai Shek would be willing to do so then Japan would
not mind who it was at the head of the government.
It seems to me that this left open the possibility of Japan’s
recognition of Chiang Kai Shek if a new basis could be worked out
which the latter could accept.
At the close of my talk one thing seemed to be intact in both
viewpoints, namely, the territorial and political integrity of
China. Of
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course, there
was the possibility of this being threatened by the proposal of
joint action in North China and Mongolia. But on the whole it
remained. There was also the possibility of the recognition of
Chiang Kai Shek under certain conditions—conditions held by both
sides. It was not ruled out.
When I came to the point of the possible mediation of the United
States to bring peace in the Far East, I again urged on the Minister
that he need not answer if he did not see fit. He replied that he
would comment not as giving an official but a personal view, that if
my suggestion meant that America was to interfere in the Far East
and try to impose her own terms, then the reply is, No. But if she
should offer her good offices to help China and Japan to settle
their own differences, then, Yes.
When I asked if I might express the substance of our conversation to
any one of my friends who might be in a position to pass it on to
those who would be in a position to do something, he replied that I
might, provided it was understood that all of these opinions were
simply explorative and were personal and private and not official.
He added that the world must have peace and that America is in a
position to help toward peace. When I suggested if America offered
her good offices to help bring peace between China and Japan it
might mean that she would thereby be led to straighten out her own
differences with Japan, he agreed.
It seems therefore that the situation may be ripe for America to
mediate between China and Japan. It appears to be the one possible
door to peace in the world situation. If it begins there, it may
spread.
