711.94/5–2341
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
These Japanese are engaging us in conversations on the subject of an agreement between Japan and the United States and an agreement between Japan and China—
not because the Japanese have had a change of mind and/or a change of heart about Japan’s policy of imperial expansion—for the Japanese haven’t had;
not because the Japanese have been defeated in China—for the Japanese haven’t been;
not because the Japanese want to withdraw their armies from China—for the Japanese do not;
not because the Japanese would be content with a national security and an equality of economic opportunity resting on and guaranteed by a bilateral treaty pledge (and nothing stronger)—for the Japanese wouldn’t be.
These Japanese are engaging us in conversations
because the Japanese are definitely bent upon imperial expansion;
because the Japanese still hope to gain control of China;
because the Japanese do not want to and they cannot (now) withdraw their armies from China;
because the Japanese believe that their national security depends on the reputation and/or the capacity of their instrumentalities of self-defense and know that possession of a treaty right is one thing while enjoyment of a treaty right is quite another thing;
because the Japanese want more than national security and more than equality of opportunity: they want power, they want prestige, they want privilege, they want a paramount position in the Far East;
because the Japanese, desirous of moving toward their many-times-declared objectives, are at present hampered and held back by fear of possible physical interposition of obstacles by the United States.
These Japanese are engaging us in conversations
in order to gain time;
in order to acquire all possible information on the basis of which to increase the accuracy of their estimates of situation and possibilities;
in order to increase the scope and the effectiveness of their operations of propaganda;
in order to add to the confusion of thought, the diversity of opinions and the variformity of counsel which prevail in this country—both among our people and in our Government;
in order to retard and delay the making by our Government of decisions;
in order to retard and delay the imposition by our Government of new restrictions upon trade with Japan;
in order to diminish the speed and the volume of (our defense production and) our deliveries of aid to Great Britain and to China;
in order to shake Chinese confidence in this country and contribute toward a break in Chinese morale;
in order to delay and if possible to prevent the taking by this country of really effective steps in support of Great Britain and ensurance of our security;
in order to shake British confidence in this country, to undermine British morale and to contribute toward the chances of success for an all-out German attack on the British Isles;
in order to influence the political situation in Japan: to preserve and strengthen the prestige and therefore the authority (which is now in a vulnerable position) of the militant militaristic element (of which these Japanese are members) in Japan;
in order to achieve, if possible, by diplomacy an alteration, favorable to Japan’s program, of a situation which is for the moment unfavorable to that program;
in order to enable Japan to straddle—with one foot resting on a German platform and the other foot resting on an American platform;
in order to make it possible for Japan to hold on to some of the loot which she gained in China, to collect additional loot as opportunity develops, and to be in position to collocate herself, as the world conflict progresses and when it ends, with whichever side seems to be or is victorious.
The Japanese have made a treaty with Germany. Do the Germans trust Japan? They have made a treaty with the Soviet Union. Do the Russians trust Japan? These Japanese want a treaty with us. Do these Japanese represent Japan? Do they represent Messrs. Shiratori and Matsuoka—who made the Japanese treaty with Germany? Do they represent Mr. Matsuoka—who made the Japanese treaty with the Soviet Union? Do they represent General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Germany—who wants Japan to go on with [Page 214] her imperialistic program? Do they represent Mr. Honda and General Hata—who want Japan to proceed with and finish her conquest of China now? Do they represent the Japanese people? Do they represent the Emperor? Whom do they represent? What do they want to deliver? What do they expect and intend that Japan (the Japanese) shall and will deliver? To what extent will Japan (the Japanese) perform on the basis of a treaty which these Japanese may conclude with the United States, if and when?
Is there not a fundamental inconsistency between the obligations of Japan under the treaty which some Japanese, including the Emperor, made with Germany—which is a ten-year treaty and which these Japanese are seeking (?) to nullify (?) but not to scrap—and the proposals which these Japanese suggest be made provisions of a treaty between Japan and the United States?
For forty-five years Japan (the Japanese) has been the great disturber of the peace of the Pacific.
Japan (the Japanese) is not today bent on creation and/or maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Japan (the Japanese) is bent on conquest and expansion—just as much as, although not in as grand a way as, is Germany. Japan (the Japanese) has unity of desire and objective—as has Germany. But Japan has not, as has Germany, unity of command. Japan has not superiority of manpower and productive capacity. Japan has not unanimity of opinion in regard to methods. Japan’s leaders must, therefore, be cautious (and their methods must be many). But the Japanese are as determined and as persistent as are the Germans.
Japan (the Japanese) has not yet undergone a change of heart and/or of mind—and if these Japanese get a treaty with the United States and/or a treaty with China, Japan (the Japanese) will not for a long time to come, if ever, get such a change.
As against all this, Japan (the Japanese) is in a position today such that—if Chinese resistance continues and Germany is defeated—she (they) might in the course of the next three or four or five years undergo a change first of mind and then of heart. That, however, would have to come not of success in making treaties—with Germany, with the Soviet Union, with the United States—but by quite another process, a process not of encouragement but of discouragement.
Japan (some Japanese) has fooled the United States in and with diplomatic exchanges no less than five times during the past thirty-three years.
Japan has, in force today, with the United States various treaties to whose provisions Japan pays no attention whatever. What reason have we to expect—and have we any reason to assume—that Japan will pay more or better attention to the provisions of a new treaty with us, if concluded, now?
[Page 215]On November 30, 1908 there were exchanged between Elihu Root, Secretary of State, and Baron Takahira, Japanese Ambassador, notes.85 These notes are still in effect. In those notes there are affirmations and agreements as follows:
“1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean.
“2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“4. They are also determined to preserve the common interest of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire. [”]