740.0011 Pacific War 1939/222½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The British Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request.
The Ambassador read to me a secret communication from his Government which he had been instructed to burn after reading it to me. It was more or less along the following lines—information which is already in the possession of the Department. (The message came personally from Mr. Eden to the Ambassador.)
The British Government is in possession of information which convinces it that the German and Italian Governments have received full reports concerning existing conversations between the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and the Secretary of State. The Axis governments have been informed by the Japanese Government that the United States Government suggested to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that an agreement be reached in order to secure the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.
The proposed agreement, according to these reports, would set forth a purely defensive attitude on the part of Japan towards her obligation under the Tripartite Pact, and the United States’ attitude towards the European war would likewise be stated as one of a purely defensive character.
The United States under the terms of the alleged agreement was to bring pressure upon China to secure peace between China and Japan.
The British Government is informed that Mr. Matsuoka has specifically stated to the Axis representative in Tokyo that these conversations took place upon the initiative of the American Government. It is further informed that Mr. Matsuoka acted without consulting the Axis powers and that the latter are curious about the matter. Mr. Matsuoka is said to have defended the action he had taken by saying that circumstances forced him to do so because of his desire to forestall action by the United States with regard to possible convoys. The British Government believes that Mr. Matsuoka further promised the Axis powers to obtain Axis agreement to any possible accord with the United States before the agreement was concluded. Mr. Matsuoka is further alleged to have said to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin that any agreement which was reached with the United States would not affect the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Ambassador was further told by Matsuoka that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was fully aware of the general lines of the negotiations.
[Page 211]The British Government believed that the United States Government should know of Mr. Matsuoka’s “gyrations”.
This same message which the Ambassador read to me concluded with the observation by the British Government that in its opinion any visit by Mr. Willkie to Japan at this time would be most injudicious since such a visit would not only strengthen Mr. Matsuoka personally, but would likewise give courage to appeasement elements everywhere.
The Ambassador then referred to his earlier talk with Secretary Hull concerning the conversations in question. I said that I had understood that Secretary Hull had already informed the Ambassador regarding them and that there was nothing I felt I could add other than that they were continuing.
The Ambassador said that his conversation with Secretary Hull had been on rather general terms, and he read to me the cable which he had sent his Government with regard thereto which gave, I think, a completely correct picture of what Secretary Hull had said to him in the talk under reference.
The Ambassador then said that he had received a message from his Government with regard to this question which he would leave with me and he gave it to me to read. A copy is attached herewith.83 After a hasty reading of the document I said to Lord Halifax that it seemed to me that Lord Halifax and the British Government must know that, in view of the continuous and ever-increasing efforts on the part of the United States Government to assist the British Government in its grave predicament, the United States Government would not undertake a policy in the Far East which could under any conditions be prejudicial to British interests nor one which was not parallel to the policy in that region upon which both Governments had agreed, and furthermore, that it seemed to me inconceivable that the British Government could for one moment assume that this Government would modify or compromise in the slightest degree the policies and principles with regard to the Far East for which it had consistently stood and which it had not compromised as certain other governments had; which it had reiterated time and again; and upon which it was firmly and positively set. I said, however, that in view of this document I felt that I did not care to give Lord Halifax any second-hand impressions in as much as the conversations in question had been conducted solely by Secretary Hull himself. I said that I would suggest to Secretary Hull in the morning that he have a personal talk with Lord Halifax at an early opportunity in order that [Page 212] his own personal position in this matter might be completely clarified.84
- See footnote at end of memorandum.↩
- In a memorandum of May 24 (740.0011 Pacific War/220), the Secretary of State recorded that on that date he talked with the British Ambassador, offering “some rather vigorous comment about an aide-mémoire regarding some phases of the Pacific area, which I considered wholly inaccurate and unsound in its chief meaning and implications” Lord Halifax thereupon “retained” the aide-mémoire.↩