867.24/212
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Mr. Welles: Attached is a rather full report3 of the meeting in my office on Friday with representatives of the British Embassy and the British Purchasing Commission to discuss the question whether lend-lease aid to Turkey should continue to be furnished by the United States to Great Britain for retransfer to Turkey, or whether such aid should be furnished direct to Turkey in the future.
I regret to report that very little if any progress appeared to be made towards reconciling the view espoused principally by Mr. Philip [Page 916] Young, Assistant to Mr. Hopkins,4 who favored direct aid to Turkey, and the view of the British officials that we should continue to furnish Great Britain with the materials intended for Turkey, the authority remaining with Great Britain as to when and how this material is retransferred to Turkey.
The principal arguments of the British were those already indicated to you by Lord Halifax. The British spokesman, Mr. Pincent, pointed out that Britain had certain treaty commitments to furnish supplies to Turkey, that Britain could not furnish all of the materials, but that if Britain could continue to retransfer to Turkey materials obtained from the United States Turkey would be estopped from claiming nonfulfillment of the Treaty. Mr. Pincent also pointed out that Great Britain was required, by the military situation in the Near East, to coordinate Turkish needs closely with her own and to determine the relative urgency of the available material in the United States. He felt that since Britain is responsible for the military operations in the Near East and must retain the right to make final decisions, it would be preferable for all the steps connected with supplying Turkey to remain in British hands until the final moment of delivery to Turkey. He was also afraid that direct American aid to Turkey would enable the Turks to play the Americans off against the British.
The principal arguments for direct aid to Turkey were presented as follows: The present method is not working satisfactorily. The British authorities have been bombarding the Department with memoranda and representations urging the necessity of keeping Turkey in a favored category under lend-lease. Lord Halifax left a further memorandum with the Secretary on the subject last Wednesday, pointing out at length the extreme military importance of Turkey and the urgent necessity to “build her up militarily” and to send her “as large a supply of war materials as possible.” But ironically, the British themselves have not kept Turkey in a favored category, and have been directly responsible for the fact that Turkey has received almost no supplies under lend-lease. We have been willing to give the British a considerable amount of supplies for Turkey under the present system, but the British have refused to permit them to go through, although pleading with us meanwhile to be generous to Turkey. For example, only two major requisitions for Turkey have been finally approved and the materials shipped. One was for 50 Howitzer guns and the other for 200 large (2½ ton) trucks. All of the guns and trucks were shipped from New York during June, more than four months ago. The guns arrived in Turkey a month or more [Page 917] ago, and ten of the trucks have arrived; but the British authorities here do not appear to know what happened to the other 190 trucks. The Lend-Lease office is anxious to comply with the British desire for more supplies to be furnished to Turkey, and feels that a considerable step towards solving this difficulty would be to make aid available direct to Turkey, subject to British countersignature of Turkish requisitions.
Some of the other suggestions favoring direct aid to Turkey which were brought out in the meeting were as follows:
- (1)
- The present system is not impressing Turkey that America is interested in her welfare, and is even causing the Turks to regard with “levity” any mention of American aid, according to Mr. MacMurray.
- (2)
- The present system is objectionable from an administrative point of view since the machinery for retransfers is cumbersome and the American authorities have great difficulty in finding out what happens to material given to Britain for retransfer to Turkey.
- (3)
- Direct aid to Turkey would have a strong effect on Turkish morale.
- (4)
- By receiving aid from the United States direct, Turkey would assume a moral obligation to the United States in addition to her treaty obligation towards Great Britain and would therefore be more likely to remain in line.
- (5)
- If Turkey is willing to receive American aid, she should be willing to do so openly.…
- (6)
- Indirect aid to Turkey, through Great Britain, is something of a subterfuge, and unless there are strong reasons to the contrary, the American public has a right to expect that American lend-lease aid be made direct to the beneficiaries, in order that American policy may benefit from the expenditure of American funds.
Both the pro’s and con’s of this argument have merit, it seems to me. It may not be of overwhelming importance, in actual practice, which method is accepted. We might come out at more or less the same point by either method, on the whole. However, I am inclined to believe under the direct method we can adequately take care of the British objections, by close cooperation between ourselves and the British with regard to Turkish requisitions, and at the same time accomplish better results than at present. I am not sanguine that the objections to the present method of aid through Britain can adequately be met by efforts to improve the present system.
The British are really afraid, I believe, that if we make supplies available direct to Turkey, we may follow an independent policy towards Turkey and grant or withhold supplies according to our own ideas of how Turkey is behaving. Lord Halifax’s latest memorandum5 seems to point to this conclusion. I do not believe these fears [Page 918] are well-founded. The direct method seems to be the best means of accomplishing just what the British have been pleading with us to do, which is to get supplies to Turkey.