Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The British Commonwealth; The Near East and Africa, Volume III

867.24/167: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

Ankara, August 9, 1941—4 p.m.
[Received August 10—12:50 a.m.]

289. Personal for Welles. I heartily concur in policy (set forth in fourth paragraph of your 134 August 1) of according Turkey parity with Western Hemisphere countries under Lease-Lend Act; I have never suggested preferential position for her and if consulted should not have recommended that she be put on same basis as countries actually bearing brunt of war. What I have been objecting to was intention recently manifested in certain quarters to disrate or blacklist her in punishment for certain imaginary “discreditable” acts as to which (through what would appear to be a bureaucratic lapse) I was cited as principal witness, despite contrary tenor of my reports.

2. I assume that sole interest of our Government in giving Turkey any benefits from Act derives from our desire to assist Britain by helping to keep Turkey available as a support of British position in Near and Middle East.

3. Under present circumstances, that support takes the passive form of constituting her a non-belligerent buffer between areas of German and British control; and at least until they are themselves in a position to take a more active role in Near East, British are more than content with her friendly neutrality. But Turkish morale is meanwhile subject to great temptations. Turks realize that even with such help as British are now in a position to give them they could not hope to resist a mechanized drive through Thrace to Straits or prevent destructive raids on all their principal cities and strong points from bases already prepared in Bulgaria and the Aegean Islands and they naturally recoil from sharing fate of Yugoslavia and Greece. I, nevertheless, believe (as I have previously reported) that they can be counted on to resist even at cost of self-immolation any overt assault upon their national rights or dignity—that what is to be feared is not their cracking under direct pressure but possibility of their buckling under such lateral strains as propaganda undermining their confidence in the reciprocal loyalty of their British allies.

4. As I see it, therefore, greatest service we can render to cause here would be in helping to build up or at any rate to counteract undermining of Turkish confidence in all out [apparent omission] and our Lend-Lease supplying of military materials should be made to serve primarily that purpose. (For reasons hitherto explained I am not disposed to attach comparable importance to military utility of equipping Turkish forces with a view to possibility of their eventual active participation in hostilities.) I submit that our supplying of equipment to Turks has not been so conducted as to contribute appreciably to that psychological result; and I venture following observations and suggestions:

5. Instead of my being instructed and especially cautioned (as in Department’s 128, July 18⁸⁴) to treat as a purely personal confidence fact (of which I know British and I think Turks are cognizant) that we have put Turkey on basis of parity with American Republics, I should be at liberty to discuss matter freely and frankly with Turkish officials and make plain to them that this basis is one of exceptional favor to a country which is neither a component element of our defensive provisions nor an active participant in war. I should furthermore be authorized to explain that we are giving them this assistance as part of our policy of aid to Britain and that its purpose is to make good (by agreement with British, who have to share with us disadvantages of sparing to Turkey things that both we and they need for our own use) the promises that exigencies of war have made it impossible for British to fulfill.

6. Instead of being forbidden (as in Department’s 110 of June 28) to make use of information furnished me as to supplies we have made and are making available to Turkey, Embassy should be kept currently informed of status of this matter and not merely authorized but instructed to discuss it as a matter of common interest with proper Turkish officials in order to make them, aware of what is being done and conscious of our readiness to accommodate our efforts to their requirements as fully as our own necessities allow (as for example, in doing our utmost to meet such particular needs as aviation repair material for which they made request transmitted in my 161, May 22⁸⁵). I would suggest that monthly summaries of status of this matter be telegraphed to me for my own use and that of Military Attaché.

7. Secretiveness enjoined upon me by my present instructions with regard to a matter of joint concern to British, Turks and ourselves not only embarrasses me in my relations with my British colleague (who is quite fully informed in regard to it) and with Turkish officials … it definitely precludes any possibility of Embassy’s doing its part in realizing only purpose which really justifies spending American money for benefit of Turkish Army. If that purpose is as sound as I believe it to be I submit it should not be made nugatory by instructions to the effect that our Government’s representation in Turkey should hold itself aloof and pretend ignorance of the whole business.

MacMurray

84. Not printed.
85. Not printed; the release was requested of $50,000 worth of machine tools ordered and paid for by the Turkish Ambassador at Washington (811.20 (d) Regulations/2436).