867.24/309
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called to see me this morning. He read to me a secret report received by his Foreign Office from the British Ambassador in Ankara under date of July 23 which stated that the Chief of the Air Staff of the Turkish Government and the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Government had informed the British Embassy that the Turkish Government, after a period of vacillation subsequent to the signing of the Turkish-German treaty, had reached the conclusion that their treaty meant nothing at all and that the British Government should realize that the treaty between Turkey and Great Britain formed the cornerstone of Turkish policy. These Turkish generals further stated that it was essential that secret talks between the Turkish General Staff and the British General Staff be undertaken immediately and, in order to avoid any leaks, suggested that these conversations be held either in Palestine or in Egypt. They further stated that they believed that a German attack was imminent; that Turkey would resist to the utmost any such German attack; and that they considered it extremely urgent that the defense preparations by Great Britain in Syria and Iraq be expedited to the utmost extent possible.
The British Government, Lord Halifax said, considered this statement of extreme importance and as being highly gratifying, and consequently believed that there should be no “hold up” in furnishing military supplies and equipment to Turkey.
[Page 887]I stated to Lord Halifax that this message was very similar in its tenor to a message I had received today [yesterday] from Mr. Eden through the American Ambassador in London.80 I stated that my own view was that because of the importance of Turkey to Great Britain in the latter’s campaign in the Near East, the British point of view as to the nature or quantity of supplies to be furnished Turkey should necessarily have great weight in the decisions which might be reached in Washington. I therefore recommended that these views be put forward by the appropriate British officials in Washington in their conversations with our own military and naval authorities as well as with the lease-lend authorities. I said it seemed to me that the determining factor in the consideration of these and similar questions was where the military equipment and matériel we might have available could most effectively be used from the standpoint of the war as a whole. I said that I felt that this point of view was becoming more and more preponderant on the part of the officials of the United States.
- Telegram No. 3341, August 1, 2 p.m., not printed.↩