740.0011 European War 1939/12954: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 9—3:40 p.m.]
238. Intellectual and emotional ferment which my 156, May 19, noon, reported as going on in minds of Turks is still in process. Looking back on developments I would reemphasize that they were stamped by obstruction [destruction] of Belgrade which brought home to them realization that their previous concepts of national defense were out of date and illusory. Their fears and their sense of helplessness were increased by progress of Balkan and Aegean campaign; they were awed by German successes, disheartened by British defeats and acutely conscious of being hemmed in and cut off from any support by their allies and indeed from any dependable communications with outside world other than Axis-controlled Europe.
2. They were furthermore annoyed with British who from time to time badgered them to make one or another gesture of solidarity with Allies (which Turks felt would quite likely involve them in the German campaign) despite understanding with Eden that Turkey could best contribute to common cause by remaining nonbelligerent at least until new balance of forces might be established in Near East.
3. It was while Turks were in temper thus indicated that Germans discontinued movement which had seemed to threaten occupation of Syria and Iraq and began to withdraw their forces from Balkans and Aegean Island and furthermore adopted towards Turkey tone of good will and flattery. This created in journalistic and popular circles extraordinary mood of relief and complacency. More realistic and cautious official circles shared that mood to surprising degree, although with qualification that something must be done to make dream of peace come true. In that spirit they undertook (with acquiescence of the British) exploratory conversations with Germans as to possibility of some sort of agreement which would evidence that there is no present cause of conflict or antagonism between them (see my 200, June 19, 5 p.m.).
4. It would now seem that when Papen carried these conversations beyond the field of mere economic agreement he appealed to latent [Page 879] Turkish suspicions of Russia by recounting Molotov’s demand for bases on the Straits; and that in proposing neutrality pact which would enable Turkey to hold aloof in event of war between Germany and Soviets he must at least have intimated that that was in prospect; for even those Turkish officials who at the time professed skepticism of such an eventuality now refer outspokenly to alternatives then presented—namely, German campaign either into Russia or into Turkey and Levant. Though warning Turks of danger of entering into any sort of political accord with Germany British somewhat grudgingly refrained from making definite objection to proposed neutrality pact. They were, however, utterly taken aback when Turks informed them of having already signified acceptability of new German proposal taking not the negative form of neutrality pact but more positive form of treaty of friendship.
5. It is true that treaty signed with Germany June 18 did not in fact impart any juridical prejudice to alliance with Britain; in first place safeguarding clause was written into its preamble; and it was furthermore the case that through successive developments in war situation British had agreed in their own interest to waive every conceivable contingent obligation on part of Turkey except what she would be expected to do even in absence of any alliance, namely, to defend what Foreign Minister had defined to British Ambassador as her “territory, sovereignty, independence, and honor.” Yet mere fact of concluding treaty of friendship with enemy of her ally gave occasion for general questioning of Turkey’s loyalty, impaired British prestige particularly in Moslem world, gave German propaganda wide field for exploitation, and (especially in view of consultation clause and concurrent declarations about attitude of press) opened up possibilities for insinuation of German influence in Turks domestic affairs as well as in their relations with British.
6. I believe thinking Turks quite generally realized that they had to this extent let British down and felt corresponding sense of humiliation which manifested itself in readiness of officials, journalists and private persons to volunteer explanations, justifications, one [and?], indeed, fervent encomiums of “Turkey’s policy of peace” whereas they react with hyper-sensitive aloofness, if not in fact resentment, to any mention of subject by foreigners. There seems to be going on in their minds curious though understandable spiritual process of self-exculpation by subconscious rationalization of what they have done. There have become apparent two lines of thinking not wholly compatible one with other but generally intermingled in various degrees.
. . . . . .
(b) Other line (more prevalent among private individuals and in subtly veiled form in some sections of press) is more directly inspired by Germans and potentially more dangerous: It is that Turks owe [Page 880] nothing anyhow to British who have never been their friends whereas Germans have never been their enemies; that alliance was made for protection of Turkey but that British have perverted it into obligation of Turkey to protect their imperial interests; that British have held back on their promised supplies of necessary war material and by their muddling in Eastern Mediterranean have created rather than relieved difficulties for Turkey and that Turks are therefore well out of it in having been able to reach with Germany understanding that hedges bet they were misguided enough to make [on] an undependable ally.
7. In first flush of their pride and elation in having as they thought diverted immediate menace towards their historic antagonist, Turks have shown marked tendency to insist that they had never ceased to regard Russia as their primary enemy despite Atatürk’s policy of conciliation—policy which one of his closest associates at time tells me he adopted with misgivings but which was thereafter followed not only faithfully but with confidence in Russia’s good faith until 2 years ago when Soviets made proposals indicating they had not relinquished imperialistic designs upon Straits (my telegram 127, October 18, 193978). On second thought, however, Turks are conscious that the German campaign in Russia promises new dilemma for them; they realize that if Soviets repel attack they will be free to develop policy of self-interest unrestrained by any necessity for consideration of Turkish interests; but they apprehend that if Germany should have quick success she might be expected in near future to drive towards Suez either directly through Turkey or indirectly through Iran and Iraq and Syria with result of isolating this country completely; and they are therefore pathetically anxious that campaign should bog down into one of mutual attrition. This anxiety lest newly recreated friendship with Germany should prove to afford only a respite, introduces new element into Turks psychological ferment; and while I do not think it impairs their determination to defend against any outright assault their last ditch position even in hopeless conflict, I am afraid that it lays them open to wearing down of their morale by temporizing and compromise and efforts at conciliation which might carry them further than they mean to go towards Germany’s side.
8. I must in frankness admit that Turks’ morale is now less solid and stable than I have hitherto believed it would prove. Their convictions and sympathies are still strongly against Nazi regime, they fully realize that German victory would mean end of Turkish independence and they put no faith in Hitler’s promises; yet one senses among them such a bewildered yearning to be left alone as might [Page 881] under conceivable circumstances tempt them to undertake desperate hazard of buying peace with Germany. I still do not think their morale would crack under direct pressure but I fear it might give way under lateral strain. It is for that reason that I feel (as indicated in my 207, June 21) that it would be a mistake to do anything that might add to their inner turmoil, demoralizing suspicion that their friends may desert them and leave them to face German menace by themselves.
9. I am not in a position to judge what it means to us in our support of British war effort to prevent Turkey’s drifting further towards Germany and perhaps even being forced like Sweden into the position of according passage through her territories; nor do I feel able to give any assurance that such developments could definitely be prevented by any degree of material aid that we could furnish. But I submit that if (as I assume) our Government regards as essential maintenance of Turkish barrier to German advance into Near and Middle East then it is a question of how large premium we are willing to pay upon insurance policy against Turkey’s being manipulated into the mood of seeking safety under Germany’s aegis. My own estimate of situation is that with eyes open to possibility of failure, we should nevertheless reckon it worth our while to continue material aid to this Government in degree sufficient to retain so far as possible its confidence in support by democratic cause.
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