867.24/153

The British Embassy to the Department of State

The British Government have been giving earnest consideration to the policy which, in the light of recent events, they should adopt in regard to the sending of supplies of war materials and other articles to Turkey from the United Kingdom. They have now decided that the present priority to Turkey shall be maintained and that their existing policy as regards both military and civilian supplies should continue [Page 876] as before, namely that while no increase in the volume of supplies is possible there should be a steady flow of both military and civilian material, subject to the proviso that caution should be exercised in regard to long-term projects and no undue call made on shipping space in respect of articles which would be of little use to the British authorities themselves in the Middle East.

The British Embassy has been instructed to inform the State Department of the above decision and to explain that it was based on the following considerations:

(a)
The British Government are under an obligation under the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance to provide Turkey with war material. If they were now to cut off supplies they would be failing to fulfil that obligation just at the time when they have been successful in obtaining assurances that this Treaty is safeguarded under the preamble of the recent Turco-German agreement.
(b)
If the British authorities were to cut off a large proportion of their military supplies to Turkey the Turks would either assume that Great Britain had lost all trust in them or that Great Britain was in such a difficult military position that they could not afford to send any important supplies to Turkey. Either assumption would be almost equally damaging and either might cause the Turks to turn to Germany for their military supplies. If the latter eventuality materialized the Germans would be encouraged to make further demands on Turkey—e. g. for the dismissal of British personnel now in Turkey, the passage of war material, the suppression of British news, etc.
(c)
The disadvantages of cutting off the military supplies might well outweigh the advantages. If Turkey obtained the impression that Britain had lost confidence in her she might well give way to the first German demand for a passage through Turkey of troops and war material and the small addition to British supplies in the Middle East resulting from a change in our supplies policy towards Turkey might be more than offset by the appearance of Germans in strength on the Turco-Syrian frontiers.
(d)
If Turkey sided with Germany all the Arab countries—Iran and Egypt—would be affected.

In the circumstances, it is felt in London that the wisest course would be to maintain military supplies to Turkey at their present level until it is seen how the matter develops as a result of the recent Turco-German agreement. If, in spite of efforts to show the Turks that Great Britain continues to trust them it becomes plain that Turkey is unable or unwilling to resist the increasing German pressure, then, but only then, will the British authorities cut down these supplies.

The British Government feel that while the United States Government are of course under no Treaty obligations to the Turks, yet the same arguments apply to the question of American supplies to Turkey. There is too the further consideration that if the Turks obtained the impression that they were being abandoned by the United States, they might find some excuse to refuse the renewal of their agreement with [Page 877] Great Britain due to expire next January, whereby they deliver to Great Britain their whole output of chrome which is subsequently sent to the United States.

For all these reasons, the British Government hope that the United States Government will feel able to adopt an attitude similar to that of the British Government and that they will feel able to continue to give the Turks the exceptional facilities that are now being extended to them.