740.0011 European War 1939/12351: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

212. (1) It would now appear that eventuality of war between Germany and Russia played considerable role in negotiation of German-Turkish treaty of friendship. As I have reported to Department Germans at one time proposed agreement designed to ensure neutrality of Turkey in event of war between Germany and Russia. In explaining to British reasons for concluding treaty Turkish Government emphasized it would facilitate such war. This justification of treaty was also advanced by high official of Foreign Office to an officer of Embassy. Department will recall that Numan Bey in course of conservation reported yesterday in my 208,70 stated that advantage which Germans would gain from treaty was that it would afford protection to German right flank in such struggle.

(2) On basis of information now available I am convinced that Germans in bringing about Turkey’s acceptance of treaty made adroit use of fear and antagonism toward Soviet which has come to exist in high Turkish circles. (As Department I believe is aware, Hitler made use of Rumanian animosity towards Soviet regime in gaining Rumanian acquiescence in German plans with regard to Rumania, holding forth prospect of German assistance in recovering lost territory and getting rid of Bolshevik menace forever. Former Yugoslav Minister to Moscow has informed me that Hitler won over violently anti-Soviet Prince Paul to his plans by assuring him that [Page 871] German action in Balkans was designed only to obtain protection of German flank in approaching war with Soviet Union.)

(3) There are many indications that Turkish leaders have recently come to conclusion that Moscow is definitely hostile to Turkey and that friendship which existed between the two countries prior to conclusion of German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact71 could not be restored. In my conversation with him yesterday Numan spoke with frankness that neither Foreign Minister nor he has ever permitted himself in talking with me about Russia. I have repeatedly had occasion to report (with my own reservations) their optimistic statements about better relations with Soviets. This time he gave me impression of being thoroughly disgusted with Russians and wanting to relieve his mind about them. He said that during course of Turkish-German negotiations British Ambassador had suggested that Turks consult with Russians in accordance with protocol between them of December 1929; in reply Foreign Office had furnished British memorandum of about 20 instances in which since war began Turks had suggested to Soviets various bases for new rapprochement—to none of which had any definite reply even been received. Numan in stating to me case involving Bulgaria (referred to below) in connection with which question had arisen as to obligation of each Government under 1929 protocol to keep other informed as to any negotiations with a neighboring state; Molotov had at first pretended not to recollect that provision and had then asked if Turkey would be willing to abide by it and was answered affirmatively. Whereupon this Government had instructed its Ambassador to go so far as to tell Molotov that Turkey would in fact be prepared to extend scope of protocol so as to obligate both parties to keep each other currently informed if [of?] any negotiations with any other government whatsoever. This offer had been completely ignored. In these circumstances Turks had told British that there was no use talking about anything to Russians who would only peddle to Germans any useful information they might pick up.

(4) More persuasive than Soviet Government’s unresponsiveness to efforts to restore cordial relations had been evidence obtained by Turks of existence of hostile intentions on its part. My telegram No. 37, February 21 escorted [reported] on Numan’s authority that Secretary General of Soviet Foreign Office on occasion of visit to Sofia last November had offered Bulgarians part of Turkish Thrace. Yesterday Numan specified that proposal was that Bulgaria extend its frontier to Enos–Midia line while Russia would take rest of Thrace down to Straits. When questioned about this proposal by Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Molotov had been evasive. Again on his visit [Page 872] to Berlin Molotov had proposed to Germans as basis of closer cooperation that Russia should occupy “certain bases” on Straits while Thracian Hinterland should go to Bulgaria.72 This according to Numan Hitler had categorically refused. On being informed of this by Germans Turks had taken this matter up through their Embassy in Moscow with Molotov who had again answered evasively. (This as I have heard from various sources within past few days was given by Government spokesman at secret party meeting on afternoon of 18th as one of principal underlying reasons necessitating new Turkish-German treaty.)

(5) It is my opinion that Numan’s attitude reflects present viewpoint of Turkish leaders towards the Soviet Union. Various influential Turkish statesmen have recently in conversation with members of my staff have given expression to anti-Soviet sentiments. I have been informed that Minister for Foreign Affairs who while distrustful of Soviet Government ever since his visit to Moscow 2 years ago has been restrained in any expression of his opinions with regard to Soviet Union was very outspoken at private luncheon a few days ago in criticising Soviet Government. Conclusion of German-Turkish Treaty of Friendship may well mark termination of friendship which developed between Soviet and Kemalist regimes and recrudescence of historical antagonism between Turkey and Russia over control of Straits.

Repeated to Bucharest, Moscow.

MacMurray
  1. Supra.
  2. Signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. vii, p. 245.
  3. Probably a reference to Molotov’s proposal of November 26, 1940, subsequent to his visit to Berlin, Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, p. 258.