740.0011 European War 1939/12250: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 20—7:05 p.m.]
200. I am now in a position to report following background of Turco-German agreement:
Shortly after Papen’s conversation with President Inönü reported in my 151, May 15, my British colleague frankly informed me he had reason to know there was something in the wind between Germans and Turks who were seeking to stave off as long as possible clash with Germany which they feel to be ultimately almost inevitable. In view of his Government’s agreed policy of keeping Turkey out of war as long as possible he was disposed to take at least complaisant attitude toward such development provided it should imply no political commitment or involvement of this country; he thought something might perhaps be worked out on economic lines by way of barter agreement more extensive than those hitherto arranged and including even copper and other minerals (other than chrome) in exchange for German manufactures (particularly spare machine parts) urgently needed by Turkish industry. While matter was, however, in such nebulous stage that he asked me to consider his intimations as mere private background information until there should emerge at least some definite tendency in these discussions.
For some time the rather academic exchanges of views between Turks and Germans (of which Hugessen was kept informed) seemed to make no progress.
He then told me Turks had confided to him that Germans had orally proposed possibility of concluding pact directed towards keeping Turkey neutral in event of hostilities between Germany and Soviets although it was not clear whether Russia was to be specifically [Page 865] referred to. Turks apparently did not treat this proposal very seriously; and he himself took attitude of letting them use that opening to explore German intentions. He again asked me to make no report of matter at stage not definite enough to be taken up with London. I should here interpolate what he later put to me quite bluntly that his Government feels it has reason for profound distrust of secrecy of our codes; see my 50, April 20, 1939,65 to you and my April 27 to London presumably repeated to you.66
At Foreign Office reception late in evening of 14th he took me aside to tell me he had to his amazement been informed by Foreign Minister few hours earlier that 2 days before Papen had urgently proposed text of a general non-aggression pact; that Minister had insisted any such agreement must contain clause (such as he had always demanded as condition to any eventual agreement) safeguarding alliance with Britain but had on that condition consented to refer question to higher authority; and that he had now received and communicated to German Ambassador (precipitately and without communication to the British) his Government’s approval in principle (see my Nos. 192 and 19367).
Since then position has developed with confusing rapidity; your instructions crossing my reports have been out of date on reaching me; and I have felt not only warranted but obligated to use my best judgment in applying to circumstances of moment intent rather than wording of even your very categorical instructions.
2. Conversations reported in later and less confidential of my telegrams of yesterday left upon my mind this disappointing set of impressions: (1st) that Turkish policy has evolved into less resolute mood than I have hitherto contemplated as possible; (2d) that Turks are naive enough to suppose that any harmful impressions upon opinion in United States, Britain, or elsewhere can be conjured away by mere statement there is no basis for them; and (3d) that they do not seem altogether to realize extent to which United States is party in interest in matters concerning war.