740.0011 European War 1939/11120: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 20—4 a.m.]
156. For Secretary and Under Secretary. As stated not only to me but to other more directly interested Ambassadors present attitude of Turkish Government is that it desires and intends to remain nonbelligerent unless its territory is attacked or its sovereignty or honor are threatened by demands such as: (a) to join Tripartite Pact; (b) to conclude nonaggression treaty with Germany; (c) to renounce its alliance with Britain; or (d) to permit passage of troops. I still believe that this formulation of Turkey’s position represents sincere convictions and intentions of leaders of Turkish policy.
[Page 851]2. Although this does not in substance differ from what I have hitherto reported as last ditch position to which this Government has (to my mind realistically and wisely) retired through almost 2 years of gradual abatement of former exaggerated presumptions of power and influence in Southeastern Europe, I nevertheless cannot but feel that it is to be understood and interpreted now in somewhat different light or at least with different nuances since that position was adopted, say couple of months ago. There has in meanwhile occurred demoralizing realization (see my 96, April 11 and 101, April 18) of perils and horrors of warfare undreamed of in experience of this warlike people; and it would appear that despite substantial recovery of morale the intellectual and emotional ferment which it produced has not yet worked itself out in Turkish mind. I cannot otherwise account for fact that rather banal flattery in Hitler’s speech of May 4 about genius of Atatürk54 and realistic policy of Turkey’s present leaders have been quite generally seized on by Turkish press as persuasive evidence that Germany has no aggressive intentions and occasions for rather servile protestations of “loyalty” of this country’s neutrality. Although it needs watching, however, I do not think this new slant of somewhat superficial press (which has perhaps merely overdone its job on official intimations to “pipe down a bit” in its tone towards Germany) should be taken too seriously.
3. Of far greater actual or potential significance is almost imperceptible change in attitude of Turkish administration towards the British, scarcely to be detected amidst formulas retailed by Foreign Office officials but more nearly tangible in private conversation of other influential personalities such as an official “elder statesman” Rauf Bey. While they have none of them said outright any of these things I venture to summarize in this way my inferences from what has been said both to me and to members of my staff.
Although it were only upon material grounds Turks have no alternative but to be faithful to their alliance with British because they can hope for national survival only in event of British victory. They can be useful to British cause as guardians of this gateway to Near and Middle East but only on defensive; they cannot do the impossible and are puzzled and hurt by vacillations of British policy which at one moment agrees that they must reserve their forces for that task and next importunes them to do something that would lay them open to head on clash with Germans which would destroy their usefulness for agreed purpose. They are perhaps over sensitively inclined to attribute these importunities to British distrust of [Page 852] their loyalty and consequent desire to commit them by armed involvement against Germany.
Up to quite recently Turks (who had never wavered in their confidence in ultimate success of British morale and particularly of sea power) had relatively detached attitude of rooters at football game who saw other team doing most of scoring but nevertheless felt sure their side would win; but past 6 weeks or so had changed it all from exciting game to life and death reality.
British had agreed to give them tanks and guns and planes, had pleaded inability to deliver them, had sent them to Greece and had then told the world that these things had been sent with foreknowledge that they would be lost in hopeless campaign. Why should not they have been sent to Turkey.
Granted British Navy had been busy in evacuating Imperial forces from Greece; but why had it so completely ignored overshadowing strategic importance of Greek Aegean Islands and permitted them to be occupied to almost hopeless disadvantage not only of its own freedom of action in that sea but also of Turkey’s defensive arrangements including air bases which Turks had prepared with British collaboration near western coast. How did they even ignore Turkish warnings of German and German-controlled vessels going out through Straits to participate in operations which gave Germans control of Aegean and its shores.
Why were British stupid enough not to take Arab tribal feuds as they found them but to make issue of Iraqi domestic quarrel with result of stirring up hornets’ nest that threatens to close Turkey’s sole dependable channel of supply from Britain or elsewhere.
4. Turkish leaders seem to have come to sudden quite comprehensible realization that they are very junior partners in joint enterprise whose affairs may indeed be conducted on lines that seem to them to take insufficient account of their particular interests.
Those close to President who have said things permitting of these interpretations have further gone on to imply that if such ideas came to prevail they might impair confidence in pro-British policy for which he is responsible and thus undermine his unquestioned leadership and destroy sense of national unity. With a people whose intense nationalism is still immature and overemotional this possibility cannot be ignored.
5. While professing again my own belief that Turks will prove staunch in any final test I must in frankness report that in this faith (possibly diversified by doubt) my British colleague and I are almost alone; most of our colleagues whose opinions are worth ascertaining are disposed to feel that they will flinch under increasing German pressure. Although I must admit that ferment of Turkish opinion has taken [Page 853] developments I had not foreseen I am, nevertheless, not yet persuaded that it represents any change in fundamental position on essentials rather than mere shift of stance in meeting unanticipated set of day to day events.
- Kemal Atatürk, former President of Turkey.↩