Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The British Commonwealth; The Near East and Africa, Volume III

740.0011 European War 1939/9783: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

Ankara, April 8, 1941—7 p.m.
[Received April 10—4:30 p.m.]

92. [For] Secretary and Under Secretary. A week ago I received visit from Rauf Bey (former Prime Minister) who, while keeping politically inconspicuous, is intimate personal adviser of President Ismet and whom I am disposed to believe President is using as informal medium for communicating his ideas through us to the British. He outlined to me as though they were his own private views following appreciation of situation as regards Turkey’s attitude towards war: This Government has committed itself wholeheartedly to the British cause; even if there were doubt as to its wisdom that decision is nevertheless irrevocable. It is therefore prepared to do whatever it usefully can do to make that cause prevail. With utterly inadequate equipment now at its disposal, however, it could not hope to carry out successful operation beyond Turkish borders either in Bulgaria or in Greek Thrace. With that possibility excluded Rauf feels this country’s best contribution to cause would be to remain on guard at its own borders to perform function that he, as old naval man describes (by somewhat loose analogy) as that of fleet in being. He said that British had for a long time misunderstood that viewpoint; they and French had made to Turks promises of all sorts of material assistance that had in fact proved impossible for most part to fulfill, but had gone on thinking that Turks could, at suitable moment, be projected into action in support of whatever plans might have been devised for them. Implication of this attitude that Turks particularly resented was that it seemed to indicate, on the part of British, distrust of their loyalty and desire to get them involved, if only for sake of committing them. This had led to certain degree of underlying distrust and shadow boxing until arrival of Eden and Dill at end of February. That gave opportunity for completely frank exchange of views which, although perhaps disappointing to British in that it made clear limitations upon possibilities of active Turkish military support, was nevertheless very satisfactory to them in that it dispelled previous doubts and enabled them to assess definitely Turkey’s military potentialities and agree upon a clean-cut allocation to her of a fixed, though relatively passive, role in any operations that might be undertaken in Balkan area.

Rauf said he came to me just for sake of talking out with a friend his own apprehensions that Yugoslavia’s abrupt turning against Axis which of course created new political situation might be taken by British as occasion for reopening military understanding with Turkey reached during Eden’s visit, and that they might again try to push Turkey into attempting role which would involve defeat of Turkish Army, ruin of this country, and destruction of only bulwark against German invasion and domination of Near and Middle East.

2. When I saw Foreign Minister⁴⁹ next day he was somewhat reserved about developments, but nevertheless, more categorical than he has ever been with me in stating that Turkish Army is not prepared for offensive action and must of necessity confine itself to purely defensive role. He insisted this country was already doing its part by containing on Thracian frontier 5 divisions or so of Bulgarians and (further back from boundary) perhaps as many as 10 German. I asked if there were any way in which Turkey and Yugoslavia could collaborate for mutual support. He answered only by pointing on map to Macedonia and asking rhetorical question whether Turks here could really help there. Saying that I quite understood that Turks might not think it good strategy to enter vacuum which Greeks and British seemed to have decided to create in Greece and Thrace I inquired whether his Government contemplated possibility of putting into operation its conditional alliance with Great Britain making air and naval bases available to British forces and entering upon what would indubitably be state of war with Germany. He replied negatively and (as I think with entire honesty) that his Government did not think that in immediate circumstances that would be helpful to cause.

3. In even more than usually outspoken talks with British colleague I have discussed these impressions and am disposed to feel that he and the various British missions that have actually been here are fully cognizant of situation of Turkish Army and in general sympathetic with military policy based thereon. (Whereas London authorities have suggested possibility of persuading Turks to send a few divisions to Greece as symbol of unity with British, Greeks and Yugoslavs, British diplomatic and military representatives here have not urged this directly because conscious that it might dangerously arouse Turkish obstinacy against any appearance of pressure but have confined themselves to intimations that Turks might be well advised in their own interest to do something of the sort.)

4. I now understand from him, however, that since German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece he feels that Turks are showing tendency to translate that policy of merely defensive military action into one of political aloofness that balks even at giving any statement of continuing moral solidarity. Immediately on receipt of news of German and Italian declarations he saw Foreign Minister to ask his views and received intimation that nothing in Turkey’s attitude had been changed thereby; he recalled Minister’s assurance to him (my 17, January 24) that this Government would regard attack upon Saloniki from any quarter as casus belli and was amazed to find Minister (for first time in his experience with him) evasive to the point of professing not to recollect such assurance and not even prepared to declare that such attack would be “mortal danger” to Turkey (see my 80, March 25). Minister appears to have been equally noncommittal and aloof with Greek and Yugoslav Ambassadors. All three seem to be seriously perturbed lest Turkey’s passivity create impression of her having dissociated herself from what she herself has hitherto urged as common cause.

5. At Hugessen’s instance I conveyed today to Rauf as my personal observation impression that British still adhere to Eden’s assurance that as regards military action they have nothing to ask of Turkey but that they (as well as other friendly observers including American journalist) seem to sense on the part of officials and inspired press sudden chill in Turkey’s sympathy towards her allies; and I contrasted this Government’s failure to give even confidential word of reassurance to Ambassadors of its allies at this new crisis with the expressions of sympathy and helpfulness which oh this and previous occasions our own Government has promptly and spontaneously offered to Balkan countries although under no like obligations to them. He remarked that criticism was destructive and asked what constructive step could be suggested. Indicating I did not feel it was for me to suggest anything more concrete I hoped that Turkish Government was bearing in mind great psychological danger of maintaining politically negative attitude which would create among her friends impression of indifference or lukewarmness. He said that if British had any feeling that Turkey was not doing her full part in that respect Hugessen should see President and thresh matter out with him before such difference of opinion could develop into mutual suspicion. I have passed on this suggestion.

6. By way of summary statement of situation as I conceive it from this viewpoint I submit following:

(a) Turkey is desperately anxious to avoid hostilities but will fight (perhaps inefficiently but courageously and doggedly) if attacked.

(b) If she fights her military effort will not be directed (like Poland’s) towards do or die defense of any particular line or holding of any city.… I think they have made up their minds to possibility that their Cakmak line (at frontier with Bulgaria) might either be broken by frontal attack or turned from Greek Thrace that they would have to fall back to so-called Catalca line and might then have to retire to positions dominating Bosphorus and Dardanelles and perhaps have to retreat into Anatolia and carry on war of harassment and attrition.

(c) This situation might have been different (as possibly it may still be) in event of fulfillment British promises of material assistance. Turks accept without resentment fact that French could do nothing and British only part of what they had undertaken to do in equipping Turkish Army; but as case stands they have had to base plans upon fact that in spite of admirable combative spirit their army must measure and use its strength according to its possibilities in terms of modern warfare and that they must not let themselves be persuaded into attempting more than they can really do.

7. For reasons substantially different from what our more sophisticated Turkish friends expound I wholeheartedly agree with their conclusion that in interest of cause it would be far wiser to let them stay neutral until defensive part is forced upon them.…

Repeated to Athens.

MacMurray

49. Sükrü Saraçoğlu.