740.0011 European War 1939/13750: Telegram
The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 7—11:15 a.m.]
323. My 313, July 27. General de Gaulle sent for me again this afternoon and said he had done so because he knew I was a sincere [Page 781] friend of England and France and he authorized me to make use of our conversation as I saw fit.
He said his relations with the British had reached such a critical stage that he was beginning to doubt whether he could go on like this much longer. Despite all promises made to him by the British Government as recently as July 25, by Lyttelton34 in Cairo, British military seemed determined to thwart and defy him wherever they could. In the first place the armistice terms in themselves were a betrayal of the Free French cause and had been dictated by the British against his own wishes. As far as he was concerned they were, therefore, practically null and void. In the second place, the solemn assurances given him by the British Government and his recent agreements with Lyttelton were being deliberately disregarded by the British military on the spot. And thirdly, British political officers were traveling all over the Jebel Druz, Hauran and Jezideh which gave the natives the impression that the British were the real masters of the country.
General de Gaulle then showed me a letter Lyttelton had sent him July 25 to which were attached two agreements regarding British and French collaboration in Syria and Lebanon. After reading them I remarked that they seemed to me quite fair and logical and if both parties acted in good faith I could not see why there should be trouble. The General replied that he accepted London’s good faith but the good faith of the British military in Syria was more questionable. I said I could not possibly enter into a discussion of this nature and expressed the hope he would tell his British friends quite frankly whenever he thought they were at fault and I knew they would appreciate it. He then startled me by saying he had found it quite useless to talk to them and from now on he would insist on Free French rights “even if this should lead to a rupture of relations with the British.” At first I thought it best to ignore this statement but when a few minutes later he repeated it with emphasis, I said “I deeply deplore your statement, for if you should make it to an indiscreet person you would be playing into the hands of Hitler which I know is furthest from your thoughts. I personally refuse to believe that the situation is such as to justify a threat of this kind. I am certain that with good will and common sense and a little tact on both sides there is no problem between French and British in Syria which cannot be satisfactorily settled. We in America are naturally interested in the preservation of harmony and effective cooperation between all the Allies, because only so will the Axis be defeated.”
[Page 782]We talked for an hour and a quarter but I fear he instinctively distrusts the British and is by nature quite incapable of understanding British character and purpose.
I have informed Generals Wilson and Spears35 of this conversation but Department may wish to repeat above to London.36