740.0011 European War 1939/13243: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 17—1:10 a.m.]
889. The termination of hostilities in Syria has unquestionably been received with great relief in all French circles. While the Government’s efforts under German prodding to stir up public indignation over the British and Gaullist “invasion” of Syria fell rather flat, as indicated in previous telegrams, the daily bulletins of the progress of the fighting in that area with indications of casualties and particularly the thought of Frenchmen fighting Frenchmen gave even the more apathetic elements of the public a feeling of uneasiness [Page 776] and futility. Even those who recognized that the French Government’s delivery of Syrian air bases to Germany during the Iraqi affair amply justified British action hoped only for an early termination of hostilities. In fact, the principal complaint heard from our pro-British friends, both in the Ministries and in French military and naval circles, concerned the failure of the British to have undertaken the operation without sufficient force to end it quickly.
The text of the armistice terms published here today will receive general approval and, in spite of the breast-beating of the “collaborationist” press that the Syrian incident has ended in neither a “capitulation” nor even a “military defeat”, the fairness of the British armistice conditions should help somewhat to remove the bitterness engendered by the affair. (Rochat incidentally attributes the “reasonableness” of the British around the armistice table to the “influence” of our Government.)
Coupled with this sense of relief that the war in Syria is over there is a natural feeling of pride that the French Army, so quickly and decisively destroyed in May and June, 1940, has on a small scale and “outnumbered four to one” proved its worth in Syria. There is also the feeling that the incident has adduced good evidence that France can and will, within the limits of her resources, “defend her empire”, and this aspect of the situation has been helpful in the delicate balance of French relations with Germany in dispelling a certain perhaps not unwarranted Nazi suspicion on this score.
If the British “attack” on Syria did not arouse the bitterness and indignation which might have been expected it was chiefly criticised as ill timed, unnecessary and Gaullist inspired—there is on the other hand no doubt that British military prestige has in no way been enhanced in their eyes by the 4 weeks’ campaign. The firm belief, all too prevalent in France, even among those who most ardently hope for an Allied victory, in British “military incompetence” and talent for “bungling” land operations (as distinct from general admiration in France for the British Navy and the R. A. F.31) has but deepened. The forces of the advocates of Franco-German collaboration would as a result have had their ranks greatly swelled by those who believe, however fallaciously, that a German victory is inevitable and that France should, therefore, endeavor to obtain a better place for herself in a German ruled world by displaying enthusiasm for the New Order from the present moment, were it not for several offsetting factors: The first and foremost of these is the strength and power of resistance which the Russian Army has displayed and the corollary feeling in all quarters in France that German losses both in men and material in the eastern campaign are far heavier than Hitler anticipated. A [Page 777] further offsetting factor is American occupation of Iceland32 and the significance of its implications. In spite of this, the evidence of British lack of military and strategic efficiency displayed, in French eyes, in the Syrian test has added one more discouragement to our pro-British at Paris to the list which began with the loss of Benghazi.
Repeated to London.
- Royal Air Force.↩
- See vol. ii, pp. 776 ff.↩