740.0011 European War 1939/11909a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Leahy )

470. Please seek an appointment with Marshal Pétain at the earliest practicable moment and deliver to him the following oral message, leaving with him an aide-mémoire:

“The Government of the United States has, ever since the Franco-German Armistice,3 been examining closely all the facts and circumstances that come to its attention in order to ascertain the true nature [Page 735] of the French policy and the French course with respect to Germany. In view of the past utterances of M. Laval, Dorian and others, the particular situation in Syria gives cause for special concern. Note has been taken of the fact that the French Government did not consider it necessary to defend Syria when the Germans made use of Syrian airports contrary to the requirements of the Armistice and in violation of the agreement of 1924 between the Governments of France and of the United States, with regard to the preservation of the control over Syria.

It would seem that a question has now arisen as to the respective attitudes of the French and the British Governments with respect to Syria. In examining this the Government of the United States considers that a sharp distinction must be made between the purely local aspect of Syrian developments and the large issue involved. In this latter phase, it appears obvious that Germany requires Syria in connection with its military operations against Iraq, and against the Suez Canal. The past action of the French authorities in permitting use of facilities in Syria as bases for further extension of German military operations in the Middle East necessarily affected adversely the British position in their present struggle against German forces. The French Government found it unnecessary to utter a word of objection, still less to offer resistance, to an avowed and actual German movement of conquest in the direction of Iraq, Egypt and the Suez Canal, using Syria as a base for that purpose. In view of this fact, it is impossible for this Government to understand why France now finds it necessary to fight the British in that area when Britain’s only objective is to prevent further use of Syria as a base of German operations against its own forces.

It would seem plain to this Government that the real interest in opposing the British in Syria is not that of France, but that of Hitler; and that the French military operations now in progress are designed not to further French, but rather German interests. It believes that the broader issue involved in the present Syrian development is of far greater importance to French interests and the future of Frenchmen than the smaller, and more local, though more immediate issue as to the occupation of Syria. The broader effect of the present French policy in Syria would appear to be the creation of a situation furthering Germany’s program of attempted crushing of the British position in the Middle East, rather than protection either of Syria as such or of any French interest therein.

In its large aspect the issue touches the very foundation of the future continuance of French life, independence and civilization. Under the guise of protecting control over Syria, it would seem that there is: being carried out a gratuitous act of vast military aid to Hitler which if successful would assist him in his supreme purpose of conquering Great Britain, and securing control of the high seas, and thereby endangering those liberties and free institutions so precious to every American, which it is believed are still precious to all Frenchmen.”

Hull
  1. Signed June 22, 1940; for text, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. ix, p. 671.