740.0011 European War 1939/10640: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

128. A few days ago the British Consul General communicated to me the Department’s instructions to our Ambassador at Vichy regarding British views on the subject of possible Axis aggressions against North Africa and Syria. He also communicated substance to the High Commissioner.

As there have been pro-Iraq street demonstrations in Beirut and the British Consulate in Damascus had many of its windows broken by a mob I went to Damascus today to discuss the situation with the head of Government and the principal Syrian leaders in the light of events in Iraq and the Department’s point of view. I talked to them along the lines of my 112, April 21, and 124, April 30, and stressed the necessity of resolute action to counter Axis machinations if they did not wish to compromise the future of all Arab countries forever.

I again saw Shukri Kuwatly—see my 105, April 9—who said everything could be arranged if only Great Britain would make a definite statement promising Syria her independence after the war. But when I asked him whether, in the event of such a promise and the failure of the French to resist a German invasion of Syria, the Syrians would ask the British Government to defend their country he said “you do not expect me to invite the British to turn Syria into a battlefield (?)” (Please compare this statement with numbered paragraph 6 of my telegram 89, March 28). I replied, it seemed to me it was the Axis that was trying to turn the whole world into a battlefield by the most arrantly high-handed proceedings any nation has ever been guilty of. Syria instead of being the keystone of a peaceful and happy Middle Eastern arch was about to be used by the Axis as a wedge with which to split the arch asunder and open the way for fresh crimes.

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I also saw Fakhri el Baroody, a popular Nationalist leader, and told him practically the same thing. I asked him how his followers would like the idea of having Syria’s future decided by Hitler whose views on “inferior races” were well known. His answer was that in the past the fate of the Arabic speaking countries had been in the hands of London and Paris and the results had not been happy either.

The only leader who seemed to be genuinely anxious to keep the Axis out of Syria was Sheik Taj-ed-Din—see paragraph 2 of my 122, April 28—who is pro-French and told me frankly he was prepared to cooperate with the British if they should decide to protect Syria against Axis aggression and the Vichy Government ordered the French here not to resist. He requested me to pass this on to the British and I have done so.

On the whole I found that events in Iraq have had a deplorable effect on the Syrians. Even in circles which are not anti-British the belief is gaining ground that they may herald the decline and fall of British power and influence in the Middle East and that at this most critical juncture in the war Great Britain may find it impossible to spare enough troops to save Syria, And the moment one mentions American assistance people repeat parrot-like and ad nauseam the German refrain that it will come too late (see also last paragraph of my 89, March 28).

While Syria is still outside the power of the Axis it seems incredible that Great Britain should permit Germany to take advantage of Vichy’s subservience to Berlin and again instigate new bases for military, naval and air action. It seems to me the complete disintegration of the French Empire especially in Indochina and West Africa would be a matter of vital concern not only to the British, but also to American security, and the Achilles heel of overseas France today is Syria.

Repeated to Vichy and Cairo.

Engert