740.0011 European War 1939/9885: Telegram
The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State
Beirut, April 9, 1941—8 p.m.
[Received April 12—6:25 a.m.]
[Received April 12—6:25 a.m.]
105. During a recent visit to Damascus I had an opportunity of conferring with Khaled Azem, the new head of the Syrian Government; [delegate] of the High Commissioner, M. Lavastre; the Commander-in-Chief of French troops in Syria, General Delhomme; as well as four of the principal nationalist leaders including Shukri Kuwatly. The following is a summary of my impressions.
- 1.
- There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that the recent disturbances in Syria and Beirut were engineered by Germans with the active and particularly official support of the Iraqi Government (see also second paragraph of my 88, March 26). The Iraqi Consul General in Damascus61a is openly boasting that the Syrian Nationalists are “allies of Iraq” and that their policy and activities are directed by him. He is also reported to have said that the recent events in Baghdad62 all form part of same program.
- 2.
- The leader of the Nationalists, Shukri Kuwatly, assured me that he and his party were really not pro-German but admitted that German propaganda was in a very strong position because both the German and the Italian Governments’ had officially and in writing informed the Iraq Government that they were in favor of Syrian statutes and of an Arab confederation. The British on the other hand had not only refused to make a similar statement but had apparently promised Turkey slices of Northern Syria and Iraq in return for Turkish military support. To my question whether he had any proof of this he replied in the negative but said it was “common knowledge and the British Government has never officially denied it.” He felt the most effective way of counteracting German propaganda was for the British to express sympathy with the Arab cause by making definite promises, preferably in consultation with the American Government. I told him it was much easier for irresponsible governments to make extravagant promises than for governments like the British and American who are in the habit of taking their promises seriously.
- 3.
- From other remarks he and Jahrfi Haffar who was present made I could see that the bluster and lies of the German and Italian broadcasts in Arabic had raised serious doubts in their minds whether any democratic nation including the United States could successfully compete with totalitarian methods. I made some obvious remarks about the unlimited resources of the United States and the British Empire [Page 696] and explained that the very methods employed by the Axis Powers during the past 3 years placed us with no illusions as to the true nature of their intentions. I said I hoped the recent acts of brutality and injustice perpetrated against small and relatively helpless peoples would suffice to prevent Syrian patriots from playing into the hands of the Nazis. They assured me that was the case but I question their sincerity.
- 4.
- I came away with the uneasy feeling that— unlike the irresponsible groups of excitable young men whose emotional rhetoric need not be taken seriously—these mature men did not regard the European war as a calamity for the simple reason that like Stalin they hoped it would still further lower the prestige and reduce the power of the West as a whole. With their narrow nationalistic outlook they seemed only very dimly conscious of the great moral issues at stake and were merely wondering from which side of the ideological fence they could expect most by political support for their vague ambitions for the future. And the people of course are even less able than their leaders to differentiate between the West as a military political factor and as the creator and home of culture and ideals and they are therefore at the mercy of every paid agitator. I have pointed out to the contemporaries that my experience in China and South America has taught me that it was always far easier to provoke a revolution than to apply constructive thinking to the consolidation of a new government.
- 5.
- Opposition to the French is on the increase among all classes, especially in Syria but even in the Lebanon. Although after the collapse of France no immediate advantage was taken of it to embarrass the French authorities here because it was realized that France herself was facing an uncertain international future, Shukri Kuwatly tells me that the people are not willing to wait until the end of the war before obtaining from the French a definite declaration re Syrian independence. It appears therefore that the extremists will not be satisfied with the present concessions but will tolerate them as a transitional arrangement to test the good faith of the High Commissioner. They accuse the French, with some justice, of having done little in the last 20 years to promote ordered and systematic progress or to create a responsible governing class, while the French administration was itself marred by petty corruption, intrigue and gross inefficiency.
- 6.
- French official circles continue to live in the atmosphere of confusion and defeatism described in my 42, February 19, 46 [49], February 26, and 70, March 11. They believe the recent disturbances in Syria and Iraq were part of the successful Nazi plan to immobilize Turkey and that the present campaign in the Balkans will lead to [Page 697] further dangerous developments which may well involve Syria. My answer to such observations has consistently been that all French Mediterranean interests will be safe only if Britain wins the war and that I felt sure the French in Syria would not wish to do anything that might endanger British security at a critical moment.
Repeated to Vichy.
Engert