740.0011 European War 1939/8635: Telegram
The Consul General at Beirut ( Engert ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:05 a.m.]
49. My 42, February 19, 1 p.m. In high French military circles there is now no longer any doubt but that Germany is about to strike at Greece through Bulgaria48 without any opposition from the latter or from Turkey. They believe that unless Great Britain establishes immediately and succeeds in holding a front in Greece it will not only be difficult to win the war in the Eastern Mediterranean but it will be impossible to win the war in Europe because they do not think another foothold can be gained anywhere else on the Continent. And without the possibility of landing large forces on the Continent it is futile to try to defeat Hitler.
Such views are held even in circles which are not anti-British and which do not underrate British and American resources and character. They are nervously watching the next phase of what they fear is Hitler’s march towards world conquest and seem to forget that there may still be an active part for Frenchmen to play. For when I intimated that Syria was doubtless a definite factor in Axis plans in the Eastern Mediterranean I was told that “weak people must pursue a cautious policy” and was given to understand that the attitude of the French authorities overseas would be largely decided by the development of events. So long as Turkey’s position remains equivocal in the event of a German attack against Greece the French here will have little faith in an ultimate British victory.
[Page 689]In the course of these conversations I referred to the strategic position of Syria as a stepping stone between Turkey, Palestine and Iraq and hinted at the possibility of the Axis having marked out a course for the use of Syrian submarine and air bases. Replies I have received leave me under the impression that the French authorities here would not permit the Axis Powers to use such bases nor would they give any other direct or indirect assistance to the Axis in the prosecution of possible political or strategic objectives.
The situation seems less clear as regards their attitude in the event of a British request for transit facilities should Turkey become involved. A feeling of real sympathy for Great Britain is growing and there is also a revival of courage and hope. It is therefore possible that if at the crucial moment the United States could express an interest in preventing the Axis from using Vichy as a catspaw for further aggression the French here would be inclined to offer a certain amount of passive resistance to instructions from Vichy which they would know had come from Berlin. They are even now desperately anxious to find an honorable compromise between their sense of duty and their desire to contribute something toward the preservation of the French Empire.
Repeated to Vichy and Angora.
- For correspondence on this subject, see vol. ii, pp. 733 ff.↩