811.34544/679: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:20 a.m.]
942. From President’s Base Lease Commission. My 939, 11th.95 During 6 weeks of negotiation, we have endeavored to secure all the rights, powers and authorities necessary to assure the effective establishment, operation, control, and defense of the bases. At the same time, we have tried to meet all reasonable contentions of the British Government and the Colonies with a view to the establishment and operation of the bases in an atmosphere of friendly cooperation. Practically every provision has been the subject of exhaustive discussion and we believe that the agreement as given in our 939 achieves both these objectives.
The agreement embodies a number of concessions by the British, particularly with respect to the specification of rights, defense and jurisdiction which they were most reluctant to make. They were finally secured yesterday at a meeting attended by the Prime Minister, Lord Moyne, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staffs’ Committee, Sir Alan Burns, the Ambassador and ourselves. The Prime Minister indicated that our requests in some respects went beyond the intent of the exchange of notes of September 2, 1940, but that he had no desire to restrict our necessary military requirements and that in view of the general situation he was prepared to accept our views. He considered, however, that the concessions given represent the maximum which the British could give. He held that any further concessions would probably necessitate an act of Parliament to override Colonial legislatures and would be difficult to defend in Parliament should the need for such an act arise.
The Prime Minister attaches great importance to the fourth clause of the preamble which he considers truly represents the spirit in which the whole base lease project was conceived and should be carried out. Without it he said the agreement would be more of a “capitulation” than a friendly arrangement between great powers. He holds that this clause sets the tone of the whole agreement that the British Government [Page 81] could agree on the understanding that our rights would be exercised in that spirit to a number of points which they could never otherwise concede and that his presentation of the agreement to Parliament will be based upon the spirit of the preamble.
The references to the preamble in article I, paragraph 3, and article II were inserted by the Prime Minister personally after we had rejected various other suggestions and illustrate his views on this point. He was seriously concerned at the almost unlimited powers in time of war or emergency granted us in article II holding that they gave us unlimited rights, should we wish to use them, as for example the right to declare martial law in the territories at any time, to occupy any areas we wished, to take over British dockyards or other installations, or even to order the evacuation of civilians from the islands. This he realized was far from the intent of either party but would be difficult to defend in Parliament unless he could make clear that our far-reaching rights would be exercised in the spirit expressed in the preamble.
The Prime Minister appreciates your efforts to meet his views on the question of jurisdiction over British subjects. While the British have not raised the point we feel that assurance that British subjects would be tried by United States courts in the leased areas might well be incorporated in the agreement rather than in an exchange of public notes. Do you perceive objection?
In article VII, paragraph 2, you will note that the words “bound to or from” have been replaced by “entering or leaving.” We believe this does not differ from the intent of our instructions.
Article IX, immigration, has been altered in language but we believe it follows our instructions.
Article X, customs, was, as you know, one of the most difficult upon which to reach agreement. The British finally agreed to duty free admission of goods for sale at post exchanges, et cetera, only on understanding we would make every effort to prevent abuses and that privilege would extend only as stated. Goods for forces operating outside the leased areas are not specifically mentioned but are covered by subparagraph (a). In view of the several important and difficult concessions made by the British in this article, we would not feel justified in pressing for exemption on automobiles for private individuals.
Article XIII, taxes, has been extended on our suggestion to exempt activities performed for our Government from license or similar taxes.
Article XXI has been difficult due to the British desire for possible continuance of local industries. All reference to such industry has been deleted and we believe you will find paragraph 2 satisfactory.
Article XXII. The special provisions are of a nature which would not ordinarily be incorporated in land leases. We understand that [Page 82] you have no strong preference either way and the British consider an annex to the agreement the logical place for them. We propose, however, that the fleet anchorage provision will be included in the Trinidad lease.
Article XXIV. The British were reluctant to agree to supplementary areas being leased under the terms and conditions specified in the agreement, holding that additional leases, with the possible exception of small sites for supplementary defense purposes, were not contemplated by the basic exchange of notes and that, while they were prepared to consider requests for essential additional areas, they could not bind themselves for the long term to grant them under the same conditions. We maintained that the lease of additional areas if agreed, as all else, rested on the September notes now implemented by this agreement and that the latter should therefore be the basic approach on terms. The final draft is an accommodation of these two positions.
Lord Moyne told us tonight that the exchange of 78 acres in Bermuda will be granted. [Base Lease Commission.]
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