740.0011 European War 1939/14763: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:55 p.m.]
1632. Department’s 1026, September 4, 2 p.m.36 Inasmuch as Dekanosov37 was placed in charge of Near Eastern affairs upon his return from Berlin, and as I understand he reports directly to Stalin,38 I conveyed to him yesterday the substance of the Department’s telegram under reference and expressed the hope that sympathetic consideration would be given the suggestion regarding the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples, reiterating the assurances already given to the Government of the Shah by the Soviet and British Governments. I also expressed a desire that my Government be kept informed of developments in the matter and requested him to inform me of the present position.
Dekanosov, who appeared to be anxious to place the Soviet position before me in the most favorable light, discussed the matter with complete frankness.
He commenced with an outline of the Soviet position which in effect constituted a summary of the note of August 25, from the Soviet Government, to the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, adding that his Government had over a considerable period of time endeavored to persuade the Shah of the dangers inherent in the presence of a large number of German agents in Iran, and had requested him to take the necessary steps to put an end to the work of these agents as much to protect the interests of Iran as those of the Soviet Union. He stated that the Soviet Government had never been able to extract a satisfactory or reassuring response and that the Iranian Government had stubbornly refused to expel the German agents. He said that it was not until then that the Soviet and British Governments had found it necessary to take positive action.
Dekanosov then stated that the present position is “not as dangerous as before,” but that he could not say that all pending questions could be settled without difficulty. He gave “merely as an example” of some of the present difficulties the fact that several Iranian “officer aviators” had refused to obey orders of the Iranian Government not to resist the Soviet and British troops and had bombed Tehran. He expressed the opinion that Iran was “not yet peaceful enough” to permit of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and that a final solution “was not simple”. [Page 454] He added that he thought the area that must be occupied would “not be so big—along the frontier” and that the Soviet Government thought it necessary for the time being to keep its troops in the country but that this would not affect the sovereignty or independence of Iran and that he was convinced a solution could eventually be found. He said it is “now more and more clear” that danger from German agents remains, not necessarily only from agents of German nationality who may now be expelled by the Iranian Government but from agents in the employ of the German Government who may be of other than German nationality.
With respect to the Department’s suggestion regarding a public statement, Dekanosov referred to the closing paragraph of the Soviet Government’s note of August 25 to the Iranian Ambassador39 and pointed out that the note had received the widest possible publicity. He said in consequence it should not be regarded as would be an unpublished diplomatic document and that through it the Soviet Government had put its assurances regarding the territorial integrity and national independence of Iran before the world. He said that in his opinion a reiteration of the Soviet Government’s position so soon after the publication of the note affirming its intentions might be misunderstood, but that he would take the suggestion under advisement and discuss it with his Government. In this connection he added that the work of the German agents “cannot be undone at once” and that he hoped the American Government would understand that, since it had been found necessary to send Soviet troops into Iran, it would not be possible to withdraw them “at once”. At this point he repeated that he thought it was “too soon” to reaffirm the Soviet Government’s assurances of eventual withdrawal but added “the assurances that were given in the note will be kept scrupulously”. At the close of our talk he again expressed the hope that the American Government understood the position of the Soviet Government, and its ultimate intentions as expressed in the note to the Iranian Ambassador Zahiniu [Saed].