740.0011 European War 1939/14299: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

1567. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary. In a conversation with the Iranian Ambassador87 yesterday he said that his Government had replied to the Soviet and British notes demanding the expulsion of all Germans with a flat rejection on the grounds that the subject was distinctly the internal affair of the Iranian Government and that the demand constituted an infringement of the sovereignty of Iran. He described the Soviet and British notes as “impertinent”. He said that notwithstanding the formal rejection the Soviet and British Governments had been orally informed that the Iranian Government was taking measures to expel the Germans.

The Ambassador then went on to state: (1) that Soviet participation in the joint demand had been at British “instigation”; (2) that after castigating Germany for having sacrificed the Baltic States in 1939 in order to curry favor with the Soviet Union, Britain was about to sacrifice Iran in order to curry favor with the Soviet Union; (3) that the present attitude of the British Government towards Iran was a poor reward for having sided with Britain and safeguarded its interests during the past 2 years; (4) that Iran would defend itself as [Page 413] best it could against any attempted violation of its sovereignty by either the Soviet Union or Britain or both; (5) that the Soviet-British demand to immediately expel all Germans from Iran was a poorly concealed pretext for occupying Iran inasmuch as the expulsion of all Germans, and transit rights through Iran if desired, “could have been amicably discussed and arranged” without offending the amour propre of the Iranian Government and people.

The Ambassador concluded his remarks, after referring to “blundering diplomacy”, with the comment “we have been the loyal friends of the British for many, many years. If what they wanted was the expulsion of all Germans from Iran, the fullest transit rights and a military base of operations from which to protect the Soviet oil fields and the Caucasus, why did they not propose an open formal military alliance between the Soviet Union, Britain, and Iran. Even now it may not be too late although my Government has been seriously offended.”

In view of the Ambassador’s influence in Tehran and his pronounced pro-British sympathies of which I have had personal knowledge for over 2 years I attach considerable importance to the views expressed by him.

Steinhardt
  1. M. Saed.