891.248/125
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)
| Participants: | Mr. Nevile Butler, Minister-Counselor of the British Embassy |
| Mr. Murray | |
| Mr. Alling |
Mr. Butler said he would recall that about two weeks ago Lord Halifax had requested the Acting Secretary of State to restrict the shipment of American airplanes to Iran. He said that he would like now to give some of the background of this request.
Mr. Butler pointed out that the Iranian Government airplane factory located a few miles outside of Tehran was manned to a large extent by British mechanics. He did not know their exact number, but he thought it was twenty or thirty. For a long period the British Government had attached considerable importance to keeping these mechanics in Iran with a view to preventing their displacement by mechanics from Axis Powers. At the same time the British Government, realizing the dangers of a German occupation of Iran, wished to prevent so far as possible any appreciable number of airplanes going to the Iranian Government. The British Government feared that in the event of an Axis occupation of Iran these planes would be used against Allied forces. It was for this reason that the British Government had requested this Government to restrict airplane shipments to Iran.
At the same time the British Government had to keep the Shah “sweet” and it had therefore been necessary to agree that certain British airplanes be shipped to Iran for assembly in the above-mentioned factory. At present, therefore, it is contemplated that during the next year parts for twelve Hurricane planes would be shipped to Tehran to be assembled by British mechanics.
Mr. Murray inquired why, if the British were permitting the shipment of such modern planes as Hurricanes to the Iranian Government, there should be any objection to the American Government permitting the shipment of such antiquated models as the Iranians desired to purchase in this country. Mr. Butler reiterated the arguments mentioned above, that is, that it was necessary to keep the Shah in good humor and also to furnish material for the factory so that the British mechanics could continue to work and operate in Iran. At the same time he admitted that from the point of view of equity it was perhaps illogical to ask the American Government to refrain from shipping planes to the Iranian Government.… In any case he [Page 365] agreed that spare parts for American planes in Iran should certainly go forward, and he felt it particularly desirable that spare parts ordered from Canada and now in transit through the United States should be granted American export licenses.
It was pointed out to Mr. Butler that the Iranian Government had been refused export licenses on numerous products such as tinplate, automobile tires, etc., and that this Government, too, had to bear in mind the desirability of retaining the good-will of the Shah. The only answer Mr. Butler had to make to this statement was that Iranian good-will was of more importance to the British and that in case we felt that something had to go to Iran the British Government would much prefer to see tinplate and rubber shipped than airplanes.
Mr. Murray said that we would go into the matter further and let Mr. Butler know the eventual decision.