891.248/125
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Mr. Welles: In accordance with your suggestion I took up with Mr. Butler21 yesterday the matter referred to in the attached memorandum.22
[Page 362]Mr. Butler explained that as far as he knew when the Ambassador spoke to you recently about the desire of the British Government that further aircraft exports to Iran be held up, the latter had in mind the general unsatisfactory Iranian attitude toward Great Britain rather than any particular new development.
Mr. Butler went on to describe the well known traditional anti-British attitude of the Iranians and expressed the opinion that in view of the present German drive into Russia and the possibility that German armies might reach the Caucasus in the near future, it was only natural that the British authorities should wish to meet as far as possible the inevitable pressure which Germany may bring to bear on Iran once she had reached the Iranian frontier in the Caucasus.
I told Mr. Butler that in my opinion these precautionary steps of the British seemed entirely reasonable and that I very much doubted that any further requests of the Iranian Government for the purchase of aircraft in this country would get any favorable consideration. I felt, however, that the matter of the small order of aircraft parts for Iran could be placed in a separate category. The Iranians had ordered these spare parts a long time ago, had paid for them and the parts were now ready for shipment. If the parts were shipped at once it would of course take several months for them to reach Iran. If, meanwhile, there were further developments growing out of the Russo-German hostilities indicating that it would be unwise to entrust even this small shipment of spare parts to the Iranians the shipment could easily be held up by the British between here and the Iranian port in the Persian Gulf where they will expect to land. Mr. Butler agreed that this was true.
Continuing our discussion I reminded Mr. Butler of growing resentment of the Iranians against us because of the almost continuous rejection of all their requests for purchases, however small, in this country. The Iranian Minister was of course under heavy pressure from the Shah and had during the recent months been telephoning us on an average of twice a day regarding these rejected orders. While it would be a simple matter to turn him down on future aircraft orders, it might be difficult and cause bitter resentment if we turned him down on this small order of aircraft parts which, in any case, would not add greatly to the efficiency of Iranian aviation. In conclusion I remark[ed] that it might be decidedly in the British interest for our own relations with Iran in times like these to remain as friendly as possible since it appeared not unlikely that Anglo-Iranian relations would be subjected to serious strain and possible disintegration in the not too distant future. Mr. Butler said he fully agreed.
[Page 363]As a result of our conversation Mr. Butler agreed to clear this question through the British Purchasing Commission and to avoid, if possible, the delay in referring it back to London. He promised to let me have an answer as soon as possible.
I hope you will agree with me that it may be greatly in the British interest for us to avoid as far as possible losing our present none too firm hold on the Iranians.…