740.0011 European War 1939/15597: Telegram
The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 4—11:55 a.m.]
1503. Department’s 516, September 30 [27], In stating the conviction that in the absence of a unified command in this theater our aid will prove a waste, I had especially in mind the belief based on results in the past and conditions at present that when the time comes to make use of the material which we are sending and propose to send in apparently ever-increasing quantities that material will be wasted if the present state of disorganization continues and is allowed to prevail, especially in an action undertaken under the divided responsibility which now marks the military direction in this area.
In reply to the Department’s request for a summarized statement of wastage of American supplies, I find certain instances which are to be included in a separate telegram.33 I wish to point out, however, that the principal significance of these instances in the present consideration is that they may be regarded as symptomatic of a state of affairs wherein a defective organization impedes attempts to make preparations for future eventualities and jeopardizes the chance of success in prospective operations. In fact the lack of coordination [Page 295] and unified direction has in the past not only reduced the effectiveness of all planning but has adversely affected the procurement of supplies as well as transport, installations and maintenance of material in this area with the consequent impairment of the scope and quality of preparedness. It is true that the situation here is complicated owing to the restrictions inherent in operating on the territory of Egypt, a sovereign state which is not technically a belligerent, but those considerations are not of the essence. The gravity of the situation here lies in the fact that lack of coordination among the various services operating in this theater have impaired and continue to impair the effectiveness of the war machine and the assumption is that only a single responsibility will galvanize that machine into a positive force.
I should profoundly deplore any impression which might be created by any consideration or derived from any source which would result in a decrease in the flow of material to this area for not only should that flow be maintained but it should be increased. The vital importance of strengthening the Middle East theater needs no further emphasis. We cannot know for certain that the next move will be in this direction but we do know that successful operation from this base could turn the scales in favor of the Allies throughout the entire Mediterranean area. At present the extent of our aid is the supply of essential material to this base and we must continue that aid. There are clear indications that the defective organization here is jeopardizing that aid and that advice is needed to avoid that danger. I submit therefore that we shall prove derelict in our war effort if we do not proffer that counsel and so take the initiative in helping the British to help themselves.
- Telegram No. 1512, October 3, noon, not printed.↩