740.0011 European War 1939/15218: Telegram
The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 20—12:50 a.m.]
1421. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Since the month of June I have on several occasions called attention to the fact that the achievements of the armed forces of Britain in the Middle East have been restricted and the efficacy of the war effort has been impaired by the lack of coordination among the various services and the absence of a unified command. During the interval attempts have apparently been made from London to remedy these defects.
The Commander-in-Chief has been changed, a Minister of State has been established here and minor alterations in system and personnel have been effected. In so far as can be observed, however, no real improvement has ensued and although it might be assumed that sufficient time has elapsed to produce apparent results the changes up to the present seem to constitute makeshift measures which have merely duplicated mechanism without improving efficiency.
It is true that the Russian campaign relieved this area of the threat of immediate attack. The possibility must be faced, however, that from one cause or another the German concentration on that front may in a few weeks be reduced and judging from the past Hitler, so long as the war lasts, must direct elsewhere his armies or his air force or portions thereof and the timing for such a move would be determined by the necessity of preparation for renewed effort which as regards the air force might be accomplished in a brief interval. There is no intent to determine the point to which that effort may be directed but the fact cannot be ignored that this area is at least indicated and that it would constitute a favorable theater for winter operations. On that assumption the strengthening of the war machine in the Middle East is essential for even if it may not be required to withstand a major attack it can serve as an offensive instrument to assault the enemy over an extended radius.
The strengthening of the machine through the increase in men and the accelerated flow of material especially from the United States is, it must be assumed, progressing within the limits of capabilities. That however is not enough. Those men and that material must be used to the maximum advantage. The record of past months proves that such has not been the case and many supplies have been wasted and much time has been lost. It would be useless to attempt to enumerate all the causes of this failure and futile to place the blame. The constructive step is to seek a remedy and I can only say that the most flagrant defects in administration here which have come to my attention [Page 293] and to the attention of those associated with me could have been cured and even avoided if there had been a unified high military command with recognized authority from London and with broad responsibility for operations in this area. I am convinced therefore that there must be established in this theater of war and established immediately a supreme British military command with jurisdiction and authority over all operations in this area, over all services involved in those operations and over all installations, maintenance and tributary organizations affecting supplies, transportation and communications connected with the prosecution of the war in the Middle East. In this way and in this way only can coordination and leadership be obtained.
The natural reaction to the foregoing observations is that even if the cursory statement of the case is true and if a remedy lies along the lines indicated it is not for us to interfere. I personally, however, am unable to accept that argument as final. In the broadest sense we know that the entire existence of our country has been staked on victory and on a victory that is not too long deferred. In particular we are pouring into this area material that is hard earned and that can ill be spared from other fields. Both of these elements are being jeopardized by defective organization which could be cured or at least improved by courageous and drastic reorganization.
I submit that it is our right and our duty to make this situation clear to the British and to urge with all vigor the necessary reforms. If those reforms are not effected and effected immediately it is my profound conviction that all our efforts here will prove futile and all our material aid sheer waste.