740.0011 European War 1939/11748: Telegram
The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 8—1:05 p.m.]
663. The lull in military activity following the termination of the Crete campaign has given rise to speculation as to when and where the next major action in this area may take place and attention in this connection is now centering particularly on the possibility of an early attempt of the British to occupy Syria in advance of the Germans.21 It is pointed out, however, that in the absence of a stronger and better equipped Allied invading force decision in the matter is rendered difficult by apprehension as to the attitude of the French Army and the native population in Syria as well as to the opposition which the Germans might be able to bring to bear. Although the preparations in process point to an immediate action in this direction the delay which has already occurred has given rise to the fear that if it is further postponed while awaiting a propitious moment the consequences will be the entire loss of such initiative as the British and Free French may now have in the matter. In the meantime the Germans are believed to have been able to increase their already [Page 278] strong forces in the western desert and only to be waiting for a favorable occasion to launch an attack on Egypt which in the opinion of many observers will probably be timed to coincide with activity in Syria and with intensive German air activity directed particularly against the British Fleet and the Canal Zone.
In any candid appraisal of the present situation here mention should also be made of the apparent recent deterioration in British morale which manifests itself in widespread criticism of decisions of responsible officers; recrimination between the various service branches directed particularly at the R. A. F. for alleged failure to cooperate; intense bitterness on the part of New Zealanders and Australians, many of whom feel they were uselessly sacrificed in Greece and Crete and say openly that they have had enough of fighting under the British and want to go home; a feeling of defeatism which seems to have its principal asylum in the new generally accepted belief that the [apparent omission] by the British in Libya, Greece, Crete were largely the result of inadequacy of equipment and that further combat under similar circumstances will only yield the same result. Furthermore, this deterioration in morale has not been without effect on the Egyptians and has increased seriousness of problem of British resistance here in the face of possible defection among the population and even highly placed Egyptians, returns of which may well become articulate under increased Nazi pressure.
It is, of course, conceivable that Hitler’s plans may exclude an extension of action in this area or that he will postpone it for a matter of weeks. It is illogical, however, to assume that the threat is not immediate and in view of the gravity of the far-reaching consequences of an easy German success in the Middle East not only from the point of view of prestige but also from the more practical considerations of oil supplies, communications and the maintenance of strategical position essential for the prosecution of the war in this general area there would appear to be no other choice than to strengthen immediately the will and capacity to resist further Nazi aggression in the Mediterranean and Near East. The deterioration in morale, both British and Egyptian, would be counteracted by a more open participation in the war on the part of the United States and the capacity to resist would be immeasurably increased by the speedy development of more inspired and courageous leadership here and by the immediate arrival of needed war material. As regards the first two factors higher questions of policy are involved than can be evaluated from this point but in spite of all possible probing I am not satisfied that the immediate increase of equipment, particularly airplanes, is physically impossible and there is every reason to believe that with the arrival here by air in the immediate future of two hundred [Page 279] bombers and the hundred fighters with supplies, an air superiority would accrue to the British which alone could give the advantage against the Germans.