740.0011 European War 1939/11256: Telegram
The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 24—5:47 p.m.]
566. My 319, April 23, 11 a.m., and my 428, May 7, 5 p.m., last paragraph.17 The following is what I regard as an authentic statement of some of the deficiencies with which the British forces in the western desert have been and are contending as revealed by expert observation during the most part in that area:
- (1)
- Lack of sufficient armored firing vehicles of the cruiser and infantry type tank with experienced operators.
- (2)
- Lack of sufficient artillery of all categories.
- (3)
- Lack of airplanes and failure on the part of the Royal Air Force to cooperate with the armored units and artillery.
- (4)
- Insufficient spare parts for maintenance of vehicles in the field.
- (5)
- Defective operation of field telephone and wireless systems.
- (6)
- Defective repair of road used by supply columns.
- (7)
- Practice of committing forces in combat without holding out reserve troops.
- (8)
- Lack of proper intelligence as to the enemy’s strength and capabilities.
As a result of the foregoing deficiencies the attitude among the commanding British officers in the field was to remain on the defensive and not take the offensive.
For what it may be worth, I add that a German officer who was taken prisoner during the latest operations in the western desert stated that the mission of the Axis forces in North Africa was to take Egypt in 80 days but did not divulge the date of expiration of the time limit.
- Latter not printed.↩