740.0011 European War 1939/9658: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State

189. The Legation’s 184, April 4th.3 According to informal British circles the original campaign by the British against Bengazi had the twofold and immediate purpose of cutting off and destroying the retreating Italian forces and acquiring use of the port. The first objective was attained completely but the second was not realized because the harbor was found littered with sunken Italian ships and also because of heavy bombing particularly by German planes.

Having captured Bengazi it would have been highly desirable to push on and occupy Tripolitania but that project had to be abandoned owing to the necessity of sending troops to Greece4 and it was therefore decided to hold Cyrenaica lightly. British strength in that area was also reduced owing to the necessity of sending back for repairs much of the mechanized equipment used in the Libyan advance. Consequently when the Italo-German forces began their recent advance [Page 266] General Wavell5 who is an exponent of mobility in desert tactics flew personally to survey the scene of action (in fact he was about the last person to leave at the time of the evacuation of Bengazi) and decided to fall back to a defense point of his choosing. In fact it is likely that in accordance with this plan still further withdrawal is in prospect but the British military maintain, albeit none too convincingly, that enemy forces now available are not sufficient for an attack directed against Egypt. They admit, however, that adverse effect of the move from a propaganda point of view and the distinct advantage to the enemy of the acquisition of advance air bases, but doubt whether it will be possible to utilize Bengazi port owing to its encumbered condition.

News of the capture of Bengazi and especially the admission in the communiqué of the part played by German troops came as a definite shock to the Egyptian public which, although originally perturbed by the reports of German troops in Libya, had been reassured by optimistic press releases of the military authorities. Correspondents had also been kept in the dark as regarded the seriousness of the situation, when advised that a special communiqué was being issued last night are said to have expected the announcement of the fall of Massawa.6

As matters stand at the moment the general Egyptian reaction is one of certain apprehension but not serious alarm owing to the reputation which General Wavell enjoys for mastering difficult situations. However, if as seems likely the Italo-German advance should continue for some distance beyond Bengazi the Egyptians will undoubtedly take a much more serious view of the situation and reassuring statements are already being issued by the British to calm public fears.

Kirk
  1. Not printed.
  2. For correspondence on this subject, see vol. ii, pp. 635 ff.
  3. Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Commander in Chief of the British Forces in the Middle East.
  4. For correspondence regarding Ethiopia and Italian East Africa, see pp. 341 ff.