845.00/5–541

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)3

Considerable thought given to the Near East in the past few days indicates that the Indian problem is now brought to the fore. India is contributing little to the present problem and if it remains in this status may well become an active danger to the whole situation in the not distant future. The British seem to be doing nothing about it. They have asked that we accept an Indian Agent General near this Government; meanwhile, they rather indignantly resent any attempt of ours to have effective representation at Delhi.4

I think the question ought to be dealt with broadly. From all the information I could get, at least a provisional settlement of the Indian problem has to be got as a preface to getting any solid help, although the Indians in general realize that if the British Empire falls their next fate will be worse than their present fate.

The attached Aide-Mémoire indicates the line that I rather feel ought to be considered. If it seems sensational, all I can say is that this is no time for half measures.

Mr. Wallace Murray5 and the Near Eastern section are of the same mind.6

A. A. Berle, Jr.
[Page 177]
[Enclosure]

Draft Aide-Mémoire

The Government of the United States has been giving earnest thought to certain problems corollary to the joint effort in which this Government and His Majesty’s Government are now engaged. Among the greatest of these problems must be included the part which may be played by the Indian Empire in the coming months.

It would seem that considerations of principle as well as of policy converge to suggest that a solution be reached in respect of certain questions outstanding. India of necessity exerts a vast influence upon the affairs in the Middle East. Her status is of interest to all of the surrounding nations, and the degree to which and the methods by which she becomes integrated into a common cooperative effort of free peoples undeniably will affect the attitude of the Middle East countries.

Were there no other compelling reasons, it would suffice that India is a vast reservoir of manpower, and occupies a dominant position in supplying certain strategic war materials; and that her resources permit the development of additional supplies which in certain contingencies might well prove crucial. Converted into an active, rather than a passive, partner in the attempt to preserve a system of free cooperation among nations, her participation might well become of first importance.

To that end the Government of the United States hopes that His Majesty’s Government will promptly explore the possibility of bringing India into the partnership of nations on terms equal to the other members of the British Commonwealth. Were this to be done, the Government of the United States would consider favorably receiving a diplomatic mission in Washington representing India as then constituted, and making provision for like representation of the United States at India.

The Government of the United States disclaims any desire to intervene in the relations existing between His Majesty’s Government and the Indian Empire, but feels it appropriate to point out that under existing circumstances it can express concern over the tangible results, in the light of a common effort, which the British policy in India in fact produces.

The pressure of events in the Middle East leads this Government to hope that the matter may be promptly considered. It believes that the more rapidly a settlement of certain outstanding questions there prevailing can be arrived at, the greater will be the accession of strength to our common interest.

  1. Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Welles).
  2. United States interest in having consular representation at Delhi was embodied in article X of the draft of the proposed treaty of commerce and navigation which had been under discussion between the United States and the Government of India since 1939; see p. 190. For correspondence regarding the establishment in 1941 of an American Commission at Delhi, see pp. 170 ff.
  3. Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
  4. Attached is a note of May 8 by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) which states: “I understand nothing is to be done on this and that Mr. Welles feels it would be undesirable to do anything which might upset the Indian apple cart at this critical juncture.”