740.0011 European War 1939/15832

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs

At Mr. Atherton’s direction I saw the Finnish Minister this morning to assist him in verifying statements made by the Secretary to him on October 3.49

When the Minister reviewed his understanding of the Secretary’s statements, it became apparent that he had toned down the full import of the Secretary’s meaning. In order to rectify this situation I read to the Minister the following excerpt in close paraphrase from our telegram to the Legation at Helsinki in regard to this conversation:

“The foremost question in the mind of the United States Government in regard to Finland is whether that country will be content to regain its lost territory and stop there or whether it will endeavor to go farther, if it has not already done so, in which event it would logically be concluded that Finland had projected itself on the side of Hitler in the general war between Germany and the Soviet Union and the other countries involved.”

The Minister stated that he had not gotten this impression from his conversation with the Secretary, and that the foregoing stated our position to be much stronger than he had thought it to be. I likewise read to the Minister the Secretary’s recapitulation of the conversation to the effect that Finnish troops had advanced entirely too far into Russia to accord with any legitimate plan to regain merely lost Finnish territory and that the Finnish Government must understand whether it persisted in maintaining this policy or in expanding it, that this Government stands with Great Britain. The Minister stated that he had not understood from the Secretary the first point at all. He did say, however, that he got the impression in his conversation with the Secretary that the Secretary had been very surprised at the extent to which Finnish troops had penetrated into Soviet territory between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega in the direction of Leningrad. The Minister inquired how far Finnish troops would have to withdraw from their present positions in order to comply with the desires of the [Page 77] British and ourselves. I replied that I found no statement in that relation in the Secretary’s memorandum of his conversation and could not therefore speak with any authority on the subject. I said that I personally, however, thought it very unlikely that this Government would ever consider saying how far Finnish troops should withdraw in one place or another, that it was my impression that the Secretary had undertaken only to lay down the broad principles of our policy toward recent Finnish actions and that in the final analysis the Finnish Government must decide for itself on the basis of our attitude and of other factors involved what action it should take in order to best serve Finnish interests.

I inquired to what extent he had reported to his Government his conversation with the Secretary. He replied that he had made only a preliminary report but that he intended to follow it up after obtaining this clarification of our position. He went on to say that the British “threats” contained in the note dispatched to the Finnish Government through the Norwegian Minister in Helsinki had infuriated all sections of the Finnish population and that the hatred that had been engendered might well last indefinitely. For that reason he said that he hesitated very much to convey to his Government the substantial support of this Government for the British position, in as much as it was reasonable to assume that a similar reaction in Finland will attend the reception of such information. He inquired whether we had instructed the American Minister at Helsinki to make any representations along the line of the Secretary’s statements to him. I told him that we had given Mr. Schoenfeld the substance of the conversation for his information only and that we did not have in mind at this time that he should make any such representations. It was to be expected, however, I told him, that in any further conversation which Mr. Schoenfeld would have with Finnish officials he would closely follow the line taken by the Secretary.

It may be well to record the at times almost uncontrolled bitterness with which the Finnish Minister referred during my conversation with him to what he characterized as British “bullying” of Finland.

L. R[andolph] H[iggs]
  1. See paragraphs 2 through 5 of telegram No. 201, October 4, to the Minister in Finland, supra.