740.0011 European War 1939/17667
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)
Pursuant to the Secretary’s instructions, I asked the Finnish Minister last week to come in to see me. I told him then that some time this week you45 would want him to explain to you the position of the Finnish Government with respect to the continuation of military operations against the Soviet Union. The Minister called to see me this morning and informed me that he had just received a telegram from his Government containing instructions with respect to the statements which he should make to you in the foregoing relation. He said that he would be in a position to talk to you in that connection any time after tomorrow.
The Minister stated with reference to recent reports which I had mentioned to him regarding the participation of Finnish troops in the attack on Leningrad that Finnish troops were now in a position just across the old Finnish-Soviet frontier on the Isthmus of Karelia [Page 73] and that there were no Finnish guns now in a position where they would be capable of shelling Leningrad. The Finnish front ran along a line from Lake Ladoga to Lake Onega but did not run as far as the White Sea. At several points Finnish troops held control of the Murmansk railroad. The Minister commented that the Murmansk railroad could be of no value as a supply line from Britain to the Soviet Union, in as much as the railroad went only to Leningrad. While he denied having any information as to Finnish intentions to extend the so-called strategic frontier desired by Finland to the White Sea, he admitted that all of the area north of Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega was of great defensive strategic value to Finland.
The Minister, who was obviously under a great strain, said that he hoped to be able to explain clearly Finland’s present position with respect to the war. He said that in 1939 Hitler had engineered the Soviet attack on Finland and had hindered the Finnish defense at that time. Neither Great Britain nor the United States had made any valuable contribution to Finnish defense, and when the war was over, Finland got almost no help in reconstruction or defensive armaments from Great Britain or the United States. Again this year Finland had found itself under the necessity of renewing its defensive conflict with the Soviet Union as a result of Hitler’s machinations. The Minister remarked that it was not beyond the realm of possibility that in the near future Hitler and Stalin would make peace with each other. He inquired what would be the position of Finland under such circumstances.
He felt that the recent démarche of the British had been a tragic error. Finland was threatened that, unless it made peace with the Soviet Union, Great Britain impliedly would go to war against Finland; but on the other hand, the British had omitted making any concrete offer of assistance to Finland if such a peace should be made. He was obviously trying to imply, I believe, that for Finland to make peace at this time with the Soviet Union, Finland would require a complete understanding of the concrete assistance which it would obtain from the British against not only the Soviet Union but also Germany which would undoubtedly turn upon Finland as a result of any independent Finnish action in making such a peace.46
- Secretary of State Hull is the person addressed.↩
- In a memorandum of October 1, analyzing this conversation, Mr. Atherton wrote: “Irrespective of the justification of Finland’s present position, the fact remains that it has joined forces with Germany and its present actions tend to thwart the announced policy of our Government to assist those nations resisting the threat of Nazi domination.”↩