861.24/5706/16
Memorandum of Conversation, Held on Morning of July 28, 1941, by Mr. Alexander Schnee of the Division of Controls
| Participants: | Mr. Acheson; the Soviet Ambassador; General Burns and Colonel Faymonville of Defense Aid Reports; Lt. General Philip Ivanovich Golikov, Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. S. R. Army; Alexander Repin, Engineer General Air Corps, U. S. S. R. Army; Mr. Henderson; Mr. Curtis; Mr. Thornburg; Mr. Lukashev and Mr. Seldiakov of the Amtorg Trading Corp., New York; Mr. Schnee. |
Mr. Acheson handed the Ambassador a memorandum, copy of which is attached,48 dated July 26, 1941, on the subject of the Soviet requests, and in briefly touching on the various items included therein, informed Mr. Oumansky that the Army had no 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns, but [Page 800] would like the opportunity of discussing with the appropriate Soviet Army Officials the possibility of their using guns of other caliber. Mr. Acheson informed Mr. Oumansky that in addition to the toluol available for immediate delivery the scheduling of future deliveries would be undertaken at once, and suggested that with respect to aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil Mr. Seldiakov confer with Mr. Ralph K. Davies, Deputy Petroleum Coordinator, in order that the purchases of these supplies might be arranged. Mr. Thornburg suggested that Mr. Seldiakov negotiate directly with the oil companies for the chartering of the two tankers requested by the Soviets, and said that Mr. Davies had informed him that he would support the Soviet requests and would have all obstacles removed.
With reference to the gasoline absorption and similar plants requested by the Soviets, Mr. Acheson informed the Ambassador that the equipment would have to be of United States standard types.
The Ambassador expressed the wish that with respect to the airplanes, a list be made setting forth the number of planes released and the probable delivery dates. General Golikov requested the opportunity of discussing the aircraft situation before final decision with respect thereto was reached. Colonel Faymonville said he would arrange a meeting wherein the General would have the opportunity of discussing these problems.
The Ambassador said that General Golikov had brought with him requests for new and additional equipment which differed in quantity and substance from lists already submitted. With respect to the memorandum, the Ambassador said he would like the opportunity of examining it before making a reply, which he thought he would be able to submit to the Department on Tuesday, July 29. Mr. Oumansky said that the Soviet’s requests were exceedingly urgent and that it was a matter of considerable regret to his government that an answer had not been received with respect to some of the requests which had been made as long as a, month ago. Mr. Acheson replied that the decisions transmitted in the subject memorandum were those of the President, and in accordance with the President’s conversation with Mr. Oumansky, the emphasis was put on those items which could be delivered immediately.
General Golikov said that although there was no present emergency, the problem of shipping would soon be exceedingly acute, and that all available Soviet dry bottoms were being put into the Soviet-American trade. This, however, would not be enough and it would be necessary to pool Soviet and American tonnage. The General added that he would submit a formal request on this subject, but said that he was requesting at this time a statement of the willingness of the United States to supply some dry bottoms for delivery of equipment to the Soviet Union. Mr. Acheson replied that this question would have to [Page 801] be discussed with the Maritime Commission and added that a study was being made of all available tonnage in the Western Hemisphere, and requested a complete statement of the names and tonnage of Soviet ships available so that deliveries could be planned. The Ambassador joined the General in stating that the question of supplies and shipping should not be considered as two separate questions, that in reality they were one.
The Ambassador requested that the Soviet requests be considered against the background of the new situation which has developed since the German attack upon the Soviet Union, the war between Germany and the Soviet Union providing the longest and the deepest front and the fiercest fighting known in this or any other war. He said that he did not wish to cast a shadow on the good will of the United States, but wished to impress with all emphasis the fact that there exists today a new situation, that the scale of fighting could not be imagined and that the Soviet Union was bearing 95% of the brunt of the German might. Mr. Oumansky said that if Soviet requests were discussed in connection with supplies previously ordered by other countries, there would be great difficulty in finding a common meeting ground on the question of supplies between the Soviets and the officials of the United States.
General Golikov stressed the importance of absolute clarity in these negotiations in order that the Soviets might know the extent to which they could depend upon American supplies. Mr. Acheson suggested that it would be advisable if the General had ready for the appropriate officials of the American Army a general picture with respect to Soviet supply reserves, so that American officials could make their own appraisal of the situation.
The Ambassador urged that the coordination of supplies between the Soviet Union and Great Britain take into account the urgency of the war in the Soviet Union where the only actual battle front exists. He said that on July 22, 1941, General Golikov had conferred with Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, who, the General said, showed a full understanding of the Soviet needs and appreciated the fact that the British would have to revise their delivery schedules from the United States. Mr. Oumansky said that he was sure the British authorities in the United States had the same understanding that their people in London had, which was that Hitler planned first of all to defeat the Soviet Union, and then to move against the British Empire.
The Ambassador spoke of a coordination plan among the governments of the U. S. S. R., Great Britain and the United States, whereby a three-man commission would be set up consisting of one member from each country, for the purpose of allocating supplies. The Ambassador added that he had been designated to represent his [Page 802] government on this committee. (The Americans present at this meeting had no information at all on this subject.)
The Ambassador mentioned the RCA and Wright technical assistance contracts and said that his Government had for one month been eagerly awaiting an answer. Mr. Oumansky added that there were fifty very capable Soviet technicians involved who were idle because of indecision on this point but who could perform valuable services at the front. Mr. Acheson said that an answer would be ready either Tuesday evening or Wednesday on the subject of RCA and Wright contracts.49 The Ambassador added that because of the war, an entirely different type of material would be involved, consisting of articles directly needed in the defense program.
Mr. Acheson handed to the Ambassador a draft of a note which this Government proposed to hand to the Ambassador at the time of the extension of the Commercial Agreement50 and also a list of supplies51 which the United States wished to purchase from the Soviet Union.
- Not attached to file copy.↩
- Assistant Secretary of State Acheson informed Ambassador Umansky on August 2, 1941, that by direction of the President these contracts would not be renewed, because to do so “would involve most serious questions of secret processes which have not yet been disclosed to any Government.” (861.24/5707/16)↩
- For correspondence concerning trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the renewal of the Commercial Agreement by an exchange of notes signed on August 2, 1941, see pp. 914 ff.↩
- Not attached to file copy.↩