740.0011 European War 1939/12571
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The British Ambassador called to see me yesterday evening and again this morning.
The British Ambassador had received word urgently from his Government with regard to the conversations had yesterday and the day before between Mr. Eden and the Soviet Ambassador in London relative to the developments in the situation between Germany and Russia. The British Government seemed to be confident that hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union were imminent and appeared likewise to have obtained the optimistic belief from the conversations in London between Mr. Eden and Ambassador Maisky that there was some possibility of a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.
Mr. Eden desired the Ambassador to inquire of this Government whether the United States would be willing to extend economic assistance to Russia in the event of the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Russia.
I stated in reply that the British Government and Lord Halifax himself must, of course, be familiar with the conversations which had taken place between this Government and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington with regard to trade relations between the two countries, which conversations had extended over the better part of ten months. I said that the British Government in framing this inquiry of the United States must, of course, be well aware that the obstacles to expanding trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were, first of all, of a practical character. I said that the desire of the Soviet Government had been to obtain in the United States to an unlimited extent all of the machine tools which it desired to have manufactured here, as well as many raw materials and manufactured products all of which were urgently needed by the United States in its own rearmament program and in making it possible to furnish as much assistance as it could to Great Britain and to other nations defending themselves against Germany. I said that consequently any economic assistance which might theoretically be made available to the Soviet [Page 760] Union could only be determined in the light of the urgent requirements of this Government as set forth above.
Furthermore, I said, it would seem quite impossible for this Government to reach any determination at this stage of what it might see fit to do at some later date in the way of furnishing economic assistance to Russia. I stated that I made this statement because of the fact that should Germany attack Russia, and should Japan then modify her present policy and move north against Russia, our ability to render economic assistance to Russia might necessarily be limited or precluded by the measures which Japan might in such event take against Russia, and would likewise necessarily be contingent upon what we considered the best interests of the United States in so far as relations between Japan and the United States might be concerned. As an example, I said, if Japan in that event did declare war upon Russia and institute a blockade against Russian Pacific ports, how would it be possible for the United States to deliver any economic assistance to Russia? All of these questions, I stated, would, consequently, have to be taken into consideration if and when the time mentioned by the British Government came to pass, and I felt that all that it was possible, therefore, for me to say was that in the event mentioned by the British Government, this Government would be glad to discuss the question with the British Government.
I said to Lord Halifax that I had given him the evening before to read a telegram which had been sent to our Embassy in London75 with the request that the outline of American policy towards the Soviet Union contained therein be made available to Mr. Eden. I said I trusted very earnestly that in the light of possible developments, the British Government would not feel disposed to modify the principles enumerated with specific regard to the Baltic states.
To my surprise Lord Halifax said that he felt he was rather cynical with regard to the Baltic states. He said he did not think that the Baltic peoples were peoples who demanded very much respect or consideration and that in the situation in which Great Britain now found herself, concentrating as her sole objective upon the defeat of Hitler, he could conceive of a situation developing in which the British Government, in order to form close military relations with the Soviet Union, might desire to take some steps with regard to recognizing the Soviet claims with regard to the Baltic States and to the Baltic peoples.
I replied by saying that I wondered whether, if the British Government adopted such a policy as that, it would not inevitably weaken one of the greatest forces now upholding, in my judgment, the British cause, namely, the innate strength of the moral issues involved. What logical distinction, I said, could be drawn between the recognition of [Page 761] the brutal conquest by Russia of the Baltic states and the brutal conquest by Hitler of other independent peoples such as the Dutch and the Belgians? I asked whether Lord Halifax believed that American public opinion would continue to have faith in the validity of the moral issues involved in this struggle if such steps were taken by the British Government.
To this Lord Halifax replied by referring to the fact that the Baltic states for over a century had been under the domination of Russia.
I said that this, of course, was indisputable, but on the other hand, they had regained their liberties as a result of the last world war and had established themselves as independent peoples. I said that exactly the same status applied to Finland which had likewise been under Russian domination for a century.
Lord Halifax replied to this by saying that he did not have the same respect and regard for the Baltic peoples that he did for the Finnish people.
I remarked that I could do no more than let the Ambassador have my individual views on this matter which were in accord with the policy announced by my Government and that I, for one, did not believe that the British Government would gain anything of a practical nature by recognizing the Russian claim to this part of the loot obtained during the past year and that I believed that the Government of the United States would not depart from its support of the moral issues involved in the present world struggle.