Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, Volume I

740.0011 European War 1939/11970: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 12, 1941—11 a.m.
[Received 8 p.m.]

1127. Department’s 776, June 9, 9 p.m. It is my understanding that the disposition of German armed forces from the Baltic to the Black Sea for quite some time has been of such a nature and in such force as to permit of an armed invasion of the Soviet Union at any time along the entire front and that Soviet troops have been disposed in the manner best calculated to resist such invasion. This circumstance combined with the fact that the present is the most favorable time of year for an attack upon this country would be sufficient to give rise to almost any kind of rumor. Moreover, it is evident that such rumors in themselves constitute a form of pressure which Germany has in the past employed with pronounced success. I have for over 2 months reported similar rumors on virtually all of the points mentioned in the Department’s telegram.

I have, however, no information which would indicate that an ultimatum has been delivered to the Soviet Government, and I may point out that the terms of the alleged ultimatum reported from Bucharest and Stockholm would be of such a nature as virtually to compel a rejection. In my opinion Germany would be more likely to present an ultimatum capable of acceptance, or to attack without warning. The list of alleged demands appear to me to be a list of German desiderata rather than an ultimatum.

It is true that haphazard measures are being taken in Moscow to meet the possibility of an attack, such as the destruction of wooden sheds, etc., which would be likely to spread fires in the event of a bombing attack. On the other hand no specially constructed bomb shelters have been prepared and no antiaircraft precautions are in evidence. Drills against parachutists are being held which, from my observation of one of them, would probably be wholly ineffective. Stalin’s assumption of the post of Prime Minister⁶³ and the restrictions recently placed upon movements of foreign diplomats⁶⁴ may be construed as a part of these general preparations. The foregoing, however, are in my opinion merely steps in a development which has been going on for some months and are called for by the general international situation, apart from any immediate menace.

On the other hand I was informed today in strictest confidence by the Rumanian Minister⁶⁵ that Schulenburg⁶⁶ told him yesterday that he had received no instructions and has carried on no negotiations since his return from Germany at the end of April and that he has received no information of any negotiations going on in Berlin. Schulenburg stated moreover that he doubted any negotiations were in fact taking place. According to Gafencu, the German Ambassador was inclined to the opinion that in view of his past efforts to promote peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and Germany and his firm opposition to a German attack upon this country, his present “isolation” indicated a German intention to attack. He even went so far as to discuss how he might be able to get out of Moscow in the event of war. Gafencu also told me that 2 days ago the Italian Ambassador⁶⁷ had expressed the opinion that Germany was contemplating an attack upon the Soviet Union but that he did not believe Italy would take part in it or would even declare war and cited the example of Germany’s attitude toward Greece during the early stages of the Italo-Greek war.⁶⁸ In evaluating these most recent remarks of the German and Italian Ambassadors it should be borne in mind that both are well aware of the fact that Gafencu continues to maintain close personal relations with the British Ambassador⁶⁹ and myself.

As I have previously informed the Department I am convinced that in order to avoid war at this time Stalin is prepared to make almost any concessions provided they do not impair the ability of the Soviet Union to defend itself. He might even make promises which would have the latter effect if carried out but I believe would fight now rather than agree to terms which would make it impossible to resist later. Just where he would draw the line of possible concessions it is difficult to say. While it is remotely conceivable that the restoration of Finnish territory, Bessarabia and Bukovina, and the Baltic States could be wrung from him it seems clear that Stalin could not yield control of the Ukraine and at the same time maintain the independence of the Soviet Union.

If the foregoing estimate of the Soviet position is correct Hitler will have to decide in the light of his major war strategy whether an attack upon the Soviet Union would be worth the risk.

In favor of an attack is the fact that whether Germany wins or loses the war with Britain it would be to her advantage to have disposed of the Soviet menace. In the event of victory over Britain the other occupied countries would be fertile fields for communism, and Germany would either have to maintain a considerable number of troops under arms to offset the Communist menace or ask her war weary people to forego the fruits of victory until yet another campaign against the Soviet Union was fought. If the Soviet Union were crushed and the Ukraine in German hands, Germany in the event of a negotiated peace would be in a position to make substantial concessions in the west and even agree to disarm. As to the effectiveness of Soviet resistance, opinions here differ, with many unbiased observers believing that military resistance could be crushed within a few weeks. It is generally conceded, however, that as time passes Soviet strength will increase relative to that of Germany. Large numbers of German troops must in any event be left on the Soviet frontier and Germany may well decide to use them while conditions for an attack are favorable. Opinion here also differs as to the time it would take Germany to reorganize production in the Ukraine after an invasion. In time Germany could no doubt increase the wheat production considerably. Similarly the Baku oil production and deliveries to Germany could in time be increased if Baku and the transportation system were under German control.

Finally, Germany must consider that if her relative strength should ever decline to the point where the Soviet Union need no longer fear attack, the delivery of Soviet products would either cease or they would have to be purchased at exorbitant prices.

Against an attack is the argument that even if successful it would not win the war against Britain for Germany.

It would probably preclude or postpone an attempt to invade England, might encourage the British to reduce their home forces and increase their armies on other fronts, but in any event would diminish German aerial operations against Britain.

Some of my colleagues believe that a successful invasion of the Soviet Union would require over 3 months and that the cost of the campaign in men, materials and in particular, in airplanes, would be considerable. In the meantime deliveries from the Soviet Union would cease and so much of the current crop would be lost that little food would be obtained this year. Soviet deliveries are now appreciable and if Germany refrains from attack they will probably increase—at least for some time to come. So far as concerns grain, Germany would be in a far worse position next winter for having attacked, and it is probable that the invasion would not be productive before the harvest of 1942 at the earliest.

In view of the secrecy which shrouds the present relations between the Soviet Union and Germany and the fact that the vital decision involving peace or war rests in each country in the inner recesses of the mind of an individual, it is obviously impossible to do more than draw inferences or conclusion from meager indications of trends or developments as little factual evidence is available here. Nor can official confirmation ever be obtained in respect of such apparently credible information as does come into my possession. The most that I can assert with reasonable confidence is that no hostile initiative will be taken by Stalin who on the contrary is undoubtedly prepared to satisfy any reasonable German demands.

In consequence the decision of peace or war will be governed exclusively by considerations of German military, economic, or political expediency which in turn will primarily be based upon the following considerations:

(a) The German estimate of the probable duration of the war.

(b) The feasibility of a successful invasion or blockade of Britain.

(c) The timeliness, extent and effectiveness of American assistance to Britain with or without active participation in the war.

(d) The ability of Germany to organize the “new order” in Europe with or without full Soviet cooperation.

(e) Germany’s appraisal of its capacity to provide food and raw materials for itself as well as the countries encompassed in the “new order” without the certainty of Soviet supplies.

(f) The German appraisal of the position in the Near and Middle East in the near future.

(g) The German appraisal of the possibility of a conflict in the Pacific between Japan, the United States and Britain.

Steinhardt

63. The assumption of this position by Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin was reported by the Ambassador in telegram No. 922, May 7, p. 613.
64. The Soviet note of May 16, 1941, which imposed these restrictions, was reported in telegram No. 991, May 17, p. 881.
65. Grigore Gafencu.
66. Friedrich Werner, Count von der Schulenburg, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
67. Augusto Rosso.
68. The Italian invasion of Greece began on October 28, 1940; see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iii, pp. 542 ff.
69. Sir Stafford Cripps.