740.0011 European War 1939/14216: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:25 p.m.]
376. My telegram 371, August 19.23 I said to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning I had been disappointed by nature of Finnish press comment which I felt would make bad impression in United States, on subject of declaration issued after Roosevelt–Churchill meeting.24 I pointed out that comment overlooked fact that declaration was consistent with established American policy of non-recognition of territorial changes wrought by force. Minister said he had not read Finnish press comment on declaration. Finland’s position in present war remained unchanged; namely, that Finland was seeking only security against threat of Bolshevik domination, and he again mentioned numerous strategic railroads westward from Murmansk. He said: I thought it was well understood in United States that Finland was seeking safety against Russian domination as it had for centuries whether Russian threat was in form of Czarism or Bolshevism and that it seemed deplorable that Finnish press should have deliberately ignored obvious purport of declaration while accepting [Page 59] without question false German claim to be defending Europe against Bolshevism.
Minister repeated hope of Finnish Government to be able to withdraw from participation in war upon achievement of its strategic aims, but said that when this point was reached, presumably coinciding with German occupation of Leningrad, it was expected that pending general settlement Finland would have to maintain “armed peace” much as it did between 1918 and 1921.
Witting, however, admitted uncertainty whether this program could be carried out. There is apparently growing anxiety here lest Germans prove unwilling to release Finland when Finnish war aims are achieved. I did not gain impression that Germans have yet made new demands for more extensive military or political cooperation. Witting said that on economic side 75% of Finnish businessmen were now convinced that Finnish economy would have to be adjusted to German system for lack of foreign exchange and free capital. But he expressed belief that Germans would make no attempt to force Nazi social and political ideology upon Finnish people who he said had five centuries of experience in free institutions and unlike German people would not accept an essentially militarist system.
When during conversation I mentioned our full expectation that Nazi regime would be destroyed, Minister expressed view that collapse of German Government would open way for Bolshevism in heart of Europe. I said we intended to forestall revolutionary disintegration of Europe upon conclusion of war by preparations now being made to meet urgent supply needs of European populations at that time.
I gained impression from today’s conversation with Witting that fear of undue delay in concluding hostilities is also growing here and that there is palpable desire to keep one foot in each opposing camp.
Procopé appears to have reported to Witting that purposes in issuing Roosevelt–Churchill declaration included checkmating any Hitler peace move and possible Soviet-Nazi peace as well as serving warning on Japan and assuring “Anglo-Saxon world domination” after war.