711.61/814½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)
Yesterday afternoon at the reception given by Mrs. Oumansky the Soviet Ambassador came up to me and after sighing rather heavily said that things appeared to look rather gloomy. I asked him to [Page 741] what things he referred and he said Soviet-American relations. I inquired as to what aspect of Soviet-American relations he had in mind. He said that he was referring to the whole general picture. I asked him then if he was referring particularly to the question of equipment, or to other phases of our relations. He replied that apparently the question of equipment for the Soviet Union was no longer an active issue following the President’s Proclamation of April 1544 which put under export control practically all the remaining commodities which the Soviet Government was accustomed to purchase in the United States. Experience had shown him that when commodities were once placed under the export control system they stopped going to the Soviet Union. I told him that he seemed to be more pessimistic than usual. He said that he was pessimistic because he felt that certain groups in the American Government, and even in the State Department, were, from political motives, doing their utmost to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining equipment from the United States. I said that I felt that he had a wrong idea of the situation so far as the State Department was concerned; that I knew that officials of the State Department had spent much time and effort in endeavoring to obtain the release of equipment for the Soviet Union, and that I was not aware of any element in the State Department which was trying to block the flow of exports to the Soviet Union out of prejudice against the Soviet Union.
The Ambassador stated that he was compelled to admit the State Department had reacted very well with regard to the conclusion of the recent Soviet-Japanese pact;45 it seemed, however, that the American public in general was falsely estimating its significance. He did not know whether the State Department was in possession of the substance of the conversation which had recently taken place between Mr. Molotov and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow46 with regard to the pact. During this conversation Mr. Molotov had assured the Ambassador that China had not been mentioned during the discussions between Molotov and Matsuoka.47 The pact did not concern China at all. In fact, he, as the Soviet Ambassador, could state that during the conversations between Molotov and Matsuoka, Molotov had adhered scrupulously to the Soviet policy of refraining, when discussing Soviet relations with one Power, from touching upon Soviet relations with another Power. The purpose of the pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was merely in the interests of peace and was not directed at any other Powers.
[Page 742]The Ambassador then referred again to what he termed as the attempts of officials of the American Government in controlling exports to bring political pressure upon the Soviet Union. He said that it seemed to him to be short-sighted of American officials to endeavor to influence the foreign policy of the Soviet Union at this time by cutting off supplies to it. This policy seemed to be particularly pointless since without doubt the Soviet Union and the United States would eventually be on the same side anyway. I told him that this statement was extremely interesting and it would be very helpful indeed, in case the Soviet Government held such views, for it to explain them frankly and fully to the appropriate officials of the American Government. He said that of course this statement represented merely his own personal views.
I told the Ambassador that I did not feel that I should allow to pass unchallenged his statement that the American Government was endeavoring through the use of the export control system to influence the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. I said that I was certain that no refusal of export licenses permitting commodities to go forward to the Soviet Union was based upon a desire to bring pressure upon the Soviet Government. I pointed out that it was, however, practically impossible to obtain the release of materials for the Soviet Union needed in the United States in cases in which there was a possibility that the despatch of such materials to the Soviet Union might facilitate the extension of Soviet economic aid to Germany.
- Proclamations Nos. 2475 and 2476, dated April 14, 1941, on control of the export of certain articles and materials, released to the press on April 15, 1941; for texts, see Department of State Bulletin, April 19, 1941, p. 475.↩
- See bracketed note, p. 612.↩
- Shao Li-tsu.↩
- Yosuke Matsuoka, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩