Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, Volume I

195.2/3822

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)⁹⁶

[ Washington ,] February 27, 1941.

Participants:	Mr. C. A. Oumansky, Soviet Ambassador;
	Mr. Welles, Under Secretary;
	Mr. Gromyko, Counselor of Soviet Embassy;
	Mr. Ray Atherton, Acting Chief, Division of European Affairs;
	Mr. Loy Henderson, Ass’t Chief, Division of European Affairs;
	Mr. Bartley Gordon, Division of European Affairs.

Section I

Mails

The Ambassador complained that the Embassy was not receiving its mail; private letters were arriving irregularly; periodicals and official publications in the Soviet Union did not come through at all. Furthermore, subscribers to Soviet periodicals and newspapers, such as private persons and institutions, were not receiving second-class mail from the Soviet Union. It would appear from a recent statement of the Postmaster General⁹⁷ that 15 tons of printed matter which had been sent from the Soviet Union to the United States by mail had been destroyed in San Francisco. He had been informed that such mail could not be distributed because the senders in the Soviet Union had not registered as the agents of a foreign principal.⁹⁸ He would like to ask several questions:

(a) Was there any international postal convention which required the registration in the United States of institutions such as newspapers, editors, or publishers residing abroad unless they had a distributing agent registered in the United States as the agent of a foreign principal?

(b) Was there any law in the United States which gave the American Government the right to destroy printed matter coming from the Soviet Union by mail because the sender was not a duly registered agent of a foreign principal?

The Ambassador continued that in his opinion Soviet printed matter coming to the United States through the mail was not being destroyed because the sender had not registered as the agent of a foreign principal; its destruction represented a kind of an unofficial censorship, a censorship that was destroying the normal cultural intercourse between the United States and the Soviet Union. He was complaining at the violation of the immunity of the Embassy and at the failure of the consulates to receive their mail. Nevertheless, the matter was much more important than that of mere diplomatic immunity. The Japanese Embassy had not experienced any difficulties in obtaining prompt delivery of printed matter from Japan. It would appear that the Soviet Embassy had been singled out in the diplomatic corps and was being discriminated against by being deprived of periodicals and newspapers emanating from the country which it represented. He wished to lodge a protest (1) because the American postal authorities were preventing the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet consulates from receiving mail sent to them from the Soviet Union; (2) because the unofficial censorship which apparently had been established in this country was discriminating particularly against the Soviet Union and Soviet representatives in this country; (3) because the action of the postal authorities was interfering with normal cultural intercourse between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. Henderson informed the Ambassador that following the Ambassador’s representations made to him on the preceding day he had inquired regarding the situation. He had learned that American laws providing for registration of agents of foreign principals were now being interpreted in such a manner as to require that agents living in foreign countries of foreign principals should register with the State Department in case they were sending certain types of printed matter to persons and institutions in the United States. Furthermore, the postal authorities, acting according to American law which, in effect, authorizes them not to deliver communications which were being sent through the mail in violation of existing legislation, were holding up large quantities of printed matter which had been sent to the United States from agents of foreign principals who had failed to register as such with the State Department. There had been no discrimination whatsoever in the enforcement of these laws. Similar types of printed matter from various countries were being treated in precisely the same manner.

With respect to the failure of the Soviet Embassy and consulates to receive printed matter sent to them from the Soviet Union, it should be stated that the postal authorities deeply regretted that action on their part may possibly have caused the Soviet Embassy and consulates inconvenience in this respect. There had been no intention on the part of any American official to deprive the Soviet Embassy and Soviet consulates in the United States of their first-or second-class mail. It would appear that Soviet newspapers and magazines were coming to the United States by mail in large bales, each of which held numerous individually wrapped papers. The postal authorities had detained whole bales of these newspapers without realizing that some of the bales possibly contained printed matter addressed to the Soviet Embassy or consulates. It was understood that these bales were now being opened and examined and that mail addressed to the Embassy and consulates would go forward at once. The delivery of Soviet printed matter to the Soviet Embassy and consulates might be facilitated, however, if in the future the senders in the Soviet Union would send such matter separately through the mail instead of including it in the bales.

The Ambassador said that the statement of Mr. Henderson although helpful was by no means satisfactory. It seemed to him that the decision of the American authorities that senders of printed matter from the Soviet Union to the United States should register as foreign agents, if carried to its logical conclusion, would result in certain absurdities. The Moscow Izvestiya, one of the two great Soviet daily newspapers, was published by the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, a body which corresponded to the Congress of the United States. Was it to be understood that the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union must register before the Izvestiya could be delivered to its American subscribers? Was the American Government demanding that the British Parliament must register as the agent of a foreign principal before its publications could be delivered to subscribers in the United States? How would the American Government feel if the Soviet Government would demand the registration of the Congress of the United States before allowing the Congressional Record to enter the Soviet Union? The public institutions—that is, Government institutions of foreign countries—should not be required to register as agents of a foreign principal. It was clear that Soviet Governmental institutions could not so register. It would appear, therefore, that if the law was rigidly enforced, not only cultural intercourse would be interrupted between the two countries but also Soviet trade magazines, scientific magazines, publications relating to works of art, etc., could no longer be sent to the United States. Mr. Henderson said that according to his understanding it was not necessary that the senders of all types of literature to the United States must register as agents of foreign principals. Persons and institutions engaged in non-political activities in furtherance of trade, or engaged in such activities as were of an educational, professional, scientific or artistic nature were not required to register.

Mr. Henderson asked why it would not be possible for the Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (International Book Company) which apparently was the main sender of Soviet publications to the United States, to register as the agent of a foreign principal.

The Ambassador said he wished again to point out that in his opinion the failure of Soviet senders of printed matter to the United States to register as foreign principals was not the real reason for the holding up of Soviet mail. He felt that the mail was being held up as the result of an unofficial censorship. As evidence of the fact that registration was not the main point involved, he wished to point out that there was in New York City an American corporation called the Four Continents Book Corporation which had registered with the State Department as the agent of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. Despite this fact, the postal authorities had refused to permit Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to distribute Soviet publications in this country. Here was a case of a duly registered agent of a foreign principal being forbidden to distribute Soviet printed matter through the mail.

He would like to know on what grounds this action of the postal authorities had been taken. He had reason to believe that the postal authorities might be applying Article No. 600 of the Postal Regulations to Soviet publications which have hitherto been distributed by the Four Continents Book Corporation. This meant that Soviet newspapers were being barred on the ground that they were obscene or seditious.

Mr. Henderson said that he knew nothing about the refusal of the postal authorities to distribute Soviet printed matter brought into the country by the Four Continents Book Corporation, but that he would look into the matter and discuss it later with the Ambassador.

The Ambassador stated that he wished again to emphasize that there was discrimination. He knew for a fact that the Japanese Embassy was receiving newspapers from Japan with no hindrance whatsoever. Mr. Henderson suggested that perhaps the newspapers addressed to the Japanese Embassy had been sent forward separately, not in bales, or perhaps had been sent through diplomatic mail pouches. He was not really qualified to discuss details of this kind.

Mr. Welles said that the Soviet Ambassador had referred to the fact that the action of the postal authorities was interrupting cultural intercourse between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Ambassador had asked in particular how the American Government would feel if the Soviet Government should demand that the Congressional Record could not enter the Soviet Union until the American Congress had registered in the Soviet Union as the agent of a foreign principal. He would like to point out that according to his understanding, no American newspaper or publication, including the Congressional Record, could not [sic] be delivered freely to institutions and private persons in the Soviet Union. The fact was that it was practically impossible for the great majority of Soviet citizens to have access to any American publication.

The Soviet Ambassador replied that he admitted that what Mr. Welles had to say was to an extent true. He wished to call Mr. Welles’ attention to the fact, however, that there were great differences between the Soviet system and the American system. Foreign publications could enter the Soviet Union only under certain conditions and these conditions were applicable to the publications of all countries. The American Government, however, was permitting publications from certain countries freely to enter the United States and at the same time prohibiting the entry of Soviet publications. He would like in this connection to state that a large variety of American printed matter was constantly entering the Soviet Union. He himself while in the Soviet Union had had the pleasure of reading every day the Congressional Record.

Mr. Welles stated that the present conversation had apparently brought out the fact that a certain amount of clarification was necessary. Certain facts had not yet been brought out clearly. He was certain that any authorities of the American Government who had destroyed or withheld mail addressed to the Embassy should, through the Department of State, express their regret that such an occurrence had taken place and should give assurance that diplomatic immunity which the American Government certainly desired to have maintained to the full extent should be extended to the Ambassador and such members of his staff as were entitled to such immunity. In the second place, it seemed to him that the Ambassador’s complaint had some basis if it was true that a distributing agent in this country, registered as the agent of a foreign principal according to law, had been forbidden to distribute the material of his principal which was not barred by any law or regulation. This matter would be looked into. In the meantime he could again assure the Ambassador that there had been no discrimination against the Soviet Union.

The Ambassador said he wished to point out that the protest which he was making was merely tentative and that undoubtedly upon instruction from his Government he would later submit a protest in writing.

Section II

Baltic Ships, Baltic Diplomatic and Consular Representatives in the United States, and Recognition of the Soviet Absorption of the Baltic States

The Ambassador said that he wished again to take up the question of the Baltic ships in this country. Mr. Welles said that he would like to take the initiative in the subject. As the Ambassador knew, he, together with Mr. Atherton and Mr. Henderson, for some time had been giving much thought and study to the Baltic questions. It had been his desire, as well as that of Mr. Atherton and Mr. Henderson, to see that this Government did all that was possible in order to surmount various obstacles which had arisen to the improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. A number of months ago he had told the Ambassador that in certain cases it would be preferable from a practical point of view to recognize the fact that certain problems exist in the relations between the two countries which did not appear to be solvable and that more could be achieved if such problems would be, so to speak, left standing for the time being in the midst of the stream. It was his belief that problems relating to the Baltic States⁹⁹ should be considered to be in the class of unsolvable problems. These problems could not be approached without coming up against a basic principle of policy of this Government—a policy which had been maintained absolutely unaltered since 1931.¹ There had been no deviation from it. As long as this Government adhered to that principle of foreign policy it could not agree to make decisions which would imply any infringement of it.

If the Ambassador desired, he was prepared to discuss these problems with him in detail and at length but that since their objective was to soothe, to consult, and to construct, he hoped that the matter could be dropped for the time being.

The Ambassador said that on January 8 he had given to Mr. Welles a statement from Mr. Molotov in which it was pointed out that the Soviet Government did not believe that a readjustment of relations could be attained as long as the Baltic problems stood between the American and Soviet Governments, or as long as the former Ministers or Consuls of the three Baltic States continued their activities in the United States. Property belonging to his country, including the former Baltic ships, was being held by persons who had no right to it. It had been pointed out to the American Government that from the point of view of his Government, which was based on the knowledge of American foreign policy and upon statements made by former Secretaries of State with regard to the Baltic problems, the principle of American foreign policy to which Mr. Welles had just referred was hardly applicable to the situation of the Baltic because in previous years the eventual reunion of the Baltic States with the Soviet Union had been explicitly recognized by the United States. The Ambassador therefore felt that Mr. Welles in making his statement had apparently reduced the scope and results of the conversations in which they had been engaging for the last few months. Translating Mr. Welles’ statement into practice, it would appear that the United States Government would continue to consider as valid and operative in the United States its treaties with the three former Baltic republics and also that the United States Government would continue to recognize the former Ministers and Consuls of the Baltic States who, in cooperation with officials of the Department of State, local Customs authorities, and police officials, were continuing to arrest Captains and members of the crews of what are now Soviet vessels only because such persons desired to go home. These Consuls, armed with certificates issued by the Department of State testifying to their official status, were also appearing in the American courts and through fictitious means were changing the registry of these vessels and directing their movements. Apparently the statement of Mr. Welles meant that the Soviet Ambassador would be unable to assist scores of his nationals in this country and to represent the interests of the legitimate owners of these vessels. The existence of such unsolved problems would result in adding for an indefinite period of time acid to the relations between the two countries, and in the meantime, the damage which was being done to Soviet national interests and Soviet nationals would continue to accumulate.

Mr. Welles stated that since the Ambassador had raised the question and since the attitude of the Soviet Government would seem to indicate that the position taken by the American Government with regard to the Baltic States was a departure from the policy of previous administrations in the United States, he felt that he should make a statement in the way of clarification. It was true that immediately after the termination of the World War, the United States Government, in view of the traditional friendship between the Russian people and the American people, had taken the attitude that it desired to take no action which could be regarded in any sense as determining the alienation of territory of the Russian people.² The Ambassador, however, should recall the fact that even before the United States had recognized the independence of the three Baltic republics,³ the Soviet Government itself had done so⁴ and had continued over a period of many years to recognize the Governments of these three countries as separate sovereign governments. The attitude of the United States had consequently been identical with the attitude of the Soviet Government itself until a few months ago. The American Government had hoped and it still hoped that the policy of the Soviet Government would be identical also with the policy of the United States with regard to the desirability of safeguarding the legitimate interests of the smaller countries of the world, a policy which would strengthen and fortify the rights of small countries to integrity and independence in every possible way. The Ambassador had just spoken of the former Ministers and Consuls in the United States of the Baltic republics. It should be made clear that as far as the American Government was concerned these officials were still being recognized as Ministers and Consuls of these republics. The attitude of the American Government was based on its policy of not recognizing the conquest of territory by force. In this connection the Ambassador should not overlook the fact that for a number of months after the total occupation of Czechoslovakia by the German Reich⁵ the Soviet Government had continued to recognize the Czechoslovak Minister of that country in Moscow. Mr. Welles added that to summarize as briefly as possible, he might state that the American Government felt very strongly that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union still had an opportunity to cooperate for a continuation of the principles of peace. It seemed singularly unfortunate, in view of the efforts which the Ambassador and he had been making to bring the two countries closer together, that this question should be brought up at the present time, since such an action tended to impede the progress which was being made. He felt it important that both sides should adopt a policy, which he strongly urged, that when they came to problems which could not be solved, they pass over them for the time being and he recommended that that policy be followed at least with regard to questions pertaining to the Baltic. The Soviet Ambassador again insisted that on July 25, 1922 the American Government had recognized the independence of the Baltic States; that no force was involved in the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States, since the absorption had been brought about by peaceful and parliamentary methods; and that the analogy with the Czechoslovak situation was not applicable since Czechoslovakia had never in the past belonged to Germany whereas the Baltic States historically had belonged to Russia.

He said that he would probably be compelled to surrender with great reluctance to Mr. Welles’ suggestion that when they met an obstacle of great magnitude they pass over it instead of endeavoring to overcome it. He regretted particularly dropping the subject of the Baltic States since such action implied that the problem was one that could not be solved. The failure of the solution of this problem, he stated, would reduce the possibility of an improvement in the relations between the two countries.

Mr. Welles said that from the standpoint of expediency it was merely a matter of passing around an obstacle until a time came when it could be discussed to a better advantage. Nothing could be gained from a conversation in which Mr. Oumansky would insist that black is white while Mr. Welles insisted that white is black. Conversations of this kind were likely to be exacerbating rather than soothing. Mr. Welles said that without arguing, he must again disagree with the statements which Mr. Oumansky had just made.

The Ambassador said that he would like to make one informal observation. It was true that Soviet foreign policy was in general independent and was affected and directly determined by Soviet national interests and Soviet national security. The course of Soviet foreign policy was bound to be affected, as was the foreign policy of any government, by the kind of treatment which it received from other governments. There was a widespread misconception in the United States regarding Soviet foreign policy. It seemed to be generally believed that it was one-sided; that the Soviet Government always asked for something and never gave anything. It should be pointed out, however, that it was only normal and natural and almost inevitable that the development of the foreign policy of a country must be affected by the extent to which another country or another group of countries recognized its rights. In particular, Soviet foreign policy must be affected by the fact that one country or a group of countries has recognized Soviet rights in an area in which they themselves have interests, whereas other countries or groups of countries which have no particular interests in those areas, have not recognized such Soviet rights. Mr. Welles replied that he was interested in this statement; he was sure that it was made in a friendly spirit and with a desire to promote Soviet-American relations; he would be remiss, however, if he did not at once make it clear that the American Government had never attempted and would not attempt to purchase the friendship of any country by recognizing the rights which it did not regard as legitimate and justifiable.

The Soviet Ambassador said that of course Mr. Welles was entitled to that point of view. The American Government could not purchase Soviet friendship since the Soviet Government would not sell such friendship. It was possible, however, for a friendly atmosphere to be created in Soviet-American relations by the continuance on the part of the United States of its traditional policy with regard to Russia.

Mr. Welles replied that the policy of friendship between the United States and the Russian people was a policy which had existed many generations and had been an extremely important factor in the foreign policy of the United States. He said that he did not need to remind the Ambassador that the present administration of the United States had done much in order to recreate the friendly relations with the Russian people which had existed for many generations.⁶ The Ambassador again repeated some of his arguments with regard to the Baltic fleet and said that he felt that it would be impossible for him entirely to drop this subject and that, therefore, he would expect to raise it on suitable occasions in the future.

L[oy] W. H[enderson]

96. A detailed account of this conversation was sent to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in Department’s telegram No. 244, March 1, 1941 (711.61/808a).
97. Frank C. Walker.
98. Foreign Agents Registration Act, approved June 8, 1938, as amended by the Act of August 7, 1939; 53 Stat. 1244.
99. For correspondence on the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 357 ff.
1. The United States policy of non-recognition of the conquest of territory by force was set forth in telegram No. 2, January 7, 1932, to the Consul General at Nanking, ibid., 1932, vol, iii, p. 7.
2. For illustrative statements of the policy consistently maintained by the United States that the disturbed condition of Russian affairs after the October (Bolshevik) revolution of 1917 should not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory without its consent, see Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, vol. ii, pp. 349–351; Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. iv, p. 688; Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 723, 727–728; and Foreign Relations, 1920, vol. iii, pp. 463–468, 659.
3. A telegram from Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes on July 25, 1922, directed that the Foreign Offices of the three Baltic States be advised on the morning of July 28, 1922, that the United States extended to each full recognition; see Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. ii, p. 873.
4. The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic had recognized the independence of the Baltic States in treaties of peace with Estonia concluded at Dorpat (Tartu, Yuryev) on February 2, 1920, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xi, p. 29; with Lithuania, signed at Moscow on July 12, 1920, ibid., vol. iii, p. 105; and with Latvia, signed at Riga on August 11, 1920, ibid., vol. ii, p. 195.
5. For correspondence on the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany and the refusal of the United States to recognize the extinction of that republic, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 34 ff.
6. Recognition by the United States of the Soviet Union was extended on November 16, 1933; see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 1 ff.