711.61/785½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)

Participants: Mr. Welles, Under Secretary of State;
Mr. C. A. Oumansky, Soviet Ambassador;
Mr. Ray Atherton, Acting Chief, Division of European Affairs;
Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Ass’t. Chief, Division of European Affairs.

The thirteenth in the series of conversations between Mr. Welles and the Soviet Ambassador took place at four o’clock in the afternoon of January 8. Mr. Welles suggested that the conversations follow an agenda which had been arranged for him and that after this agenda has been completed, other subjects which the Ambassador might desire to present could be discussed. The Ambassador agreed. Mr. Welles stated that the first item on his agenda related to the machine tool problem.

Machine Tools

Mr. Welles stated that he was exceedingly sorry to have learned that five machines out of the list of 21 which he had told the Ambassador at the preceding conference42 were available for export should not have been contained on the list. This error, as the Ambassador had already been informed, had arisen as a result of a misunderstanding between the Administrator of Export Control43 and other agencies of the Government. The fact that the five machines in question had been diverted some time ago. The Under Secretary said that he had just returned from a conference with the Secretary of the Treasury44 and [Page 668] Mr. Young45 of the President’s Liaison Committee during which the possibility had been discussed of granting priorities for the replacement of these five machines. He hoped to have a definite answer within the next few days as to what, if any, priorities could be arranged.

Mr. Welles stated that he also had asked the appropriate Governmental authorities to give every consideration to the possibility of granting priorities to orders for replacements of machines contained in List C.

Mr. Welles thereupon read the first paragraph of a memorandum, a copy of which is attached hereto as Enclosure No. 1,46 which had been received from Colonel Maxwell. This paragraph gave a breakdown of List C. He also informed the Ambassador that he had received information from the Administrator of Export Control which caused him to believe that several other machine tools might be released to the Soviet Government in the near future. He did not, however, wish to go into this matter at the present time because of the uncertainties still involved.

Referring again to his conversation with Mr. Young, Mr. Welles said that he had obtained the impression that the Ambassador had not seen Mr. Young since October 31. Mr. Welles thereupon read certain excerpts from a memorandum prepared by Mr. Young, dated January 8, a copy of which is attached hereto as Enclosure No. 2,46 and suggested that it might be helpful if the Ambassador in the future would endeavor to maintain closer contact with Mr. Young’s office.

Mr. Oumansky thanked Mr. Welles for his statements and suggestions and said that he must be frank in stating that in spite of the efforts which the Under Secretary had made, the situation with regard to machine tools was bad. The information given by Mr. Welles at the conference of December 16 had been relatively encouraging. At that time, Mr. Welles had given the Ambassador to understand that machine tools to the value of $1,113,000 would be released for export to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, since that conference, licenses covering only $339,000 worth of goods had been issued. Licenses covering goods to the value of $226,000 had been rejected and applications for licenses covering machine tools valued at $548,000 still remained unanswered. Among the applications unanswered were those covering machine tools contained in List C to the value of $480,000—machine tools which the Ambassador had understood from his last conversation with Mr. Welles were not needed for national defense and could be exported to the Soviet Union. In response to inquiries made to Colonel Maxwell regarding the reasons for the delay in the issuance of licenses covering these machine tools, Colonel Maxwell [Page 669] had informed him that a final decision had not as yet been made with respect to them.

Mr. Welles said that when he gave the lists on December 16 to the Soviet Ambassador he had understood that the decision had been reached that all items contained in the list could be exported to the Soviet Union, and that he failed, therefore, to understand how the question of their export could still be under consideration. The Ambassador remarked that he had informed Mr. Henderson some time ago of Colonel Maxwell’s statements. Mr. Henderson said that the Soviet Ambassador had mentioned this matter to him and that it had been taken up at once with Colonel Maxwell’s office. Colonel Maxwell had stated that he had endeavored to make it clear to the Ambassador that no guarantee could be given that any machine tools could be exported. Any machine tool, regardless of whether or not a license governing its export had been issued, could be detained and diverted by the appropriate American authorities in case it should be needed for American defense purposes. Mr. Welles requested Mr. Henderson to get in touch with Colonel Maxwell at once and to find out precisely why licenses had not been issued covering the machine tools in question.

The Ambassador said that he had received communications from his Government insisting upon the release at once of two particular items—namely, eight gear cutting machines which had been purchased from the Gear Grinding Machine Company of Detroit, Michigan, and a welding machine which had been purchased from the Federal Machine and Welding Company of Warren, Ohio. The value of the gear grinding machines was not very great. It totaled only about $40,000. Nevertheless, the machines were so urgently needed in Soviet industry that it was hoped that a way could be found to release them. The welding machine was a more expensive and complicated piece of machinery. It was valued at about $200,000, and the need for it was very great. The Soviet Government therefore insisted that it be released at once. These machines, the release of which was being requested, had been manufactured after much energy and ingenuity had been expended upon them by Soviet engineers and they were destined to play an important role in Soviet industry.

The Ambassador said that he wished to refer to a statement made during the conference of December 16 to the effect that Stankoimport47 had voluntarily relinquished its claim to two items of machinery. This had been a misunderstanding since Stankoimport had at no time relinquished such claims.

The whole situation, the Ambassador continued, with regard to requisitioning was worse than he had thought. He had just learned [Page 670] that in addition to the machine tools contained in List C, equipment valued at approximately $3,095,000, which had already been inspected and accepted by the Soviet authorities, had been either formally requisitioned or diverted. It was very important that his Government should have “a definite assurance of the replacement of these machines at definite times on terms agreeable to the Soviet purchasing organizations which, of course, would realistically evaluate the situation here.”

The Ambassador then referred to the two machines which had been ordered from the Gould Eberhardt Company in the delivery of which the Soviet Government had been particularly interested. He said that the Soviet Government was willing to give up its claim to these machines and to negotiate with respect to their replacement.

Mr. Welles suggested that the question of machine tools be dropped for the present and that he be permitted to proceed with the agenda. The Ambassador said that in a memorandum from his Government which he had been directed to read there were certain passages relating to the machine tool situation. He asked whether it would be preferable to read the memorandum at this juncture or later. Mr. Welles suggested that the memorandum be presented after the completion of his agenda.

The Soviet Request that Funds Belonging to the National Bank of Rumania Which are Frozen in this Country be Released in Order to Pay Wages of Railway Workers in Bessarabia

Mr. Welles referred to the request which Mr. Oumansky had made at the conference of December 16 that the American Government take steps in order to effect the release of certain funds belonging to the National Bank of Rumania which at present were frozen in the United States48 so that these funds could be turned over to the Soviet Government for the payment of the salaries of Bessarabian railway employees. Mr. Welles said that this matter was still under consideration by Treasury and he was not prepared to state what the decision would be.

Mr. Oumansky said that he was disappointed to hear this statement. It was his understanding that the Treasury Department usually passed upon applications for permits to release frozen funds within ten days. Two months had already elapsed since an application for the release of the funds in question had been made to Treasury. He could not understand why there should be so much delay in the approval of a transaction of the type in question. Mr. Welles said that the only reply which he could make was that the matter was still under consideration.

[Page 671]

The Moral Embargo

Mr. Welles said that he had been giving careful consideration to the question of the moral embargo.49 A draft of a letter on this subject which he was proposing to send to Mr. Oumansky had been prepared and he would like to have Mr. Oumansky’s comment with regard to it. He handed the draft to the Ambassador. (A copy of this draft is attached hereto as Enclosure No. 3).50

The Ambassador, after examining the draft, said that he had one question to ask and one amendment to offer. His question was, “In what form would this matter be made public?” Mr. Welles replied that in his judgment the Soviet Government could take such action as it might deem appropriate with regard to publication. The American Government on its part would notify the interested firms.

The Ambassador said that he did not consider publication in the Soviet Union as of importance. It was important, however, for Soviet-American trade relations that just as much publicity be given to the lifting of the embargo as had been given to the announcement of its imposition. Mr. Welles replied that it was not the intention of the Department to inform only those American firms which might inquire regarding the lifting of the moral embargo. It was planned to notify the various firms which had shown an interest in the matter in the past without waiting for new inquiries from them. The Ambassador said that the question still remained of giving full publicity to the lifting of the embargo in view of the fact that the original proclamation had been given so much publicity. He knew that the lifting of the embargo was not a legislative act; that it was merely a statement by the Executive; nevertheless, the act was of great importance. He felt sure that it would be possible to reach some understanding whereby the lifting of the moral embargo could be made public.

Mr. Welles asked if Mr. Oumansky really thought that it would be to the advantage of the Soviet Government to have this matter made public. Would it not be preferable, so far as American-Soviet relations were concerned, not to remind the public of unpleasant incidents of the past? It was sometimes better not to arouse old disagreeable memories.

The Ambassador expressed the opinion that a public statement would serve the purpose of destroying certain conceptions. Mr. Welles disagreed. In his opinion, a public statement would have the opposite effect.

[Page 672]

The Ambassador said that in the American public mind his country was under a moral embargo. This fact was of the greatest importance and continued to be a topic of discussion. The public should be informed that the Soviet Union was no longer under a moral embargo. Mr. Welles promised to take the matter under consideration, although he said that he still believed that the giving of publicity on the matter would be unfortunate.

Mr. Oumansky said he would like to ask another question in this regard: “What was to be the relation between the question of the moral embargo and the other questions under discussion?” Mr. Welles replied that they would be treated as separate matters. Mr. Oumansky said he was glad to hear this statement since both he and his Government felt that the question of the moral embargo should be considered as having no relationship whatsoever between other matters under discussion.

Mr. Welles stated that he wished to make it clear that although the question of the moral embargo, in his opinion, should be treated as a separate and individual matter, nevertheless, it was also his belief that any action taken for the purpose of lifting the moral embargo should be timed so that it would form an integral part of the settlement of the other matters under discussion. Mr. Oumansky said that his Government took the view that the lifting of the moral embargo should not be delayed pending the solving of other problems between the two Governments. It saw no reason why it should not be lifted at once.

The Soviet Ambassador stated that the amendment which he desired to make was as follows:

The last part of the third to the last line on page 1 of the draft which now reads “is not now applicable” should read “is no longer applicable”.

Mr. Welles said that he would be glad to give the proposed amendment consideration. He added that he would like to have suggestions from the Ambassador as to the nature of the reply which Mr. Oumansky might propose to make to the letter, the draft of which was under discussion. Mr. Oumansky said that in his reply he would merely reiterate what had been said in the letter. After a moment’s hesitation, he added that he would prefer to study the matter and suggest the nature of his reply at a later date.

Mr. Welles said that the nature of Mr. Oumansky’s reply could be agreed upon later.

The Fur Seal Convention

Mr. Welles referred to the inquiry which the Soviet Ambassador had made previously as to the action which the American Government proposed to take with regard to the abrogation by Japan of the Fur [Page 673] Seal Convention of 1911.51 Mr. Welles said that although the American Government could not agree technically or otherwise that there was any basis for the action of Japan in abrogating this Convention, the matter was so technical and so complicated that it had decided that before taking any steps with regard to it, the situation should be carefully studied by American experts. American experts at present were giving the matter careful consideration and probably in a month or so might be in a position to furnish an indication of what attitude the American Government should take.

The Ambassador replied that he was of the opinion that the matter was of a highly complicated and technical nature and should not be handled in a hurried or premature manner. There seemed to be a partnership of interest between the United States and Japan with regard to it. The treaty was an old Convention which had been entered into by the Imperial Russian Government and the Soviet Government had become a party to it as a successor to the Imperial Russian Government. His Government was merely interested in exchanging opinions regarding the matter with the American Government.

Mr. Welles suggested that if Mr. Oumansky cared to do so and if he had people in his Embassy who were qualified to discuss the matter, talks on this subject could be arranged between American experts and some of his assistants.

Mr. Oumansky said that he would suggest that parallel work first be done by experts in Moscow and in the United States. After both groups had reached certain conclusions, they might then discuss the matter to their mutual benefit.

Mr. Welles said that this arrangement would be satisfactory with the Government of the United States which would be glad to cooperate in the matter with the Soviet Government.

Difficulties Encountered by Soviet Engineers in Connection with their Visits to the Wright Aeronautical Plant

Mr. Welles referred to Mr. Oumansky’s request made at a previous conference that the State Department assist in making it possible for Soviet engineers to visit the factory of the Wright Aeronautical Corporation in Paterson, New Jersey, in a manner convenient and agreeable to all parties concerned. Mr. Welles said that the matter had been taken up energetically with the War and Navy Departments and that he hoped to have a reply with respect to it in the near future.

[Page 674]

The Ambassador stated that apparently Soviet engineers stationed at the plant in pursuance of long standing contracts with the Wright Aeronautical Corporation were encountering incredible formalities in connection with their endeavors to visit the plant. It would be recalled that a number of months ago a systematic arrangement which would permit Soviet visits to the plant had been worked out with the assistance of the Department of State. These arrangements were not operating at the present time, apparently because of formal reasons. The reasons given were that the passes of the Soviet engineers had expired and therefore no visits would be permitted. The Soviet Ambassador said that Mr. Bone, the head of the factory, had told him informally:

“I like to cooperate with you. I wish that I could hear from the Department of State with regard to this matter; this is not merely a question of authorization for visits from the War and Navy Departments; this Corporation would like to know what the attitude of its Government is in this matter; I would like to go together with you to the Department of State in order to discuss the whole matter with the Secretary of State or with Mr. Welles.”

Mr. Welles said that he would personally take up the matter with General Marshall52 and Admiral Stark.53 Mr. Oumansky said that he would appreciate it if Mr. Welles would do so. The Soviet Government has cooperated for many years with the Wright Aeronautical Corporation and wished to extend still further this cooperation.

Mr. Welles stated that it was his understanding that the difficulties had arisen largely from the fact that certain machinery of a confidential nature which was being manufactured for the American Government had been placed in various parts of the plant and that the visits of foreigners to portions of the plant in which this confidential work was being carried on caused considerable inconvenience as well as delay in production. He said that in his opinion, however, the problems could eventually be solved in a manner satisfactory to all concerned.

The Roszkowski Case

Mr. Welles recalled the fact that in the conversation of December 16, the Ambassador had stated that the American Embassy at Moscow had made representations on behalf of a certain Roszkowski,54 said to be in a Soviet prison. The Ambassador had stated that these representations [Page 675] had been made in spite of the fact that Mr. Roszkowski was not an American citizen; that he had never been in the United States; and that his only claim to citizenship apparently arose from the fact that he had applied for certain American documents in 1939. Mr. Welles said that investigations by the Department had disclosed the fact that Mieczyslaw Roszkowski had been born in Fall River, Mass on October 29, 1920; that he had been taken to Poland as an infant by his parents, along with two American-born brothers; that his father and two brothers were at present in the United States; that he had never of his own free will set foot in the Soviet Union; that he had been seized by the Soviet authorities subsequent to the invasion of Poland. (These statements made by Mr. Welles were taken, and in part read, from telegram no. 1804 of December 30, 6 p.m. from the American Embassy at Moscow55).

The Ambassador stated that he was sure that the Under Secretary had not drafted the document from which he was reading since he was certain that Mr. Welles would not use such an expression as “invasion of Poland”. Mr. Welles asked the Ambassador what words should be used when referring to what had transpired in Poland last year. The Ambassador said that he would suggest words somewhat as follows: “Subsequent to the adherence of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia to the Soviet Union”. Mr. Welles said that perhaps Mr. Oumansky might also object to his use of the word “seized”; perhaps he would prefer him to say that Mr. Roszkowski had “been adhered to by the Soviet authorities”.

Mr. Welles continued quoting from the telegram from Moscow without, of course, disclosing the source of the document in his hand. He pointed out that according to the records of the American Government, Mr. Roszkowski had applied on January 8, 1940 for a passport to the American Consulate General in Warsaw, and that as he was about to arrange to depart for the United States, was arrested by the Soviet authorities. Mr. Oumansky said that he doubted that the Roszkowski held in the Soviet prison was the Roszkowski which Mr. Welles was describing. Mr. Welles replied that it was impossible for the American authorities to reach any conclusion in regard to the identity of Mr. Roszkowski since the Soviet Government thus far had refused to permit members of the American Embassy to visit Roszkowski in prison and had failed by questioning to ascertain his identity.

Mr. Oumansky took notes of the statements made by Mr. Welles, and said that he would refer this matter to his Government by telegraph and would endeavor to get more information with regard to it.

[Page 676]

Soviet Wives of American Citizens

Mr. Welles stated that he wished at this time to refer again to the failure of the Soviet authorities to permit the Soviet wives of a number of American citizens to come to the United States with their husbands.56 The position taken by the Soviet Government in this regard was in contrast to the attitude which, he understood, it displayed towards requests of a similar nature from another Government. He understood that the Soviet authorities were facilitating the departure from the Soviet Union of the Soviet wives of nationals of another country.

Mr. Oumansky said that he would take this matter up again with his Government.

Treatment of American Citizens in the Soviet Union

Mr. Welles referred to a statement which had been made by the Soviet Ambassador in the conference of December 16 to the effect that the Soviet Government had been leaning over backwards in its endeavors to make sure that persons in Soviet-occupied Poland who had any claim to American citizenship be permitted to proceed to the American Embassy at Moscow to verify their citizenship and to obtain American passports. Mr. Welles said that the American Government had information which did not correspond to that given him by Mr. Oumansky. He stated that according to information in his possession, of the approximately 600 persons in Soviet-occupied Poland whose claims to American citizenship had seemed to be sufficiently well founded to warrant an investigation by the Embassy, approximately only 100 persons had been permitted to depart from the Soviet Union or to go to Moscow in order to obtain American passports. Despite repeated representations made by the Embassy to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,57 the other 500 persons had not been permitted either to go to Moscow or to leave Soviet-controlled territory. Mr. Oumansky said that he was surprised to hear this and that he would make further inquiries on the subject of his Government and would discuss the matter in greater detail with Mr. Atherton and Mr. Henderson.

Notification to the Department of Employees of Amtorg 58

Mr. Welles referred to a request made by the Ambassador at the last conference that some kind of a document be furnished Soviet officials whose presence in the United States had been notified to the [Page 677] Department through the Embassy, so that these officials would be able to prove their official status to American Governmental authorities interested in the registration of aliens or in registration for the draft. Mr. Welles thereupon showed Mr. Oumansky a specimen of the form of receipt of notification which the Department planned to issue.

The Ambassador said that Mr. Chuvakhin, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, had already shown him a specimen form of the receipt and that he had found it satisfactory.

The Ambassador said that fresh difficulties had arisen, however, in that the State Department was now requesting that both Soviet and American employees of Amtorg notify the Department of their presence and of the nature of their activities through the Soviet Embassy. The American employees of Amtorg had consulted lawyers and were convinced that it was not necessary for them to register with the Department. He was willing to admit that the question of the registration, or rather notification, of Soviet employees of Amtorg was a difficult one. The Soviet Government could not agree that Soviet employees of Amtorg were Soviet governmental officials. On the other hand, they could not agree to the registration of these employees as aliens or to their registration for the draft. Amtorg possessed a peculiar status—it was an American corporation which acted as a buying and selling agency for certain Soviet Governmental organizations. The Soviet Government did not feel that it could acknowledge that Soviet officials were working for an American corporation. The question of the status of these Soviet employees of Amtorg had been discussed with the Department on previous occasions. About a year ago an agreement had been reached with the Department under which the Soviet Embassy undertook to submit to the Department monthly a list of Soviet employees of Amtorg, together with a statement regarding the address and nature of duty of each employee. This compromise had worked satisfactorily. He hoped that the arrangement could be continued and that it would not be necessary for these employees to fill out the forms which were now being demanded by the Department from foreign governmental officials in the United States.

Mr. Henderson stated that the Department had come to the opinion after careful study of the matter that it would not be necessary for notifications to be sent to the Department covering the American employees of Amtorg. It would be necessary, however, for the Soviet employees of Amtorg to fill out the notification forms and send them to the Department through the Embassy. The arrangement which had been put into effect some time ago had been entered into before the enactment of the laws requiring the registration of aliens in the [Page 678] United States59 and providing for registration for the draft.60 In view of these new laws, a new procedure was required. Under the law providing for the registration of aliens, all aliens except Government officials must register. The American Government, therefore, must require the registration and fingerprinting of Soviet employees of Amtorg unless it could consider such employees as officials of the Soviet Government. If they were to be considered as employees of the Soviet Government, they must submit notification forms required from all officials of foreign governments. At the present time, Soviet citizens departing from the Soviet Union to the United States on detail to Amtorg were receiving Governmental official visas. If the Soviet Government should insist that they were not Governmental officials, it would not be possible any longer to issue to them Governmental official visas. They would, therefore, be compelled to have their fingerprints taken in Moscow and to undergo formalities which Governmental officials escaped. Furthermore, when they arrived in the United States, they would be obliged to register with the appropriate authorities as aliens.

Mr. Oumansky asked if employees of other Governments in similar positions were being compelled to fill out the forms. Mr. Henderson replied in the affirmative. He said that according to his information all officials of the British Government, including those in the United States for commercial purposes, were also being required to fill out the forms. The Soviet Ambassador stated that in view of these assurances of non-discrimination, he was willing to surrender his point and to take steps for the purpose of requiring Soviet employees in Amtorg to fill out the notification forms. This work, however, would entail a tremendous amount of time; as a result of various American Governmental regulations, the bulk of the time of the Embassy was being taken up with routine work rather than with duties of a diplomatic nature.

Mr. Henderson said that the inconvenience to the Embassy arising from the filling out and transmission of forms was understandable. The Department regretted that this burden should be put upon it. However, in view of all the circumstances, there seemed to be no other course of action.

The Ambassador said that he would request Mr. Chuvakhin to arrange the details with Mr. Henderson or Mr. Page61 at a later date.

[Page 679]

Mr. Molotov’s Statement

The Ambassador stated that he wished at this time, on instructions from his Government, to present a memorandum from Mr. Molotov. He thereupon read a lengthy memorandum touching upon most of the points which had been discussed during recent months between the two Governments, including problems such as those relating to machine tools, to the moral embargo, to gold purchases, to discrimination in trade matters, to recognition of Soviet absorption of the Baltic States, to the presence of Baltic diplomatic missions and consulates in the United States, and to Baltic ships in American harbors. A copy of this statement is attached hereto as Enclosure No. 4.62

After the Ambassador had finished reading his statement, Mr. Welles said that he hoped to see him in a few days to discuss some of the matters raised in the memorandum, in particular, the new aspects of the machine tool problem which had been presented.

The Soviet Ambassador said that it seemed to him that Soviet economy had reached a point which necessitated a clarification of the question of equipment obtainable in the future. In view of the tremendous work ahead for Soviet economy, it was necessary that the Soviet Government should have data as to the machinery which could be delivered and the dates of delivery. He hoped that an examination of statements contained in the memorandum would place the American Government in a better position to understand the Soviet point of view. He did not see any reason why the lifting of the moral embargo should be held in abeyance pending the outcome of discussions on other subjects. He felt that the time had come when Mr. Welles and he should sit down, work out, and sign those documents with respect to which agreements had already been reached—namely, documents relating to gold, to the moral embargo, to the furnishing of cargo space in American bottoms, et cetera. He wished again to emphasize the importance to Soviet economy of the two items mentioned in the earlier part of the discussions—namely, the welding machine and the gear cutters. Furthermore, without delay the machines in List C should be divided into their various categories and arrangements should be made to replace machines which had been requisitioned or diverted.

Mr. Welles stated that it would be unrealistic for him even in principle to encourage the idea that the American Government could definitely assure the Soviet Government that certain machines could be delivered to the Soviet Government on a certain date. The Soviet Government itself should know that the needs of national defense were superior to all other considerations. He was afraid that Mr. Molotov [Page 680] didn’t thoroughly understand the situation in the United States. The appropriate authorities of the American Government were giving full consideration to the possibilities of arranging for the replacement of certain items which had been requisitioned or diverted, particularly those items, the production of which had been completed prior to July 2, 1940.63 The American Government, however, could not enter into any kind of a formal agreement. In the meantime, Mr. Welles was doing all he could to see what could be worked out with the Department of Treasury and the President’s Liaison Committee.

Mr. Oumansky stated that 99 percent of the machines set forth in the list of machines attached to the memorandum which he had just read had been ordered in 1939 and most of them had been completed before July 2.

Mr. Welles said that he hoped there could be another conversation within a few days at which time these matters could again be discussed.

The Ambassador said that he hoped also to hear from Mr. Welles regarding that part of the memorandum relating to the Baltic ships in American harbors. He could add scores of facts not mentioned in the memorandum relating to the material damage done to these vessels and to the harsh treatment of the crews.

Mr. Welles said that he did not wish to be unduly pessimistic. He felt that he should point out, however, that the Ambassador and he at the beginning of the conversations had fully recognized the fact that there were certain matters with regard to which they must agree to disagree.

Mr. Oumansky replied that the conversation to which Mr. Welles referred had taken place five months ago.64 Much had happened in the meantime. He added that “we must agree on these matters if we are going to accomplish anything constructive in Soviet-American relations.” Mr. Welles replied that he felt that much constructive work had already been accomplished.

Mr. Oumansky referred once more to the question of the moral embargo. He said that he hoped that it could be found possible to arrange for the publication of the exchange of letters on this subject. Mr. Welles asked if he was to understand that Mr. Oumansky was requesting that the exchange of letters be published. Mr. Oumansky replied that, in principle, his answer was “Yes”. He did not mean to say that it would be necessary that the documents themselves be published but he felt that the contents of the documents should be made public.

[Page 681]

The Ambassador asked if it would be possible to set the date for another meeting now. Mr. Welles said that he hoped to be able to set a date for the next meeting before the end of the current week.

[Loy W. Henderson]
  1. See the two memoranda of December 16, 1940, by Mr. Henderson, ibid., pp. 419 and 420.
  2. Col. Russell L. Maxwell.
  3. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
  4. Philip Young.
  5. Not printed.
  6. Not printed.
  7. All-Union Combine for the Import of Machine Tools and Instruments.
  8. Concerning the application of controls on Rumanian assets in the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. ii, pp. 780 ff.
  9. For the institution of the moral embargo, see telegram No. 265, December 4, 1939, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and footnote 2g, Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, p. 801; also telegram No. 313, December 24, 1939, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, ibid., p. 806.
  10. Not printed; the definitive text of the letter ending the moral embargo, dated January 21, 1941, is printed on p. 696.
  11. Concluded between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia at Washington on July 7, 1911; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 260, or 37 Stat. 1542. For correspondence regarding the abrogation of this treaty by Japan, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, pp. 907 ff.
  12. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
  13. Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy.
  14. For correspondence with regard to the arrest and detention of Mieczyslaw Roszkowski and of other American citizens in the Soviet Union, see pp. 926 ff.
  15. Post, p. 927.
  16. See footnote 54, p. 867.
  17. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov.
  18. Amtorg Trading Corporation, official purchasing and sales agency of the Soviet Union in the United States, 210 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.
  19. Alien Registration Act (Smith Act), approved June 28, 1940; 54 Stat. 670.
  20. Selective Training and Service Act, approved September 16, 1940; 54 Stat. 885.
  21. Edward Page, Jr., of the Division of European Affairs.
  22. Infra.
  23. Under the provisions of the Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense (Export Control Act), approved July 2, 1940; 54 Stat. 712.
  24. See memorandum of July 27, 1940, by the Under Secretary of State, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iii, p. 327.