740.0011 European War 1939/13238: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:10 p.m.]
292. Department’s telegram 139, July 12.12 I asked Minister of Foreign Affairs today to give me Finnish Government’s views of significance of reference to the liberation of Eastern Karelia made [Page 49] by Field Marshal Mannerheim in his order of the day reported in my 279, July 11.13 Witting said he would speak to me more freely than he could to other diplomatic representatives knowing that we understood delicacy of Finland’s position. After recounting background of Eastern Karelian question Witting said that neither he nor President of Republic had been advised in advance of Field Marshal’s proposed statement. In 1918 Field Marshal had similarly spoken of liberation of Eastern Karelia without knowledge of political authority. While as I gathered it was delicate matter openly to disavow Field Marshal, and Witting said order of day had been primarily designed as exhortation to the army, it was evident from Witting’s remarks that for present there is no intention of annexing an area which as Witting said is undefined and still mere geographical expression. He mentioned hope of recovering Viborg and spoke along same lines as President Ryti did on July 4th as reported in my No. 266 regarding possible Finnish concessions west of old frontier on Karelian Isthmus to enhance security of Leningrad. When I mentioned rumors regarding proposed annexation of Kola Peninsula and shortening of frontier from White Sea to Lake Onega, Witting intimated that Finland could not supply settlers for such large expansion of Finnish territory. He admitted that Finnish population of Repola and adjacent districts as well as in other Eastern Karelian areas had been greatly reduced by Soviet policy of dispersion but I gained impression that frontier rectifications in that neighborhood area [were?] included in Finnish territorial war aims.
Minister of Foreign Affairs gave me substance of circular instruction to Finnish diplomatic representatives as to what they were to say in reply to queries regarding significance of Field Marshal’s second order of the day above mentioned. These instructions were substantially to the effect above reported and have presumably been basis for statements made by Finnish Minister at Washington to you.
In response to my direct query whether it remained true as stated to me by President Ryti on July 4th that there were no political agreements between Finland and Germany, the Minister answered in affirmative but also intimated possibility that this might not remain true though he assured me Germans had not brought up any such matters and cooperation still remained purely military. Thus far, he said, Finland and Germany were merely co-belligerents against a common enemy.
[Page 50]Witting referred to new situation created by British-Soviet Alliance14 but gave me impression that Finnish Government is seeking to avoid having to draw any conclusions from this new state of affairs, asserting that Germans have not thus far exerted any pressure to this end.
He also referred to detention by Britain of Finnish ships in British harbors and failure of Finnish Government to elicit any decision from British Government regarding possibility of granting permission for shipment of some 300,000,000 marks worth of imports to Swedish port of Goteborg upon condition that Finnish ships used for this transport be returned to British control immediately after unloading at Goteborg. He mentioned difficulty of clearing Finnish ships in United States and said efforts were being made to dispose of Finnish-owned imports so detained in United States and other markets, placing Finnish ships in American trade. He mentioned these matters in connection with statement that blockade was now “absolute.”
Concluding conversation Witting reiterated hope that United States would use its influence for early peace confessing himself unable to understand our Government’s policy in this respect. I have frequently explained that policy to him and today referred him again to President Roosevelt’s speech of May 27 last.15 Like President Ryti however Witting is concentrated on Soviet danger to Finland and he is much less capable than President of appreciating broader issues of western war from Anglo-American standpoint. On other hand Witting like Ryti today again expressed appreciation of understanding of Finland’s position in United States and informed me that Procopé telegraphing analysis of feeling in United States had described it as involving deep conviction of necessity of British victory overriding only slightly less strong anti-Communist sentiment.
Witting again emphasized that any other course than that followed recently which has led to hostilities with U. S. S. R. would have been impossible for Finland which had to rely upon German strength as only available source of support in desperate situation. He said that in discussing it with President Ryti recently, latter had likened situation to that of man on narrow ledge with bottomless abyss on each side.
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed. In his despatch No. 2099, July 11, Minister Schoenfeld wrote that this order of the day “clearly sets forth territorial aspirations on behalf of Finland extending to that portion of Karelia held by the Soviet Union prior to the outbreak of the Finnish war of 1939–40.” This exceeded the war aims announced by President Ryti in his radio address of June 26, 1941. (740.0011 European War 1939/14173)↩
- Agreement and Protocol for Joint Action in the War against Germany, signed at Moscow on July 12, 1941; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 277, or Department of State Bulletin, September 27, 1941, p. 240.↩
- Radio address from the White House; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1941, p. 647.↩